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From  a  photograph  taken  in  1866. 


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THE 

Campaign  of  Koniggratz, 


A    STUDY    OF   THE    AUSTRO  -  PRUSSIAN 

CONFLICT  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  THE 

AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR. 


By 

LIEUT.-COL.  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

Assistant  Adjt.-Gen.  U.  S.  ArkTV', 

Late  Instructor  in  the  Art  of  War,  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School.  Ft.  Leavenworth, 

Kan.;  Gold  Medalist  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United  States; 

Member  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts;  Author 

of  "The  Service  of  Security  and  Information," 

"Organization  and  Tactics,"  etc. 


SECOND  EDITION. 


HuDSON-KlMBERLY    PUBLISHING    Co. 

1014-1016  Wyandottb  St. 

Kansas  City,   Mo. 

1899. 


Copyright  1889, 
ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER. 

Copyright  1899, 
By  HUDSON-KIMBERLY  PUBLISHING  CO. 


TO 

JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES, 

AMERICA'S  GREATEST  MILITARY  HISTORIAN, 

THIS  BOOK  IS  DEDICATED. 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 
Preface 7 

Chapter  I.     The  Military  Strength  of  the  Opposing  Nations.     .    .      11 
Chapter  II.     The  Geographical  Situation,  the  Plans  of  the  Oppos- 
ing Commanders,  and  the  Dispositions  of  Their 
Armies 21 

Chapter  III.     Operations  against  the  Hessians  and  Hanoverians, 

and  the  Invasion  of  Saxony 26 

Chapter  IV.     The  Invasion  of  Bohemia 36 

Chapter  V.     The  Battle  of  Koniggratz 69 

Chapter  VI.     Comments  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle 89 

Chapter  VII.     The    Prussian    Advance    from   Koniggratz   to   the 

Danube 121 

Chapter  VIII.     The  Campaign  in  Western  Germany  and  in  Italy  .  130 

Appendix 148 


LIST  OF  MAPS  IN  ATLAS. 


1.  Map  of  Germany  Previous  to  the  War  of  1866. 

2.  Position  of  the  First  Army  on  the  22d,  23d,  and  24th  of  June. 

3.  Proposed  Advance  of  the  Second  Army  from  25th  to  28th  of  June. 

4.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  25th  of  June. 

5.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  26th  of  June, 

6.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  27th  of  June. 

7.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  28th  of  June. 

8.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  29th  of  June. 

9.  Position  of  Both  Armies  on  the  Evening  of  the  2d  of  July. 

10.  Battlefield  of  Koniggriitz. 

11.  Koniggriitz  to  the  Danube. 

12.  Valley  of  the  Main. 


PREFACE. 

The  greater  part  of  the  subject-matter  of  this  volume  was 
originally  given  as  a  lecture  to  the  officers  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry 
and  Cavalry  School.  The  kindly  reception  accorded  to  the 
lecture  encouraged  the  author  to  revise  and  amplify  it,  and  to 
publish  it  in  a  small  volume,  which  made  its  appearance  ten 
years  ago.  Though  the  first  edition  was  exhausted  soon  after 
it  issued  from  the  press,  a  gratifying  demand  for  the  book  has 
continued  and  has  prompted  the  author  to  revise  the  work  and 
to  present  it  again  to  the  public. 

As  to  the  narrative  portion  of  the  book,  no  other  claim  is 
made  than  that  it  is  based  upon  the  story  of  the  campaign  as 
given  in  the  Prussian  Official  History  of  the  Campaign  of  1866, 
Hozier's  "Seven  Weeks'  War,"  Derrecagaix's  "La  Guerre 
Moderne,"  and  Adams'  "Great  Campaigns  in  Europe."  It  has 
not  been  deemed  necessary  to  cumber  the  pages  with  notes  of 
reference,  but  the  author  desires  here  to  express  his  indebted- 
ness to  these  works,  giving  precedence  to  them  in  the  order 
stated.  Other  books  consulted  are  mentioned  in  foot-notes. 
The  author  has  personally  visited  the  scene  of  the  opera- 
tions described,  and,  especially  in  regard  to  the  topography 
of  the  battle-field  of  Koniggratz,  he  is  able  to  speak  from 
his  own  observation. 

The  object  of  this  volume  is  two- fold:  1.  To  present 
a  brief,  but  accurate,  historical  sketch  of  a  great  campaign, 


8  Preface. 

to  which  but  little  attention  has  been  given  in  this  country. 
2.  To  make  a  comparison  of  some  of  the  militarj-  develop- 
ments of  the  War  of  Secession  with  corresponding  features  of 
the  European  conflict  which  occurred  one  year  later. 

European  critics  have  generally  been  loath  to  acknowl- 
edge the  military  efficiency  displayed  in  the  last  two  years  of 
the  Great  Civil  War;  and,  even  when  giving  full  credit  for  the 
valor  exhibited  by  our  soldiers,  have  too  often  regarded  our 
veteran  armies  as  mere  "armed  mobs."  Chesney,  Adams, 
Trench,  and  Maude  have  recognized  the  value  of  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  great  American  contest;  but  European  military 
writers  generally,  and  those  of  the  Continent  especially,  still 
fail  to  recognize  in  the  developments  of  our  war  the  germ,  if 
not  the  prototype,  of  military  features  which  are  regarded  as 
new  in  Europe.  The  remarks  of  Colonel  Chesney  still  hold 
true:  "There  is  a  disposition  to  regard  the  American  gener- 
als, and  the  troops  they  led,  as  altogether  inferior  to  regular 
soldiers.  This  prejudice  was  born  out  of  the  blunders  and 
want  of  coherence  exhibited  by  undisciplined  volunteers  at 
the  outset — faults  amply  atoned  for  by  the  stubborn  cour- 
age displayed  by  both  sides  throughout  the  rest  of  the  strug- 
gle; while,  if  a  man's  claims  to  be  regarded  as  a  veteran  are  to 
be  measured  by  the  amount  of  actual  fighting  he  has  gone 
through,  the  most  seasoned  soldiers  of  Europe  are  but  as  con- 
scripts compared  with  the  survivors  of  that  conflict.  The 
conditions  of  war  on  a  grand  scale  were  illustrated  to  the  full 
as  much  in  the  contest  in  America,  as  in  those  more  recently 
waged  on  the  Continent." 

There  is  no  claim  set  forth  by  the  author  for  military 
efficiency  on  the  part  of  our  soldiers  in  the  early"days  of  the 
Civil  War.     Our  inexperienced  troops  were  as  inefficient  then 


Preface.  9 

as  raw  levies  always  are;  as  unreliable  as  the  French  impro- 
vised armies  in  1871,  and  as  uncertain  in  their  action  as  the 
small  force  of  newly  raised  volunteers  that  accompanied  our 
regular  troops  in  the  Santiago  campaign.  The  claim  is  made, 
however,  that  when  our  volunteers  in  the  Great  War  had 
thoroughly  learned  their  trade,  and  had  become  regulars  in 
everything  but  name,  they  displayed  a  degree  of  courage  and 
war-like  skill  unequalled  in  the  contemporary  armies  of  the 
Old  World;  and  the  Austro-Prussian  conflict  occurred  so  soon 
after  the  War  of  Secession  as  to  enable  a  comparison  between 
the  European  and  American  military  conditions  to  be  made 
with  fairness. 


THH  CAMPAIGN  OF  KONIGGRATZ. 


Chapter  I. 

THE  MIIvITARY  vSTRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  NATIONS. 

The  German  conflict  of  1866,  generally  known  as  "The 
Seven  Weeks'  War,"  presents  many  features  of  interest  to  the 
student,  the  statesman,  and  the  soldier.  It  closed  a  strife  of 
centuries  between  opposing  nations  and  antagonistic  political 
ideas.  It  resulted  in  the  formation  of  the  North  German  Con- 
federation, and  thus  planted  the  seeds  of  a  nation  which  germ- 
inated four  years  later,  during  the  bloody  war  with  France.  It 
banished  Austria  from  all  participation  in  the  affairs  of  Ger- 
many, expelled  her  from  Italy,  and  deflected  her  policy  thence- 
forth towards  the  east  and  south.  It  demonstrated  that  mili- 
tary preparation  is  a  more  potent  factor  than  mere  numbers 
in  computing  the  strength  of  a  nation;  and  it  gave  an  illustra- 
tion on  a  grand  scale  of  the  new  conditions  of  war  resulting 
from  the  use  of  the  telegraph,  the  railroad,  and  breech-loading 
firearms. 

It  is  not  the  intention  here  to  consider  any  but  the  mili- 
tary features  of  the  great  Germanic  contest.  Beginning  the 
subject  at  the  period  when  the  quarrel  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  over  the  provinces  that  they  had  wrested  from  Den- 
mark passed  from  the  tortuous  paths  of  diplomacy  to    the 


12  The  Campaign  of  Kbniggrdtz. 

direct  road  of  war,  we  will  consider  the  relative  strength  of  the 
combatant  nations. 

As  the  advocate  of  the  admission  of  Schleswig  Holstein 
as  a  sovereign  State  in  the  Germanic  Confederation,  Austria 
gained  first  the  sympathy,  and  then  the  active  alliance,  of 
Bavaria,  Hanover,  Saxony,  Hesse-Cassel,  Wiirtemberg,  Baden, 
Hesse-Darmstadt,  and  Nassau.  Prussia  aimed  at  the  incorpo- 
ration of  the  duchies  with  her  own  territory;  and,  though 
loudly  championing  the  cause  of  German  unity,  her  course 
was  so  manifestly  inspired  by  designs  for  her  own  aggrandize- 
ment that  she  could  count  on  the  support  of  only  a  few  petty 
duchies,  whose  aggregate  military  strength  did  not  exceed 
28,000  men.  As  an  ofi"set  to  Austria's  formidable  German 
allies,  Prussia  had  concluded  an  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance with  Italy,  whose  army,  though  new  and  inferior  in 
organization,  armament,  and  equipment  to  that  of  her  antag- 
onist, might  be  relied  upon  to  "contain"*  at  least  three  Aus- 
trian army  corps  in  Venetia.  The  main  struggle  was  certain 
to  be  between  the  two  great  Germanic  nations. 

At  a  first  glance  Prussia  would  seem  to  be  almost  hope- 
lessly overmatched  in  her  contest  with  Austria.  The  latter 
nation  possessed  an  area  more  than  twice  as  great  as  the  for- 
mer, and  in  contrast  with  the  Prussian  population  of  less  than 
20,000,000,  it  could  show  an  aggregate  of  35,000,000  people. 
But  a  more  careful  examination  discloses  the  great  superiority 
of  the  Prussian  kingdom.  The  population  of  Prussia  was 
almost  exclusively  German;  that  of  Austria  was  a  heteroge- 
neous aggregation  of  Germans,  Czechs,  Magyars,  Poles,  Croats^ 
and  Italians,  bound  together  in  a  purely  artificial  nationality. 

••'To  "contain"  means  to  hold  in  check  a  hostile  force  superior  in  numbers  or 
morale  •while  more  important  op9rations  are  conducted  in  another  part  of  the 
theater. 


The  MUilary  Strength  of  the  Opposing  Nations.  13 

The  Austrian  national  debtamonnted  to  nearly  $1,550,000,000; 
the  annual  expenditures  so  far  exceeded  the  revenue  as  to 
cause  a  yearly  deficit  of  more  than  $16,000,000,  and  the  nation 
was  threatened  with  bankruptcy.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Prussian  national  debt  was  only  $210,000,000,  the  revenue 
exceeded  the  expenditures,  and  the  finances  were  in  a  healthy 
condition.  But  the  great  superioiity  of  the  northern  kingdom 
over  its  opponent  lay  in  the  organization,  armament,  equip- 
ment, and  perso7inel  of  its  army. 

The  old  adage,  "Experience  is  a  severe,  but  good,  school- 
master," is  true  of  nations  as  well  as  individuals.  A  crushing 
disaster,  bringing  with  it  humiliatiation,  sorrow,  and  disgrace, 
is  often  the  birth  of  a  stronger,  better  life  in  the  apparent  vic- 
tim of  misfortune.  The  greatness  of  Prussia  was  not  born  in 
the  brilliant  victories  of  Rossbach,  Leuthen,  and  Zorndorf.  It 
was  in  the  bitter  travail  of  Jena  and  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  that 
birth  was  given  to  the  power  of  the  kingdom.  Forbidden  by 
Napoleon  to  maintain  an  army  of  more  than  42,000  men,  the 
great  Prussian  war  minister,  Scharnhorst,  determined  to  create 
an  army  while  obeying  the  commands  of  the  conqueror.  There 
was  no  stipulation  in  the  treaty  as  to  the  length  of  service  of 
the  soldiers;  and  after  a  few  months  of  careful  instruction  and 
almost  incessant  drill,  they  were  quietly  discharged,  and  their 
places  were  taken  by  recruits,  who  were  soon  replaced  in  the 
same  manner.  Thus  the  little  army  became,  as  it  were,  a  lake 
of  military  training,  into  which  flowed  a  continuous  stream  of 
recruits,  and  from  which  there  came  a  steady  current  of  effi- 
cient soldiers.  When  the  army  of  Napoleon  returned  from  its 
disastrous  campaign  in  Russia,  there  arose,  as  by  magic,  a 
formidable  Prussian  army,  of  which  nearly  100,000  men  were 
trained  warriors. 


14  Tlic  Campaign  of  Kiniii/f/riifz. 

The  success  of  the  Prussian  arms  iu  the  final  struggle 
with  Napoleon  was  so  manifestly  due  to  the  measures  adopted 
by  Scharnhorst,  that  his  system  was  made  the  permanent  basis 
of  the  national  military  policy.  The  "Reorganization  of  1859" 
nearly  doubled  the  standing  army,  and  made  some  important 
changes  in  the  length  of  service  required  with  the  colors  and 
in  the  Landwehr;  but  the  essential  features  of  the  Prussian 
system  are  the  same  now  as  in  the  days  of  Leipsic  and 
Waterloo. 

Ever)'  Prussian  twenty  years  of  age  is  subject  to  military 
duty.  The  term  of  military  service  is  divided  into  periods  of 
two  years  with  the  colors,*  four  with  the  reserve,  and  five  in 
the  first  levy  of  the  Landwehr.  The  soldier  then  passes  into 
the  second  levy  of  the  lyandwehr,  in  which  he  remains  until 
the  completion  of  his  thirty-ninth  year  of  age,  w^hen  he  passes 
into  the  lyandsturm,  in  which  he  remains  six  years.  But, 
though  every  Prussian  is  liable  to  military  duty,  all  are  not 
passed  through  the  full  and  complete  term  of  military  service 
and  instruction.  The  number  of  soldiers  in  the  active  army 
is  definitely  fixed  at  a  little  more  than  1  per  cent,  of  the  pop- 
ulation, and  the  number  of  recruits  annually  required  is  regu- 
lated by  the  number  of  men  necessary  to  keep  the  regular 
force  on  its  authorized  peace  footing.  A  list  of  the  young 
men  available  for  military  service  is  annually  made  out,  and 
the  selection  of  recruits  is  made  by  lot.  There  are  but  few 
exceptions;  such,  for  instance,  as  young  men  who  are  the  sole 
support  of  indigent  parents.  Students  who  are  preparing  for 
the  learned  professions  are  permitted  to  serve  as  "one-year 
volunteers,"  on  condition  of  passing  certain  examinations  sat- 

*The  term  of  service  with  the  colors  is  two  years  for  the  infantry,  and  three 
years  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery.  From  1859  un.il  a  recent  time  the  term  of  service 
was  three  years  for  all  arms. 


Tlie  Military  Sircnglh  of  fJic  Opposing  Katiofis.  15 

isfactorily,  and  furnishing  their  own  clothing  and  equipments. 
Voluntary  enlistment  in  the  army  is  permitted  at  the  age  of 
seventeen,  the  volunteers  having  the  privilege  of  selecting  their 
own  regiment  and  garrison.  Some  of  the  e/i/e  regiments  are 
recruited  chiefly  from  such  volunteers.  The  name  of  a  man 
convicted  of  crime  is  never  placed  on  the  list  of  available 
recruits;  and  however  humble  the  position  of  a  private  soldier 
maybe,  his  uniform  is  the  honorable  badge  of  an  honest  man. 
Every  young  man  may  be  called  up  for  draft  three  years  in 
succession.  Those  who  are  not  drawn  for  service  at  the  end 
of  the  third  year  are  passed  into  the  Ersatz  reserve,  in  which 
are  also  men  whose  physical  imperfections  are  not  sufficient 
to  exempt  them  entirely,  where  they  are  free  from  service  in 
time  of  peace,  but  from  which  they  may  be  called  in  time  of 
war  to  replace  drafts  from  the  reserve.  In  time  of  peace  the 
military  demands  upon  the  soldiers  of  the  reserve  or  Landwehr 
are  very  light.  A.  soldier  participates  in  at  least  two  field 
maneuvers,  aggregating  about  sixteen  weeks,  during  his  four 
years  of  service  in  the  reserve.  He  is  also  required  to  attend 
muster  once  every  spring  and  autumn.  During  his  five  years 
in  the  first  levy  of  the  L^andwehr  the  soldier  is  called  out  for 
duty  only  twice,  each  time  for  a  field  exercise  of  two  weeks' 
duration.  The  men  of  the  Ersatz  reserve  have  three  periods 
of  field  training,  aggregating  twenty  weeks.  Neither  the 
second  levy  of  the  Landwehr  nor  the  Landsturm  is  called  out 
in  time  of  peace. 

The  active  or  regular  army  consists  of  the  troops  with  the 
colors  under  regular  officers.  When  the  decree  for  the  mobil- 
ization of  the  army  is  promulgated,  this  force  is  at  once  put 
upon  its  war  footing  by  drafts  from  the  reserve.  The  depots 
are  immediately  formed,  and  one-half  of  the  troops  stationed 


16  Tlie  Camjiaign  of  K'unifjqriUz. 

therein  are  drawn  from  the  reserve;  the  other  half  being  re- 
cruits from  the  Ersatz  reserve.  As  these  two  classes  become 
exhausted,  the  depot  battalions  are  filled  from  the  Landwehr, 
the  youngest  classes  being  taken  first ;  or,  if  needs  be,  the  entire 
I^andwehr  is  called  out  in  battalions,  regiments,  brigades,  divi- 
sions, or  even  army  corps,  and  sent  into  the  field.  After  exhaust- 
ing the  Landwehr,  there  still  remains  the  Landsturm,  which 
embraces  all  able-bodied  men  between  the  ages  of  seventeen 
and  forty-nine  years  who  do  not  belong  to  the  active  army,  the 
reserve,  or  the  lyandwehr.  Though  the  calling  out  of  the  I^and- 
sturm  would  imply  the  exhaustion  of  the  organized  forces  of  the 
nation,  it  would  be  more  than  a  mere  levy  ^«  masse,  as  it  would 
bring  back  into  the  army  many  soldiers  whose  years  of  mili- 
tary training  would  not  have  been  completely  forgotten  in  the 
midst  of  civil  vocations. 

The  machinery  for  the  rapid  mobilization  of  the  army  is 
kept  in  perfect  order.  Each  array  corps,  except  the  Guards, 
is  assigned  to  a  particular  province.  The  province  is  divided 
into  divisional  districts,  which  are  again  subdivided  so  that 
each  brigade,  regiment,  and  battalion  has  its  own  district,  from 
which  it  draws  its  recruits  both  in  peace  and  war.  A  register 
is  kept  of  every  man  available  for  military  duty,  and  in  time 
of  peace  every  officer  knows  just  what  part  he  is  to  perform 
the  minute  mobilization  is  decreed,  and  each  soldier  knows 
where  he  is  to  report  for  duty.  The  secret  of  the  efficiency 
of  the  German  military  system  lies  in  the  division  of  responsi- 
bility and  the  thorough  decentralization,  by  which  every  man, 
from  the  monarch  to  the  private  soldier,  has  his  own  especial 
part  to  perform. 

In  1866  the  active  army,  on  a  war  footing,  consisted  of 
nine  army  corps  and  four  cavalry  divisions.     Each  army  corps 


The  Military  Strenglh  of  llir  Opposinrj  Nations.  17 

comprised  two  divisons,  a  battalion  of  jagers,'^'  and  a  battalion 
of  engineers.  Each  division  consisted  of  two  brigades  of 
infantry,  one  regiment  of  cavalry,  four  batteries  of  light  artil- 
lery, one  field  hospital,  and  one  section  of  "krankentragers," 
or  sick-bearers.  Each  brigade  of  infantry  contained  two  regi- 
ments, each  composed  of  three  battalions,  each  battalion  con- 
sisting of  four  companies  of  a  strength  of  250  men  each.  Each 
battery  contained  six  guns.  Each  cavalry  regiment  consisted 
of  four  squadrons,  each  numbering  140  sabers.  Two  regiments 
formed  a  brigade,  and  three  brigades  a  "cavalry  division." 
Two  such  divisions  constituted  a  cavalry  corps.  Two  batter- 
ies of  horse  artillery  were  attached  to  each  cavalry  division. 
In  the  campaign  under  consideration,  the  artillery  not  assigned 
to  the  divisions  was,  in  the  First  Army,  organized  as  an  artil- 
lery reserve;  in  the  vSecond  Army  it  was  used  as  corps  artil- 
lery. The  artillery  reserve  of  the  First  Army  consisted  of 
sixteen  batteries.  In  the  Second  Army  the  corps  artillery 
consisted  of  from  five  to  seven  batteries  to  each  corps.  The 
corps  artillery  was  independent  of  the  divisions  and  was  under 
the  command  of  the  corps  commander.  Each  corps  numbered 
about  31,000  combatants,  except  the  Guards,  which  numbered 
36,000.  The  active  army  at  a  war  strength  aggregated  335,000 
men. 

The  depot  troops  consisted  of  a  battalion  for  each  regi- 
ment of  infantr.y,  a  squadron  for  each  regiment  of  cavalry,  an 
abtheilic7ig  (3  or  4  batteries)  for  the  artillery  of  each  corps, 
and  a  company  for  each  rifle  battalion,  engineer  battalion,  and 
train  battalion.  The  army  in  the  field  was  constantly  kept  up 
to  a  full  war  strength  by  men  drawn  from  the  depots.  The 
fortresses  %vere  garrisoned  by  Landwehr;  and  on  troops  of  the 

*The  jJigers,  as  the  name  implies,  were  sharpshooters,  recruited  mainly  from 
foresters  and  huntsmen. 


18  T//C  Cdinpaiijn  of  KunujiiriUz. 

same  class  devolved  the  duty  of  pushing  forward  to  occupy 
invaded  territory,  and  to  relieve  the  active  armj^  from  the 
necessity  of  leaving  detachments  to  guard  its  communications. 

This  is  a  brief  outline  of  the  organization  that  enabled  a 
nation  of  less  than  20,000,000  people  eventually  to  bring 
600,000  soldiers  upon  the  theater  of  war,  and  to  place  a  quar- 
ter of  a  million  of  them  upon  the  decisive  field  of  Koniggriitz. 

The  Austrian  regular  army,  when  placed  upon  its  war 
footing,  numbered  about  384,000  men;  and  by  calling  out  all 
of  the  reserve,  this  force  could  be  raised  to  a  formidable  total 
of  700,000.  But  in  organization  and  system  of  recruitment  the 
Austrian  army  was  inferior  to  its  antagonist,  notwithstanding 
its  war  experience  in  1849  and  in  the  struggle  with  France 
and  Sardinia  ten  years  later.  The  superb  system  by  which 
Prussia  was  enabled  to  send  forth  a  steady  stream  of  trained 
soldiers  to  replace  the  losses  of  battle  was  wanting  in  Austria; 
and  the  machinery  of  military  administration  seemed  deranged 
by  the  effort  required  to  place  the  first  gigantic  armies  in  the 
field.  The  difference  between  the  two  military  systems  is 
shown  in  a  striking  manner  by  the  fact  that  the  mobilization 
of  the  Prussian  army  of  490,000  men,  decreed  early  in  May, 
was  completed  in  fourteen  days,  and  by  the  5th  of  June 
325,000  were  massed  on  the  hostile  frontiers;  while  the  mobil- 
ization of  the  Austrian  army,  begun  ten  weeks  earlier  than  that 
of  Prussia,  was  far  from  complete  on  that  date. 

The  organization  of  the  Austrian  army  differed  consider- 
ably from  that  of  its  antagonist.  The  divisional  organization 
did  not  exist,  but  each  army  coips  consisted  of  four  brigades 
(each  composed  of  three  regiments  of  infantry,  one  squadron, 
and  one  field  battery),  and  one  sanitary  company,  one  field  hos- 
pital, one  company  of  pioneers,  four  field  batteries,  two  batter- 


The  Militarij  SlreiifjIJi  of  lite  Opposing  Nalions.  19 

ies  of  horse  artillery,  and  one  rocket  battery.  Each  regiment 
of  infantry  was  composed  of  four  battalions,  each  consisting 
of  six  companies.  The  infantry  companies  at  full  strength 
averaged  160  men.  The  army  comprised  ten  army  corps  and 
five  cavalry  divisions,  each  of  the  latter  consisting  of  three 
brigades,  each  composed  of  two  (in  some  cases  three)  regi- 
ments, a  ad  one  battery  of  horse  artillery.  There  was  an 
army  artillery  reserve,  consisting  of  sixteen  batteries.  The 
regimental  organization  of  the  Austrian  cavalry  was  similar  to 
that  in  the  Prussian  army. 

The  superiority  of  the  Prussian  to  the  Austrian  army,  as 
a  collective  body,  was  not  greater  than  the  individual  superi- 
ority of  the  Prussian  soldier  to  his  antagonist.  As  a  result  of 
the  admirable  Prussian  school  system,  every  Prussian  soldier 
was  in  some  degree  an  educated  man.  Baron  Stofifel,  the 
French  military  attache  at  Berlin  from  1866  to  1870,  says: 
"  'When,'  said  the  Prussian  officers,  'our  men  came  in  contact 
with  the  Austrian  prisoners,  and  on  speaking  to  them  found 
that  they  hardly  knew  their  right  hand  from  their  left,  there 
was  not  one  who  did  not  look  upon  himself  as  a  god  in  com- 
parison witl]  such  ignorant  beings,  and  this  conviction  increased 
our  strength  tenfold.'"''- 

The  Prussian  army  was  the  first  that  ever  took  the  field 
armed  entirely  with  breech-loading  firearms.  In  the  War  of 
Secession  a  portion  of  the  Federal  troops  were,  towards  the 
end  of  the  struggle,  armed  with  breech-loading  rifles;  but  now 
the  entire  Prussian  army  marched  forth  with  breech-loaders, 
to  battle  against  an  army  which  still  retained  the  muzzle-load- 
ing rifle.  Great  as  was  the  superiority  of  the  needle-gun  over 
the  Austrian  musket,  it  would  seem  but  a  sorry  weapon  at  the 


*"MilitaiT  Reports,"  translated  by  Captain  Home,  R.E. 


20  The  Campnign  of  Kiinifii/riifz. 

present  day.  The  breech  mechanism  was  clumsy,  the  cart- 
ridge-case was  made  of  paper,  the  accuracy  of  the  rifle  did  not 
extend  beyond  300  yards,  and  its  extreme  range  was  scarcely 
more  than  twice  that  distance.  Yet  this  rifle,  though  inferior 
to  the  Spencer  carbine  and  other  breech-loading  weapons  that 
had  been  used  in  America,  was  the  best  infantry  weapon  in 
Europe,  and  it  contributed  greatly  to  the  success  of  the  Prus- 
sians. The  Prussian  artillery  was  armed  mainly  with  steel 
breech-loading  rifled  guns,  which  were  classed  as  0-pounders 
and  4-pounders,  though  the  larger  piece  fired  a  shell  weighing 
15  lbs.,  and  the  smaller  one  used  a  similar  projectile  weighing 
9  lbs.*  Shell  fire  was  exclusively  used,  and  the  shells  were 
uniformly  provided  with  percussion  fuses. 

In  the  Austrian  army  the  artillery  was  provided  with 
bronze  muzzle-loading  rifled  guns,  classed  as  8-pdrs.  and  4pdrs. 
The  infantry  was  armed  with  the  muzzle-loading  Lorenz  rifle. 

The  German  allies  of  Austria  could  place  about  150,000 
men  in  the  field;  on  the  other  hand,  Italy  could  put  about 
200,000  men  in  the  scale  against  her. 


••'These  guns  were  classed,  ;not  according  to  the  weight  of  the  projectile,  but 
according  to  the  diameter  of  the  bore.  Thus  the  gun  firing  a  15-lb.  shell  was  rated 
as  a  6-pdr.,  because  the  diameter  of  its  bore  was  the  same  as  that  of  a  6-pdr.  smooth 
bore  gun. 


The  iSil iKil ion,  rians,  and  iJispasll inns.  21 


Chapter  II. 


THE   GEOGRAPHICAL   SITUATION,  THE  PLANS   OF    THE 

OPPOSING   COMMANDERS,  AND  THE  DISPOSITIONS 

OF  THEIR  ARMIES. 

The  geographical  situation  was  unfavorable  to  Prussia. 
The  map  of  Germany,  as  it  existed  before  the  Austro-Prussian 
War,  shows  Rhineland  and  Westphalia  completely  separated 
from  the  other  provinces  of  Prussia  by  the  hostile  territory  of 
Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel,  which,  extending  from  the  north, 
joined  the  South  German  States  which  were  in  arms  against 
the  northern  kingdom.*  The  Austrian  province  of  Bohemia, 
with  the  adjacent  kingdom  of  Saxony,  formed  a  salient,  push- 
ing forward,  as  it  were,  into  the  Prussian  dominions,  and  fur- 
nishing a  base  from  which  either  Silesia  or  I^usatia  might  be 
invaded.  In  the  language  of  the  Prussian  Staff  History  of  the 
Campaign  of  1866:  "In  one  direction  stood  the  Saxon  army 
as  a  powerful  advance  guard  only  six  or  seven  marches  dis- 
tant from  the  Prussian  capital,  which  is  protected  from  the 
south  by  no  considerable  vantage-ground;  in  the  other  Breslau 
could  the  more  easily  be  reached  in  five  marches,  because, 
trusting  to  a  former  federal  compact  with  Austria,  Schweid- 
nitz  had  been  given  up  as  a  fortress."  The  forces  of  Hanover 
and  Hesse-Cassel,  numbering  25,000  men,  could  operate  against 
the  communications  of  the  Prussian  armies,  or  withdraw  to 
the  south  and  unite  with  the  Austrians  or  Bavarians.  The 
South  German  armies  might  form  a  junction  in  Saxony  or 
Bohemia  with  the  Austro-Saxon  army. 

*See  Map  No.  1. 


22  The  CciDipdifiii  of  Koiti(j(/ratz. 

The  Prussian  army  was  commanded  by  the  King.  His 
chief  of  staff  was  Baron  Hehnuth  Karl  Bernhard  von  Moltke, 
a  great  soldier,  but  as  yet  almost  unknown  beyond  the  bound- 
aries of  his  own  country.  He  had  a  ju.stly  high  reputation  as 
an  accomplished  .staff  officer,  and  was  known  as  the  author  of 
"Letters  on  the  Conditions  in  Turkey"  and  "The  Russian 
Campaign  of  1828-9  in  Turkey";  the  former  published  in  1841 
and  the  latter  in  1845.  He  was  the  chief  strategi.st  in  the  brief 
war  of  1864  between  Denmark  and  the  allied  Prussians  and 
Austrians.  A  deep  military  student,  and  a  man  of  great  exec- 
utive abilit}^  he  had  nevertheless  never  been  in  command  of 
troops,  and  his  actual  service  in  the  field  had  been  limited  to 
his  duties  as  military  attache  with  the  Turkish  army  in  the 
unsuccessful  campaign  against  Ibrahim  Pasha  in  1832,  and  as 
chief  of  staff  in  the  Danish  campaign.  At  the  opening  of  the 
war  with  Austria  he  was  sixty-six  years  old. 

The  object  of  Moltke  was  to  protect  the  Prussian  rear 
by  defeating  the  Hanoverian  and  Hessian  troops;  to  prevent 
a  junction  of  these  troops  with  their  South  German  allies;  to 
"contain"  the  latter  with  as  small  a  force  as  possible,  and  to 
hurl  the  crushing  weight  of  the  Prussian  forces  upon  the 
Austro-Saxon  army. 

On  the  14th  of  June  the  Prussian  armies  were  stationed 
as  follows:''- 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  consisting  of  three  divisions, 
two  cavalry  brigades  and  144  guns,  in  cantonments  round 
Torgau,  under  command  of  General  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld; 

The  First  Army,  consisting  of  three  army  corps,  a  ca\  - 
airy  corps,  and  300  guns,  near  Gorlitz,  under  command  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles; 

'■'See  Map  No.  1. 


The  Silualion,  Pldiis,  avd  Dispofii/ions.  23 

The  Second  Army,  consisting  of  four  army  corps,  a 
cavalry  division  of  three  brigades,  and  336  guns,  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Neisse,  under  command  of  the  Crown  Prince. 

Besides  the  three  main  armies,  there  were  other  forces 
stationed  as  follows : 

One  division  at  Altona,  in  Holstein,  under  Manteuffel; 

One  division  at  Minden,  under  Vogel  von  Falckenstein ; 

One  division  (made  up  principally  of  the  Prussian  garri- 
sons withdrawn  from  the  Federal  fortresses  of  Mayence,  Ra- 
stadt,  and  Frankfort)  at  Wetzlar,  under  Beyer. 

The  Austrian  Army  of  the  North  was  posted  as  follows: 

1st  Corps,  at  Prague,  Teplitz,*  Theresienstadt,  and  Jo- 
sephstadt; 

lid  Corps,  near  Bomisch  Triibau; 

IVth  Corps,  near  Teschen; 

Vlth  Corps,  at  Olmiitz; 

Hid  Corps,  at  Briinn; 

Xth  Corps,  at  Briinn; 

Vlllth  Corps,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Austerlitz. 

To  these  corps  were  attached  five  divisions  of  cavalry  and 
more  than  750  guns. 

This  army  was  under  the  command  of  Feldzeugmeister 
Ludwig  von  Benedek,  an  officer  of  great  experience  and  high 
reputation.  Unlike  his  opponent,  he  had  commanded  troops 
in  a  number  of  important  campaigns.  He  had  served  in  the 
Hungarian  and  Italian  campaigns,  and  at  Novara,  in  1849,  he 
had  won  great  distinction.  As  a  corps  commander  at  Solferino, 
a  decade  later,  his  courage  and  tactical  ability  had  been  so  con- 
spicuous as  to  gain  for  him  increased  renown,  though  the  day 
had  gone  so  sorely  against  the  Austrians.     His  chief  of  staflF 

♦Teplitz  is  46  miles  north-west  of  Prague. 


24  The  Catnonign  of  K'uniijijriHz. 

in  the  campaign  now  opening  was  Lieutenant-Field  Marshal 
von  Heuikstein. 

The  Saxon  army,  25,000  strong,  with  fifty-eight  guns,  was 
at  Dresden,  under  command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

The  Bavarian  army  was  concentrating  on  the  line  of  the 
Main  between  Amberg  and  Wiirzburg.  It  numbered  52,000 
men,  and  was  under  command  of  Prince  Charles  of  Bavaria. 

The  Vlllth  Federal  Corps  was  forming  at  Frankfort.     It 
consisted  of  the  contingents  of  Wiirtemberg,  Baden,  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  and  Nassau,  and  an  Austrian  division  drawn  from 
the  Federal  fortresses.     It  numbered  about  42,000  men,  and  " 
was  under  the  command  of  Prince  Alexander  of  Hesse. 

The  Vth,  Vllth,  and  IXth  Austrian  corps,  under  the  Arch- 
duke Albrecht,  were  in  Venetia,  opposed  to  an  Italian  army 
of  four  corps. 

Benedek  expected  to  assume  the  offensive  and  invade 
Prussia.  He  had  announced  this  intention  before  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities,  even  going  so  far  as  to  prescribe  rules  for 
the  behavior  of  his  soldiers  while  in  the  enemy's  country.  It 
is  hard  to  understand,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  the 
slight  esteem  in  which  the  Austrians  held  their  opponents 
before  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  In  a  general  order 
issued  to  his  army  on  June  17, 1866,  the  Austrian  commander 
says:  "We  are  now  faced  by  inimical  forces,  composed  partly 
of  troops  of  the  Line  and  partly  of  Landwehr.  The  first  com- 
prises young  men  not  accustomed  to  privations  and  fatigue, 
and  who  have  never  yet  made  an  important  campaign ;  the 
latter  is  composed  of  doubtful  and  dissatisfied  elements,  which, 
rather  than  fight  against  us,  would  prefer  the  downfall  of  their 
Government.     In  consequence  of  a  long  course  of  years  of 


'Ilic  tSilnalioii,  Plans,  and  J^isposiliuns.  25 

peace,  the  enemy  does  not  possess  a  single  general  who  has 
had  an  opportunity  of  learning  his  duties  on  the  field  of  battle." 

Benedek's  unfavorable  opinion  of  his  adversaries  was 
probably  shared  by  many  other  prominent  European  soldiers; 
for  the  excellence  of  the  military  system  of  Prussia  was,  as 
yet,  not  appreciated  by  other  nations.  Absurd  as  the  Feld- 
zeugmeister's  order  now  appears,  it  seems  to  have  excited  no 
unfavorable  comment  at  the  time;  and,  in  fact,  the  expecta- 
tion of  Austrian  success  was  quite  general  in  Europe. 

On  the  15th  of  June  the  Austrian  outposts  were  notified 
of  the  intention  of  the  Prussians  to  begin  hostilities,  and  war 
was  formally  declared  against  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel.and  Sax- 
ony. Within  twenty-foui  hours  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
the  invasion  of  each  of  these  minor  States  was  begun. 


26  The  Campaif/n  oj  Kiinif/r/riifz. 


Chapter  III. 


OPERATIONS  AGAINST  THE  HESSIANS  AND  HANOVERIANS, 
AND  THE  INVASION  OF  SAXONY.- 

Falkenstein  from  Minden,  and  Manteuflfel  from  Alton  a, 
moved  upon  Hanover,  and  Beyer  invaded  Hesse- Cassel  from 
Wetzlar.  On  the  night  of  the  15th  the  Hanoverian  army, 
acccompanied  by  the  blind  monarch,  King  George,  retreated, 
chiefly  by  rail,  to  Gottingen;  the  movement  being  conducted 
in  such  haste  that  even  the  reserve  ammunition  and  hospital 
supplies  w^eie  left  behind.  On  the  17th  Falckenstein  entered 
the  Hanoverian  capital ;  on  the  19th  Manteuflfel  marched  into 
the  city;  and  by  the  22d  all  Hanover,  except  Gottingen,  was  in 
the  possession  of  the  Prussians. 

Beyer  pushed  into  Hesse-Cassel,  the  Hessian  army  retir- 
ing before  him,  by  way  of  Fulda,  upon  Hanau,  where  it  formed 
a  junction  with  the  Federal  forces.  On  the  19th  the  Prus- 
sians entered  Cassel,  and  an  army  was  thus  placed  across  the 
path  of  the  retreating  Hanoverians. 

The  Hanoverian  army,  which  had  been  compelled  to  wait 
several  days  at  Gottingen  to  complete  its  organization,  resumed 
its  march  on  the  21st,  intending  to  cross  a  portion  of  the  Prus- 
sian territory  vm  Heiligenstadt  and  Langensalza,  and  thence 
through  Eisenach  or  Gotha,  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Bava- 
rians in  the  neighborhood  of  Fulda.  Falckenstein  pursued 
from  Hanover,  detachments  were  sent  from  Magdeburg  and 
Erfurt  to  Bleicherode  and  Eisenach,  and  Beyer  occupied  the 


*See  Map  No.  1. 


The  Hessians  and  Hanoverians.  27 

line  of  the  Werra  between  Allendorf  and  Eisenach.  Though 
the  route  through  Eisenach  was  thus  blocked,  energetic  meas 
ures  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  might  easily  have  extricated  the 
Hanoverian  army  from  the  constricting  grasp  of  the  Prussians. 
Gotha  was  occupied  by  a  weak  force  of  six  battalions,  two 
squadrons,  and  three  batteries,  while  the  retreating  army  num- 
bered 20,500  men.  Had  the  Bavarian  army  been  well  prepared 
and  ably  led,  a  junction  might  have  been  formed  with  the  Han- 
overians, and  the  Prussian  force  at  Gotha  captured.  But  the 
•  Bavarian  commander  was  inefficient,  and  the  over-estimate 
placed  by  King  George  upon  the  number  of  his  enemies  at 
Gotha  was  strengthened  by  the  receipt,  from  the  commander 
of  the  petty  force,  of  an  audacious  summons  to  surrender. 
Negotiations  were  entered  upon  b}^  the  Prussian  and  Hano- 
verian representatives ;  but  the  armistice  (begun  on  the  24th 
and  continued  until  the  2(3th)  produced  no  other  result  than 
the  reinforcement  of  the  force  at  Gotha ;  General  Flies,  with 
five  battalions,  being  detached  from  Falckenstein's  armj',  and 
sent  by  rail,  via  Magdeburg  and  Halle,  to  Gotha. 

At  TreflFurt,  Kreutzberg,  Eisenach,  and  Gotha,  points  on 
a  semi-circle  in  front  of  the  Hanoverians,  and  within  a  day's 
march  of  them,  were  nearly  80,000  Prussians. 

On  the  27th,  General  Flies,  advancing  through  Warza 
upon  Langensalza,  with  about  90U0  men,  struck  the  army  of 
King  George,  which  was  well  posted  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Unstrut  river.  A  battle  followed,  in  which  the  Hanoverians 
defeated  Flies,  and  drove  his  army  several  miles  towards 
Warza. 

But  the  Hanoverian  victory  was  a  barren  one.  Flies  was 
reinforced  at  Warza  by  a  strong  detachment  from  Goeben's 
division    at    Eisenach.     Goeben    and    Beyer   advanced    from 


28  The  Campaifjit  of  KlJniggrdtz. 

Eisenach  upon  Langensalza,  and  Manteuffel,  moving  via  Heil- 
igenstadt,  Worbis,  Dingelstadt,  Miihlhausen,  and  Gross  Got- 
tern,  closed  upon  the  Hanoverians  from  the  north.  The  army 
of  King  George  was  now  surrounded  by  40,000  Prussians, 
united  under  the  command  of  Falckenstein.  Further  resist- 
ance was  hopeless,  and  on  the  21)th  of  June  the  Hanoverians 
surrendered.  The  men  were  dismissed  to  their  homes,  the 
officers  were  paroled,  and  King  George  was  banished  from  his 
kingdom. 

THE  INVASION  OF  SAXONY,  AND  ITS  RESULTS. 

In  the  meantime  the  main  armies  had  not  been  idle.  The 
invasion  of  Saxony  was  begun  on  the  16th  of  June  by  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the  First  Army.  On  the  night  of  the 
loth  of  June  the  Saxon  army  began  its  retreat  to  Bohemia, 
detachments  of  pioneers  tearing  up  the  railroad  track  between 
Rieza  and  Dresden,  and  between  the  latter  city  and  Bautzen. 
The  work  of  destruction,  except  the  burning  of  the  bridge  at 
Rieza,  was  hurriedly  and  imperfectly  done,  and  did  not  appre- 
ciably delay  the  Prussian  advance.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe 
advanced  from  Torgau,  via  Wurzen,  Dahlen,  and  Strehla;  a 
division  to  each  road,  and  a  detachment  from  the  right  division 
moving  via  Ostrau  and  Dobeln  to  cover  the  right  flank.  The 
First  Armyadva'iced  from  the  neighborhood  of  Gorlitz,  through 
Ivobau  and  Bautzen,  a  strong  detachment  being  sent  out  on 
the  Zittau  road,  beyond  Ostritz,  to  observe  the  passes  of  Reich- 
enberg  and  Gabel,  for  the  army  was  making  a  flank  march, 
and  the  Austrians  might  attack  through  these  passes.  A  cav- 
alry detachment  was  pushed  out  through  Bischofswerda  to 
feel  the  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe. 

On  the  18th  of  June  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  occupied  Dres- 


The  Invasion  of  Saxoni/.  '  29 

den,  and  pushed  its  outposts  beyond  the  city  as  far  as  Lock- 
witz  and  PiHnitz.  On  the  following  day  the  junction  of  the 
two  armies  was  eflfected.  The  1st  Reserve  Division  was  sent 
from  Berlin  to  reinforce  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld,  and  the 
combined  forces  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the  First  Army 
were  placed  under  the  command  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
To  guard  against  a  possible  invasion  of  Saxony  by  the  Bava- 
rians, measures  were  at  once  taken  to  fortify  Dresden,  which 
was  occupied  by  the  2d  Reserve  Division  from  Berlin;  Leipsic 
and  Chemnitz  were  occupied  by  Landwehr;  and  the  Leipsic- 
Plauen  railway  beyond  Werdau  was  destroj-ed. 

On  the  17th  of  June  the  Emperor  of  Austria  issued  a  man- 
ifesto, in  which  he  fornially  announced  to  his  subjects  the 
state  of  war  existing  between  Austria  and  Prussia.  ■  Italy 
declared  war  against  Au&tria  three  days  later. 

We  can  now  see  the  immense  results  following  from  the 
thorough  military  preparation  of  Prussia.  Launching,  as  it 
w^ere,  a  thunderbolt  of  military  force  upon  her  enemies  at  the 
first  moment  of  war,  less  than  two  weeks  sufficed  for  the  com- 
plete conquest  of  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  and  Saxony.  Indeed, 
four  days  had  sufficed  for  the  seizure  of  the  last  two.  The 
King  of  Hanover  had  been  dethroned,  the  Elector  of  Hesse- 
Cassel  was  a  prisoner,  and  the  King  of  Saxony  was  a  fugitive 
w^ith  his  army  in  Bohemia.  The  military  results  were  even 
greater  than  the  political  consequences.  The  severed  portions 
of  the  Prussian  kingdom  were  united.  The  Hanoverian  army 
had  been  eliminated  from  the  military  problem,  and  there  was 
no  longer  any  menace  to  Prussia  from  the  rear.  Falckenstein 
was  now  free  to  turn  his  undivided  attention  to  the  Bavarians 
and  the  Federal  Corps,  and  the  occupation  of  Saxony  pre- 
vented all  possibility  of  a  junction  of  the  Bavarian  and  Saxon 


30  The  Campaign  of  Kdniggriltz. 

armies.  But  the  strategical  advantages  gained  in  regard  to 
operations  in  Bohemia  were  the  grandest  result  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Saxony. 

We  have  seen  that  on  the  14th  of  June  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  was  around  Torgau,  the  First  Army  near  Gorlitz,  and 
the  Second  Army  in  the  vicinity  of  Neisse  ;  being  thus  sepa- 
rated from  each  other  by  from  100  to  125  miles.  The  Second 
Army  covered  Breslau,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  covered  Berlin, 
and  the  First  Army  was  in  a  position  to  support  either  of  the 
others.  Geographical  circumstances  thus  compelled  the  sepa- 
ration of  the  Prussian  armies,  and  only  two  of  them  were  avail- 
able for  the  invasion  of  Bohemia.  The  occupation  of  Saxony 
changed  matters  for  the  better.  The  distance  between  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the  First  Army  was  reduced  to  the 
extent  of  actual  junction,  and  these  combined  armies  were 
only  about  120  miles  from  Landshut,  where  the  right  of  the 
Second  Army  now  rested,  and  with  which  there  was  commu- 
nication by  means  of  the  hill  road  of  Schreiberschau.  The 
entire  force  was  now  available  for  the  invasion  of  Bohemia ; 
the  northern  passes  of  the  Bohemian  frontier  were  secured ; 
and  if  compelled  to  act  upon  the  defensive,  Frederick  Charles 
could  find  in  the  mountains  of  Southern  Saxony  many  advan- 
tageous positions  for  defensive  battle. 

The  Prussian  plan  of  operations  required  an  advance  of 
Frederick  Charles'  armies  from  Saxony  into  Bohemia,  and  an 
invasion  of  that  province  by  the  Second  Army,  advancing  from 
Silesia;  both  armies  to  unite  at  Gitschin,  or  in  its  vicinity. 
It  is  clear  that  in  thus  advancing  from  divergent  bases,  the 
Prussians  gave  to  their  adversary  the  advantage  of  operating 
by  interior  lines;  generally  a  serious  military  error,  as  the 
general  operating  by  interior  lines,  holding  one  of  the  oppo- 


The  Invasion  of  Saxon i/.  81 

nent's  armies  by  a  containing  force,  and  falling  with  superior 
numbers  upon  the  other,  may  defeat  both  in  succession. 
Moltke's  plan  was,  however,  sound  and  proper,  for  the  follow- 
ing reasons : 

1.  The  geographical  configuration  of  the  Prussian  fron- 
tier compelled  the  separation  of  the  Prussian  armies,  in  order 
that  Lusatia  and  Silesia  might  both  be  protected  from  Aus- 
trian invasion;  and  the  only  possible  concentration  that  would 
not  yield  to  the  enemy  the  advantage  of  the  initiative,  and 
permit  him  to  invade  Prussia,  was  a  concentration  to  the  front, 
in  the  hostile  territory. 

2.  Owing  to  the  limited  number  and  difficult  nature  of 
the  mountain  roads  leading  into  Bohemia,  the  entire  army 
could  not  have  advanced  by  a  single  route  or  set  of  roads 
without  being  extended  in  columns  of  such  length  as  to  make 
it  impossible  to  deploy  promptly  or  on  a  front  commensurate 
with  its  numbers. 

3.  The  reentering  base  of  the  Prussians  would  enable 
each  of  their  armies  to  cover  its  communications  with  its 
base,  while  either  would  surely  menace  the  communications 
of  the  Austrians,  if  Benedek  should  advance  against  the 
other. 

4.  It  was  certain  that  the  Pru5sian  forces  could  act 
promptly  and  with  celerity,  and  it  was  known  by  Moltke  that 
the  Austrian  army  was  not  yet  fully  prepared  for  prompt 
offensive  maneuvers.  The  distance  from  G5rlitz  and  Neisse 
to  Gitschin  being  less  than  that  from  Olmiitz,  Briian,  and 
Bomisch  Triibau  to  the  same  point,  there  was,  then,  good  rea- 
son to  believe  that  the  junction  of  the  Prussian  armies  could 
be  effected  at  a  point  some  distance  in  front  of  the  enemy's 


32  The  Ccunpaigii  of  Kiiinf/i/ratz. 

lute,  and  before  Benedek   could  get   his  own  forces  well  iu 
hand. 

5.  By  keeping  up  telegraphic  communication  between 
the  two  separated  armies,  their  cooperation  and  simultaneous 
action  could  be  assured. 

6.  If  the  Prussians  could  reach  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe 
without  serious  check,  the  contracted  theatre  of  operations 
would  render  Benedek's  interior  position  one  of  danger,  rather 
than  one  of  advantage.  Moltke  himself,  in  commenting  upon 
his  strategical  combination,  says:  "If  it  is  advantageous  for  a 
general  to  place  his  army  on  an  anterior  line  of  operation,  it 
is  necessary,  in  order  that  he  may  profit  by  it,  to  have  suffi- 
cient space  to  enable  him  to  move  against  one  of  his  adver- 
saries at  a  distance  of  several  days'  march,  and  to  have  time 
enough  then  to  return  against  the  other.  If  this  space  is  very 
contracted,  he  will  run  the  risk  of  having  both  adversaries  on 
his  liands  at  once.  When  an  army,  on  the  field  of  battle,  is 
attacked  in  front  and  on  the  flank,  it  avails  nothing  that  it  is 
on  an  interior  line  of  operations.  That  which  was  a  strate- 
gical advantage  becomes  a  tactical  disadvantage.  If  the 
Prussians  were  allowed  to  advance  to  the  Iser  and  to  the 
Elbe;  if  the  several  defiles  which  it  was  necessary  to  pass  fell 
into  their  power — it  is  evident  that  it  would  be  extremely  per- 
ilous to  advance  between  their  two  armies.  In  attacking  one, 
the  risk  would  be  incurred  of  being  attacked  in  rear  by  the 
other."  The  combination,  on  the  field  of  battle,  of  the  two 
armies  operating  from  divergent  bases  would  admit  of  just 
such  a  front  and  flank  attack  as  would  convert  Benedek's 
strategical  advantage  into  a  serious  tactical  disadvantage.  It 
would  be  a  repetition  of  Waterloo. 

7.  A  failure  to  unite  before  encountering  the  main  force 


The  Invasion  of  Sa.roni/.  38 

of  the  enemy,  though  unfortunate,  would  not  necessarily  have 
been  disastrous.  According  to  Jomini,  the  advantages  of  an 
interior  position  diminish  as  the  armies  operating  increase  in 
size;  for  the  following  reasons: 

(a)  "Considering  the  difficulty  of  finding  ground  and 
time  necessary  to  bring  a  very  large  force  into  action  on  the 
day  of  the  battle,  an  army  of  130,000  or  140,000  men  may 
easily  resist  a  much  larger  force. 

(d)  "If  driven  from  the  field,  there  will  be  at  least 
100,000  men  to  protect  and  insure  an  orderly  retreat  and  effect 
a  junction  with  one  of  the  other  armies. 

(r)  "  The  central  army  *  *  *  requires  such 
a  quantity  of  provisions,  munitions,  horses,  and  materiel  of 
every  kind,  that  it  will  possess  less  mobility  and  facility  in 
shifting  its  efforts  from  one  part  of  the  zone  to  another;  to 
say  nothing  of  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  provisions  from 
a  region  too  restricted  to  support  such  numbers. 

{d)  "The  bodies  of  observation  detached  from  the  cen- 
tral mass  to  hold  in  check  two  armies  of  135,000  men  each 
must  be  very  strong  (from  80,000  to  90,000  each);  and, 
being  of  such  magnitude,  if  they  are  drawn  into  a. serious 
engagement,  they  will  probably  suffer  reverses,  the  effect  of 
which  might  outweigh  the  advantages  gained  by  the  principal 
army."* 

Finally,  the  increased  defensive  power  given  to  infantry 
by  the  introduction  of  breech-loading  rifles  might  be  counted 
upon  to  increase  greatly  the  probability  of  either  of  the  Prus- 
sian armies  being  able  to  fight  successfully  a  purely  defensive 
battle  against  the  entire  army  of  Benedek,  armed,  as  it  was, 
with  muzzle-loaders. 


*Jomini's  "Art  of  War,"  translated  by  Mendell  and  Craigbill,  p.  126. 


34  The  Campaifjii  of  Kniiigf/rtitz. 

In  view  of  these  reasons,  Moltke's  strategy  was  not  only- 
justifiable,  but  perfect.  The  Prussian  objective  was  the  Aus- 
trian army,  wherever  it  might  be. 

Before  the  commencement  of  hostilities  Benedek  had,  as 
we  have  seen,  announced  his  intention  of  invading  Prussia. 
Two  routes  ofiFered  themselves  to  his  choice:  one  by  way  of 
Gorlitz  and  Bautzen  to  Berlin;  the  other  by  way  of  the  valley 
of  the  Oder  into  Silesia.  The  latter  route  was  obstructed  by 
the  fortresses  of  Glatz,  Neisse,  and  Kosel;  the  former  would 
have  led  to  the  unobstructed  occupation  of  Saxony,  and  would 
have  enabled  the  Bavarian  army  to  concentrate,  via  the  passes 
of  the  Saale  and  Wittenberg,  with  the  Austrians  and  Saxons. 
But,  at  a  time  when  minutes  were  worth  millions,  Benedek 
was  slow,  and  the  preparation  and  energy  of  the  Prussians 
enabled  them  to  take  the  initiative  and  throw  the  Austrians 
upon  the  defensive  in  Bohemia.  The  Feldzeugmeister  then 
decided  to  concentrate  his  army  in  the  vicinity  of  Josephstadt 
and  Koniginhof;  to  hold  the  strong  defiles  of  the  Iser  or  the 
Elbe  with  comparatively  weak  detachments,  and  throw  his 
main  army  upon  the  Crown  Prince  or  Frederick  Charles,  as 
circumstances  might  decide. 

The  concentration  of  the  Austrian  army  began  on  the 
18th  of  June,  and  on  the  25th  it  stood  as  follows: 

The  1st  Corps,  with  one  brigade  of  the  Illd  Corps  and 
a  cavalry  division,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Iser,  from  Turnau, 
through  Miinchengratz  to  Jung  Buntzlau,  wherethe  retreating 
Saxons  formed  on  the  left; 

The  Xth  Corps,  with  one  cavalry  division,  at  Jaromir; 

The  IVth  Corps  at  Opocno; 

The  Vlth  Corps  at  Solnitz; 

The  Hid  Corps  on  the  left  of  the  Vlth,  at  Tynist; 


The  Invasion  of  Saxony.  35 

The  Vlllth  Corps  at  Wamberg; 

The  lid  Corps  at  Geyersberg; 

Four  cavalry  divisions  were  at  Gabel,  Leitomischel,  Abts- 
dorf,  and  Policzka,  respectively. 

The  force  on  the  Iser,  under  Count  Clam-Gallas,  was 
thus  opposed  to  the  entire  army  of  Frederick  Charles;  while 
Benedek  confronted  the  Crown  Prince  with  six  corps.  The 
Austrian  line  extended  beyond  Gitschin,  the  point  at  which 
the  Prussian  armies  were  to  concentrate. 


36  The  Carii/)ai(/n  of  h'niiifjr/ralz. 


Chapter  IV. 


THE  INVASION  OF  BOHEMIA. 

It  was  now  certain  that  Bohemia  was  to  be  the  theater  of 
war.  This  province  of  the  Austrian  Empire  may  be  described 
as  a  huge  basin,  whose  rim  is  composed  of  mountains.  It  is 
separated  from  Silesia  by  the  Riesengebirge  (Giant  Moun- 
tains), from  Saxony  by  the  Erzgebirge  (Iron  Mountains), 
from  Moravia  by  the  Moravian  Hills,  and  from  Bavaria  by.the 
Fichtelgebirge  and  the  Bohmerwald;  the  Moravian  Hills  and 
the  Bohmerwald  separating  it  from  the  valley  of  the  Danube. 
This  great  basin  is  drained  by  the  Elbe  river,  which,  rising  in 
the  Riesengebirge,  makes  a  huge  loop,  flowing  first  south, 
then  west,  and  finally  north,  and  receives  the  waters  of  the 
Iser,  Adler,  Moldau,  and  Eger  rivers  before  it  issues  forth 
from  the  Bohemian  frontier  into  Saxony.  This  theater  is 
well  suite  1  to  defensive  operations,  as  the  mountain  frontiers 
are  penetrated  by  few  passes,  and  the  forests  and  rivers  con- 
stitute additional  obstacles.  On  the  Silesian  frontier  the  only 
issues  by  which  an  invader  can  enter  Bohemia  are  the  passes 
of  Trautenau,  Eypel,  Kosteletz,  Nachod,  and  Neustadt.  These 
could  all  be  easily  defended,  while  on  the  Saxon  frontier  the 
defiles  of  Reichenberg,  Gabsl,  and  Konigstein-Tetschen  could 
bs  used  by  retarding  forces,  which  could  afterwards  find  a 
btrong  defensive  line  on  the  Iser. 

Two  railway  lines  lay  in  the  theater  of  war,  and  were  of 
great  importance  to  the  contending  armies.  One  line  ran 
from  Vienna,  via  Kosel,  Breslau,  and  G6rlitz,to  Dresden.    The 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  '  37 

other  connected  the  Austrian  capital  with  Prague,  via  Olmiitz 
(or  Briinn)  and  Bomisch  Triibau.  The  two  lines  were  joined 
by  a  railway  from  Dresden  to  Prague,  and  by  one  which,  run- 
ning from  lyobau  to  Turnau,  branched  from  the  latter  point 
to  Prague  and  Pardubitz.  These  railways  connected  with 
others  leading  to  all  the  important  cities  of  Prussia.  The  two 
Prussian  armies  could  cover  their  railway  communications 
while  adv^ancing;  but  the  Prague-Olmiitz  line,  which  was  of 
vital  importance  to  the  Austrian  army,  ran  parallel  to,  and 
dangerously  near,  the  Silesian  frontier,  and  was  not  covered 
by  the  Austrian  front  during  the  operations  in  Bohemia. 

The  Prussian  advance  began  on  the  20th  of  June.  The 
Army  of  the  Elbe  marched  from  the  vicinity  of  Dresden,  via 
Stolpen,  Neustadt,  Schluckenau,  and  Rumburg,  to  Gabel.* 
As  the  greater  part  of  this  march  had  to  be  made  by  one  road, 
it  required  six  days,  though  the  distance  was  only  65  miles. 
The  First  Army  had  concentrated  at  Zittau,  Herrnhut,  Hirsch- 
felde,  Seidenberg,  and  Marklissa.  From  these  points  it  began 
its  march  on  the  22d  of  June,  each  division  taking  a  separate 
road,  and  on  the  25th  it  was  closely  concentrated  around 
Reichenberg.  The  entire  Prussian  front  was  now  reduced  to 
about  100  miles,  and  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld  was  only  twelve 
miles  from  Frederick  Charles. 

It  would  have  been  dangerous  in  the  extreme  for  the 
Crown  Prince  to  begin  his  march  while  Benedek  held  six 
corps  in  hand  to  hurl  upon  him.  The  passage  of  the  Second 
Army  through  the  defiles  depended  on  surprise;  and  in  the 
face  of  a  superior  and  concentrated  army,  it  would  have  been- 
a  desperate  undertaking.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  dis- 
tract the  plans  of  the  enemy  by  false  maneuvers,  and  to  wait 

*See  Map  No.  2. 


38  The  Campaif/ii  of  K(i»iii;/ratz. 

for  Frederick  Charles  to  menace  the  Austrian  left,  on  the  Iser, 
before  beginning  the  forward  movement  with  the  Second 
Army.  With  these  objects  in  view,  the  Vlth  Corps  was 
ordered  to  push  forward  towards  Olmiitz,  and  Frederick 
Charles  received  the  following  instructions  from  Moltke: 
"Since  the  difficult  task  of  debouching  from,  the  mountains 
falls  upon  the  Second,  weaker,  Army,  so,  as  soon  as  the  junc- 
tion with  Herwarth's  corps  is  effected,  the  First  Army  must, 
by  its  rapid  advance,  shorten  the  crisis."  The  Vlth  Corps 
moved  from  Neisse  into  the  Austrian  dominions  as  far  as  Frei- 
waldaa,  where  its  advance  guard  had  a  successful  skirmish 
with  a  party  of  Austrian  cavalry.  This  corps  was  supposed 
by  the  Austrians  to  be  the  advance  guard  of  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  marching  upon  Olmiitz;  and  the  demonstration 
had  the  effect  of  holding  a  large  force  of  Austrians  between 
Hohenmauth  and  Bomisch  Triibau,  where  it  could  not  be  used 
to  oppose  the  real  advance  of  the  Second  Army. 

The  Crown  Prince's  army  was  to  move  as  follows:'-'^ 

The  1st  Corpsf  via  Liebau  and  Trautenau,  to  Arnau; 

The  Guards,  via'Nenrode,  Braunau,  Eypel,  to  Koniginhof; 

The  Vth  Corps,  v/a  Glatz,  Reinerz,  Nachod,  to  Gradlitz; 

The  cavalry,  from  Waldenburg,  via  Trautenau,  to  Kou- 
niginhof. 

The  Vlth  Corps,  having  made  the  diversion  to  Frei- 
waldau,  was  withdrawn  to  Glatz  and  Patschkau,+  from  which 
points  it  was  to  follow  the  Vth.     A  corps  of  observation,  con- 


*See  Map  No.  3. 

tit  may  be  of  assistance  to  the  reader,  in  the  following  pages,  to  note  that  the 
divisions  in  the  Prussian  army  are  numbered  consecutively  throughout  the  several 
army  corps.  Thus,  the  1st  Corps  consists  of  the  1st  and  2d  Divisions  ;  the  lid  Corps, 
of  the  3d  and  4th  Divisions ;  the  Vlth  Corps,  of  the  11th  and  12th  Divisions,  and  so  on. 

JPatsclikau  is  46  miles  south  from  Breslau. 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  39 

sisting  of  two  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  cavalry,  and  a  light 
battery,  was  detached  at  Ratibor*  to  make  demonstrations 
against  Austrian  Silesia.  In  case  this  detachment  should  en- 
counter a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  it  was  to  fall  back  upon 
the  fortress  of  Kosel.  During  the  campaign  an  unimportant 
war  of  detachments  was  carried  on  in  this  region  generally  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Prussians. 

JUNE  26th. t 

On  the  26th  of  June  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  marched  upon 
Niemes  and  Oschitz.  The  advance  guard  encountered  an 
Austrian  outpost  near  Hiihnerwasser,  and  drove  it  back  after 
a  sharp  skirmish.  The  main  body  of  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  bivouacked  at  Hiihnerwasser,  with  outposts  towards 
Weisswasser,  Miinchengratz,  and  Gablonz.  In  the  evening 
there  was  another  brisk  outpost  fight  in  the  direction  of  Miin- 
chengratz, in  which  the  Austrians  were  again  worsted. 

In  the  First  Army  the  advance  on  this  day  was  begun  by 
General  Horn,  whose  division  had  held  the  outposts  the  night 
before.  At  Liebenau,  Horn  struck  the  Austrians,  whose  force 
consisted  of  a  small  body  of  infantry,  four  regiments  of  cav- 
alry, and  two  batteries  of  horse  artillery.  Driven  out  of  the 
village,  and  from  the  field  where  they  next  made  a  stand,  the 
Austrians  retreated  across  the  Iser,  i7/«Turnau,  to  Podol.  The 
First  Army  now  occupied  a  position  extending  through  Reich- 
enberg,  Gablonz,  I,iebenau,  and  Turnau  ;  Horn's  division  ex- 
tending down  the  Iser  from  Turnau,  with  outposts  near  Podol. 
Free  communication — in  fact,  a  junction — was  now  established 
with  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  one  division  of  which  occupied 
Bomisch  Aicha. 


'■'Ratibor  is  50  miles  east-south-east  from  Xeisse. 
tSee  Maps  4  and  5. 


40  The  Campaign  of  Koniggrdtz. 

An  attempt  made  by  a  company  of  Prussian  riflemen  to 
seize  the  bridges  at  Podol,  about  dusk  in  the  evening,  brought 
on  a  sharp  fight.  The  forces  on  each  side  were  reinforced  until 
parts  of  two  Prussian  and  two  Austrian  brigades  were  engaged. 
A  stubborn  infantry  battle  was  carried  on  by  moonlight  until 
1  o'clock  in  the  morning,  when  the  Austrians  retreated  towards 
Miinchengratz.  By  this  victory  the  Prussians  secured  the 
passage  of  the  Iser  at  Podol;  the  shortest  line  toGitschin  was 
opened  to  them;  the  communications  of  Count  Clam-(jallas 
with  the  main ar^ny  were  threatened;  and  a  plan  which  he  had 
formed  to  riposte  upon  the  Prussians  at  Turnau  was  thwarted. 

We  will  now  turn  to  the  Second  Array.  On  this  day  the 
1st  Corps  concentrated  at  lyiebau  and  Schomberg,  ready  to 
cross  the  frontier.  The  Vth  Corps  was  at  Reinerz,  about 
twenty  miles  from  the  1st.  The  Guard  Corps,  which  had  just 
crossed  the  frontier,  in  front  of  Neurode,  midway  between  the 
two  corps,  was  in  a  position  to  support  either.  The  Vlth  Corps 
was  at  Landeck  and  Glatz,  part  of  its  cavalry  being  sent  for- 
ward to  cover  the  left  of  the  Vth  Corps  and  maintain  commu- 
nication between  the  two.  After  passing  the  mountains,  the 
entire  army,  pivoted  on  Nachod  and  Skalitz,  was  to  wheel 
to  the  left,  seize  the  Josephstadt-Turnau  railway,  and  form  a 
junction  along  that  line  with  the  armies  of  Frederick  Charles. 
On  the  evening  of  the  26th  the  advance  guard  of  the  Vth 
Corps  occupied  Nachod.  The  distance  between  the  Crown 
Prince  and  Frederick  Charles  had  now  been  reduced  to 
about  fifty  miles,  while  that  between  the  extreme  corps  of 
the  Austrian  army  was  about  the  same.  Benedek's  strate- 
gical advantages  were  already  beginning  to  disappear.  The 
Prussian  demonstrations  towards  Olmiitz  had  caused  the  Aus- 
trian lid  Corps  to  be  retained  dangeously  far  to  the  right; 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  41 

Count  Clam-Gallas  was  struggling  against  superior  numbers 
on  the  Iser,  and  Benedek  had  only  four  corps  with  which  he 
could  immediately  oppose  the  four  corps  of  the  Crown  Prince. 

The  Austrian  commander  ordered  the  following  move- 
ments for  the  next  day : 

The  Xth  Corps,  from  Josephstadt  and  Schurz,  upon 
Trautenau; 

The  Vlth  Corps,  from  Opocno  to  Skalitz; 

The  IVth  Corps,  from  I^anzow  to  Jaromir; 

The  Vlllth  Corps,  from  Tynist  to  beyond  Jaromir,  to 
support  the  Vlth  ; 

The  Hid  Corps,  from  Koniggratz  to  Miletin; 

The  lid  Corps,  from  Senftenberg  to  Solnitz; 

The  Reserve  Cavalry,  from  Hohenraauth  and  Wilden- 
schwerdt  to  Hohenbriick; 

The  Light  Cavalry  to  accompany  the  lid  Corps. 

JUNE  27th. 

On  the  27th  of  June  the  Crown  Prince  pushed  forward 
the  1st  Corps  against  Trautenau,  and  the  main  body  of  the 
Vth  Corps  upon  Nachod.  One  division  of  the  Guard  sup- 
ported each  corps. 

The  1st  Corps,  under  Bonin ,  marched  in  two  columns 
from  Liebau  and  Schomberg,  and  was  to  concentrate  at  Par- 
schnitz,  about  .two  miles  east  of  Trautenau,  where  it  was  to 
rest  two  hours  before  moving  upon  the  latter  place. 

Contrary  to  expectation,  the  left  column  arrived  first  at 
Parschnitz,  the  right  (with  the  advance  guard)  being  delayed 
by  bad  roads.  Trautenau  was  as  yet  unoccupied  by  the  Aus- 
trians;  but,  instead  of  seizing  the  town  and  the  heights  which 
overlooked  it,  on  the  farther  bank  of  the  Aupa  river.  Clause- 


42  Tlw  Caiiipdii/ii  oj   h'lhili/i/n'ilz. 

witz  (commanding  the  left  column)  obeyed  the  strict  letter  of 
his  orders,  and  waited  at  Parschnitz  two  hours,  from  8  to  l<> 
A.  M.,  until  the  advance  guard  of  the  right  column  arrived. 
While  Clausewitz  was  thus  idly  waiting,  Mondl's  brigade 
of  the  Xtli  Austrian  Corps  arrived,  and  took  up  a  strong  posi- 
tion in  the  town  and  on  the  heights  which  commanded  it.  A 
stubborn  fight  took  place  before  the  Austrians  could  be  dis- 
lodged; and  Mondl  fell  back  in  good  order  upon  the  main 
body  of  the  Xth  Corps,  which  was  hurrying  towards  Traut- 
enau.  Believing  himself  in  complete  possession  of  the  field, 
Bonin,  at  I  o'clock,  declined  the  assistance  of  the  1st  Division 
of  Guards,  which  had  hurried  up  to  Parschnitz;  and  this  divis- 
ion, after  a  halt  of  two  hours,  marched  off"  to  the  left,  towards 
Eypel.  About  half  past  3  o'clock  the  entire  Xth  Corps,  under 
Gablentz,  arrived  on  the  field,  and  made  a  vigorous  attack 
upon  the  Prussians.  Bonin's  left  wing  was  turned;  and,  after 
fighting  six  hours,  the  Prussians  were  driven  from  the  field, 
and  retreated  to  the  positions  from  which  they  had  begun 
their  march  in  the  morning. 

The  Prussian  defeat  was  due  to  two  causes: 
1.  The  dela)'  of  Clausewitz  at  Parschnitz,  when  common 
sense  should  have  prompted  him  to  exceed  his  orders,  and 
seize  the  unoccupied  town  and  heights  of  Trautenau.  For 
two  hours  these  positions  were  completely  undefended  by  the 
Austrians,  and  could  have  been  occupied  by  Clausewitz  with- 
out firing  a  shot.* 


*Derr^cagaix  and  the  Prussian  Official  History  both  condemn  Clausewitz's 
delay.  Adams,  however,  finds  an  excuse  for  it.  He  says  :  "  The  first  question  that 
arises  is,  Should  Clausewitz  have  occupied  Trautenau?  Mondl  was  up,  in  all  prob- 
ability, and  he  would  have  been  deeply  engaged  before  Grossmanu  [commanding  the 
right  column]  came  up,  against  orders.  He  could  not  have  been  acquainted  with  the 
situation,  for  Bonin  himself  was  not,  and  it  is  difficult,  therefore,  to  attach  blame  to 
him.  The  cause  of  Grossmann's  delay  is  said  to  have  been  the  hilly  character  of  the 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  43 

2.  The  fatuity  of  Bonin  in  declining  the  assistance  of 
the  Guards.  Bonin  knew  that  Mondl  had  not  been  routed, 
that  he  had  fallen  back  "slowly  and  fighting,"  and  he  did  not 
know  what  other  force  might  be  in  his  immediate  front.  He 
had  no  reason  to  expect  that  he  would  be  allowed  to  pass 
through  the  defile  without  the  most  stubborn  opposition.  He 
knew  that  he  had  been  opposed  by  a  single  brigade,  and  the 
plucky  resistance  of  that  small  body  should  have  made  him 
suspicious  that  it  had  stronger  forces  at  its  back.  His  orders 
were  to  push  on  to  Arnau,  some  twelve  miles  from  Trautenau, 
and  to  carry  out  these  orders  it  was  necessary  to  sweep  aside 
the  opposition  in  his  front.  His  declination  of  assistance  when 
the  firing  had  scarcely  ceased,  and  when  the  aid  of  the  Guards 
would  have  enabled  him  to  clinch  his  success,  was  inexcus- 

road.  Moudl,  on  the  other  hand,  reaching  Hohenbriick  about  7:30,  seems  to  have 
halted  there  to  form.  The  Austrian  Official  Account  states  that  he  had  occupied  the 
heights  since  9:15,  and  before  this  he  had  reached  Hohenbriick  at  7:45.  When  he 
had  formed— that  is  to  say,  waited  to  mass  his  brigade  before  deploying— the  posi- 
tion must  have  been  taken  up  by  him  between  8:30  and  9:15.  Had  Clausewitz 
advanced,  it  would  have  taken  tliree-quarters  of  an  hour  to  debouch  in  force  south 
of  Trautenau,  so  that  he  would  have  had  to  continue  his  march  without  halting  to 
cross  the  Aupa,  and  push  forward  from  Trautenau,  contrary  to  orders,  in  order 
to  engage  Mondl  on  the  very  strong  ground  he,  by  that  time,  had  fully  occupied. 
Probably  the  latter  was  informed  *  *  *  *  ^^^^  ^^  immediate 

danger  was  impending,  or  he  would  not  have  waited  leisurely  to  form.  The  first 
duty  of  the  advance,  on  coming  into  collision  wi.h  the  enemy,  is  to  occupy  rapidly 
such  localities  as  may  prove  of  use  in  the  impending  action." 

Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  the  heights  were  unoccupied  when  Clause- 
witz arrived  at  Parschnitz ;  and  it  was  his  duty,  as  well  as  that  of  Mondl,  on  coming 
into  collision  with  the  enemy,  to  occupy  rapidly  such  localities  as  might  have  proved 
of  use  in  the  impending  action.  As  to  engaging  Mondl  "  on  the  very  strong  ground 
lie,  by  that  time,  had  fully  occupied,"  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  he  had  only  a 
brigade,  while  Clausewitz  had  a  division.  A  subordinate  commander  assumes  a 
grave  responsibility  when  he  violates  or  exceeds  his  orders ;  but  it  is  hardly  to  be 
expected  that  an  able  division  commander  will  fetter  himself  by  observing  the  strict 
letter  of  an  order,  when  he  knows,  and  his  superior  does  not  know,  that  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  in  his  front  is  such  as  to  offer  an  opportunity  for  a  successful  and  val- 
uable stroke,  even  though  that  stroke  be  not  contemplated  in  tlie  orders  of  his  chief. 
Alvensleben  understood  matters  better  when  he  marched  without  orders  to  assist 
Fransecky  at  Koniggratz.  If  a  division  commander  were  never  expected  to  act  upon 
his  own  responsibility  when  a  movement  is  urged  by  his  own  common  sense,  it  is 
evident  that  the  position  of  general  of  division  could  be  filled  by  a  man  of  very 
limited  abilities. 


44  The  Campaign  of  Koniggrdtz. 

able.  Like  Beauregard  at  Shiloh,  Bonin  seems  to  have  la- 
bored under  the  delusion  that  a  victory  could  be  sufficiently 
complete  while  the  enemy's  army  still  remained  in  his  front.* 

The  Austrians  had  certainly  gained  a  brilliant  victory. 
With  a  force  of  83,600  men,  they  had  defeated  35,000  Prus- 
sians, armed,  too,  with  breech-loaders,  while  the  victors  had 
only  muzzle-loading  rifles.  The  loss  of  the  Prussians  was  56 
officers  and  1282  men,  while  the  Austrians  lost  196  officers 
and  more  than  5000  men.  This  disparity  of  loss  illustrates 
the  difference  in  the  power  of  the  old  and  the  new  rifles;  it 
also  speaks  volumes  for  the  pluck  of  the  Austrian  soldiers. 

But  the  Austrian  victory  was  doomed  to  be  as  fruitless  as 
it  was  costly;  for  Prussian  skill  and  valor  on  other  fields  oblit- 
erated all  that  was  gained  by  Gablentz  in  the  bloody  combat 
of  Trautenau. 

The  march  of  the  Vth  Corps,  under  Steinmetz,  lay  through 
the  defile  of  Nachod,  five  miles  in  length,  in  which  the  entire 
corps  was  obliged  to  march  in  a  single  column.  The  advance 
guard,  which  had  seized  Nachod  the  night  before,  pushed  for- 
ward rapidly,  beyond  the  outlet  of  the  defile,  to  the  junction 
of  the  roads  leading  to  Skalitz  and  Neustadt,  where  it  received 
orders  to  halt,  and  thus  cover  the  issue  of  the  main  body 
through  the  defile.  While  the  advance  guard  was  making 
preparations  for  bivouacking,  its  commander,  General  Loew- 
enfeldt,  received  news  of  the  approach  of  the  Austrian  Vlth 
Corps,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  ordered  upon 
Nachod.      Hastily  forming  for  action,  the  Prussian  advance 


*"  While  this  was  goins  on,  a  staff-officer  of  General  Beauregard's 

headquarters  *  *  came  up  to  General  Bragg  and  said :  '  The  general  directs 
that  the  pursuit  be  stopped ;  the  victory  is  sufficiently  complete  ;  it  is  needless  to 
expose  our  men  to  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats.'  General  Bragg  said,  'My  God!  was  a 
victory  ever  sufficiently  complete? '  "—Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.  I., 
p.  605. 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  45 

guard  received  the  attack  of  a  brigade,  which  was  reinforced 
until  nearly  the  whole  Austrian  corps  was  engaged.  It  was 
a  desperate  struggle  of  six  and  one  half  battalions,  five 
squadrons,  and  12  guns,  against  twentj'-one  battalions,  80 
guns,  and  a  greatly  superior  force  of  cavalry.  For  three 
hours  the  advance  guard  sustained  the  unequal  conflict,  with 
no  other  reinforcement  than  Wnuck's  cavalry  brigade.  The 
Prussian  force,  in  one  line,  3000  paces  long,  without  reserves, 
was  sorely  pressed,  until  the  main  body  began  to  issue  from 
the  defile  and  deploy  upon  the  field.  The  entire  Austrian 
corps  was  now  engaged.  Finally,  after  a  successful  charge  of 
Wnuck's  cavalry  brigade  upon  the  Austrian  cuirassiers,  and 
the  repulse  of  a  heavy  infantry  attack,  Steinmetz  assumed . 
the  offensive,  and  the  Austrians,  defeated  with  great  loss, 
retreated  to  Skalitz.  In  the  latter  part  of  this  action  the 
Prussians  were  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  Crown 
Prince.  The  Prussian  loss  was  1122,  killed  and  wounded; 
the  Austrians  lost  7510,  of  which  number  about  2500  were 
prisoners. 

The  1st  Division  of  the  Guards  halted  this  night  at 
Eypel;  the  2d  Division  at  Kosteletz. 

This  day,  which  had  seen  iwo  bloody  actions  fought  by 
the  Second  Army,  was  one  of  inaction  on  the  part  of  the 
armies  of  Frederick  Charles.  The  daj'  was  consumed  in  con- 
structing bridges  across  the  Iser,  at  Turnau  and  Podol,  and  in 
concentrating  the  main  body  of  the  army  on  the  plateau  of 
Sichrow,  preparatory  to  an  attack  upon  the  Austrian  position 

at  Miinchengratz. 

JUNE  28th.* 

The  First  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  made  a  com- 

*  See  Map  No.  7. 


46  The  Campaign  of  Koniggrdtz. 

bined  attack  upon  Count  Clam-Gallas  at  Miincheugratz,  the 
Austrians  being  assailed  in  front  and  on  both  flanks.  The 
Austrian  commander  had  begun  his  retreat  before  the  Prus- 
sian attack  commenced;  and,  after  a  brief  resistance,  he  fell 
back  upon  Gitschin,  with  a  loss  of  about  2000  men,  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  The  Prussian  loss  was  only  341. 
The  armies  of  Frederick  Charles  were  now  completely  united. 
One  division  was  pushed  forward  to  Rowensko,  and  the 
remaining  eight,  numbering,  with  the  cavalry,  upwards  of 
100,000  men,  were  concentrated  upon  an  area  of  about  twenty 
square  miles.  Some  distress  began  to  be  felt  because  of  the 
short  supply  of  food  and  the  difficulty  of  getting  water;  for 
only  part  of  the  provision  trains  had  come  up,  and  the  Aus- 
trian inhabitants,  when  they  ab^jUdoned  their  homes,  had 
filled  up  the  wells.  Two  roads  led  east  from  the  Prussian 
position,  but  both,  united  at  Sobotka.  The  Austrian  rear 
guard  was  driven  back  during  the  night,  and  both  roads  were 
open  for  the  Prussian  advance  on  the  following  morning. 

Frederick  Charles  has  been  severely  (and  it  would  seem 
justly)  criticised  for  his  inaction  on  the  27th  of  June.  His 
explicit  instructions  from  Moltke  should  have  been  enough 
to  cause  him  to  hasten  forward,  and  so  threaten  the  Austrian 
left  as  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  Crown  Prince.  And 
there  was  another  reason  for  prompt  action.  As  already 
mentioned,  the  victory  of  Podol  had  opened  to  Frederick 
Charles  the  shortest  line  to  Gitschin,  from  which  place  he  was 
now  distant  only  fifteen  miles,  while  Clam-Gallas,  at  Miincheu- 
gratz, was  twenty  miles  away  from  the  same  point.  The  town 
of  Gitschin,  like  Ivrea  in  1800,  or  Sombref  and  Quatre-Bras 
in  1815,  had  accidentally  become  a  strategic  point  of  the  first 
importance  by  reason  of  the  relative  positions  of  the  opposing 


Tlic  Incasinn  of  Bohemia.  47 

armies  and  the  direction  of  the  roads  necessary  for  the  con- 
centration of  each.  All  the  roads  leading  from  the  Iser,  from 
Turnau  to  Jung  Buntzlau,  center  at  Gitschin,  whence  other 
roads  branch  out  to  Neu  Bidsow,  Koniggratz,  Josephstadt, 
Koniginhof,  and  other  important  points.  The  possession  of 
Gitschin  by  either  army  would  seriously  delay,  and  perhaps 
eventually  prevent,  the  concentration  of  the  other.  A  prompt 
movement  to  Gitschin  by  Frederick  Charles  would  have  cut 
off  Clam-Gallas,  who  could  then  have  eflfected  a  junction  with 
Benedek  only  by  a  circuitous  march  of  such  length  as  to  make 
it  probable  that  his  two  corps  would  have  been  eliminated 
altogether  from  the  problem  solved  on  the  field  of  Koniggratz. 
As  the  AustroSaxons  at  Miinchengratz,  covering  the  roads 
to  Prague,  could  have  protected  their  communications  with 
that  city,  while  menacing  the  communications  of  the  Prus- 
sians with  their  base,  it  was  doubtless  necessary  to  dislodge 
them  from  that  position;  but  Frederick  Charles  might  have 
promptly  pushed  to  Gitschin  a  force  sufficient  to  seize  and 
hold  the  place,  and  still  have  kept  in  hand  enough  troops  to 
defeat  Clam-Gallas  so  heavily  as  to  drive  him  back  in  com- 
plete rout;  for  Frederick  Charles'  army  numbered,  at  this  time, 
nearly  140,000  men,  while  Clam-Gallas  had  not  more  than 
60,000. 

This  movement  would  not  have  really  divided  Frederick 
Charles'  army,  for  the  force  at  Gitschin  and  the  one  attacking 
at  Miinchengratz  would  have  been  practically  within  support- 
ing distance,  and  in  direct  and  unimpeded  communication 
with  each  other.  Moreover,  the  nearest  troops  available  to 
oppose  such"  a  force  thrust  forward  to  Gitschin  would  have 
been  the  single  Austrian  corps  (the  Hid)  which  was  at  Mile- 
tin,  quite  as  far  from  Gitschin  as  the  main  body  of  Frederick 


48  The  Campaign  of  Koniggrdtz. 

Charles'  army  would  have  been.  Frederick  Charles'  entire 
army  could  have  been  at  Gitschin  quite  as  soon  as  Benedek 
could  have  sent  thither  any  force  large  enough  to  offer  respect- 
able opposition;  and  the  necessity  of  hurrying  troops  to  that 
point  would  have  caused  the  Austrian  commander  to  relax 
materially  the  pressure  upon  the  Crown  Prince ;  a  pressure 
which  Frederick  Charles  had  every  reason  to  believe  greater 
than  it  really  was.  Hozier  states  that  the  Prussian  comman- 
der had  formed  a  plan  to  capture  the  entire  army  of  Clani- 
Gallas;  but  Adams  truly  remarks  that  the  destruction  of  the 
Austro-Saxons  at  Miinchengratz  would  not  have  compensated 
for  a  severe  defeat  of  the  Crown  Prince.  Moreover,  as  we 
have  seen,  Clam-Gallas  was  not  captured,  but  fell  back  upon 
Gitschin,  whence  he  was  able  to  form  a  junction  with  the 
main  army.  Had  Frederick  Charles  pushed  a  force  to  Git- 
schin, and  with  the  rest  of  his  army  dealt  Clam-Gallas  such 
a  blow  as  to  send  him  reeling  back  towards  Prague,  the  Prus- 
sian general  would  have  reaped  the  double  advantage  of  inter- 
posing between  the  divided  forces  of  the  enemy  and  facilitat- 
ing his  own  junction  with  the  Crown  Prince.  Adams  correctly 
says  of  Frederick  Charles:  "The  fault  attributable  to  the 
Prince  is,  that  with  a  superiority  of  force  at  his  command, 
which  gave  him  unbounded  advantage  over  his  enemy,  he 
refused  to  incur  risks  which  that  fact  reduced' to  a  minimum, 
in  the  general  interests  of  the  campaign."* 


*The  above  criticism  on  the  delay  of  Frederick  Charles  is  based  mainly  on  the 
comments  of  Major  Adams,  in  his  "Great  Campaigns  in  Europe."  Hozier,  who,  in 
the  main,  follows  the  Prussian  Staff  History  of  the  war,  has  nothing  but  praise  for 
the  Prince.  The  absence  of  adverse  criticism  on  the  action  of  Frederick  Charles  in 
the  Prussian  Official  History  is,  perhaps,  explained  by  the  high  military  and  social 
position  of  that  general.  Adams  seems  to  think  that  a  forward  movement  by  Fred- 
erick Charles  would  have  caused  Clam-Gallas  to  abandon  Miinchengratz  at  once,  and 
does  not  seem  to  consider  that  if  the  Austro-Saxons  had  not  been  dislodged,  Clam- 
Gallas  would  have  had  the  Prussian  communications  by  the  throat,  while  covering 


TJie  Invasion  of  Hohemia.  49 

To  return  to  the  Second  Army: 

The  Crown  Prince  received  information,  at  1  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  of  the  defeat  of  the  1st  Corps  at  Trautenau. 

The  1st  Division  of  the  Guards  was  at  once  ordered  to 
move  against  Gablentz  from  Eypel,and  the  2d  Division  (which 
had  been  intended  to  support  the  Vth  Corps)  was  ordered  from 
Kosteletz  to  support  the  1st  Division.  The  movement  was 
begun  at  4  a.  m.  Anticipating  the  attack,  Gablentz  took  up 
a  position  facing  east,  with  his  left  in  Trautenau  and  his  right 
at  Prausnitz,  about  five  miles  south  of  the  former  village.  A 
brigade  of  the  Austrian  I  Vth  Corps,  ordered  to  his  assistance 
from  Jaromir,  mistook  the  route,  and  did  not  arrive  in  time  to 
participate  in  the  action. 

The  Prussian  attack  was  begun  by  the  1st  Division  of  the 
Guards  at  9:30  a.  m.  The  Austrian  center  and  right  were 
forced  back  upon  Soor  and  Altenbach.  The  brigade  on  the 
Austrian  left  w^as  "contained"  by  two  Prussian  battalions  until 
thearival  of  the  2d  Division,  at  12:30  p.  m.,  when  it  was  driven 
back  upon  Trautenau,  and  the  greater  part  of  it  captured. 
The  main  body  of  the  Austrians  was  driven  from  the  field,  and 
retreated  upon  Neustadt  and  Neuschloss.*  The  Prussian  loss 
was  713,  killed  and  wounded;  the  Austrian  loss  3674,  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners. 

his  own,  and  that  this  advantage  might  have  compensated  him  for  his  separation 
from  Benedek.  It  may  ba  urged  in  objection  to  these  comments,  that  Frederick 
Charles  did  not  know  the  exact  condition  of  affairs  in  his  front  at  the  time.  To  this 
it  may  be  replied  that  ability  to  appreciate  a  strategical  advantage,  and  power  to 
form  a  correct  estimate  of  the  enemy's  dispositions,  are  tests  of  a  general's  merits  as 
a  strategist.  McClellan  is  not  excused  for  believing  that,  when  Lee  was  attacking 
his  right  at  Gaines'  Mill,  the  enemy  was  in  strong  force  between  the  Federal  army 
and  Richmond;  and  Hamley  is  not  gentle  in  his  comments  on  Napoleon's  failure  to 
estimate  correctly  the  force  and  dispositions  of  the  Prussians  at  Jena ;  though  he 
does  not  hesitate  to  adopt  another  standard  of  criticism  when  he  finds  it  necessary 
to  defend  Wellington  for  his  error  in  leaving  at  Hal  17,000  men  so  sorely  needed  at 
Waterloo.    (See  Hamley's  "  Operations  of  War,"  p.  94  et  seq.,  and  p.  198. ) 

♦Neustadt  is  about  2  miles  south  from  Neuschloss. 
4 


50  Tlie  Caiit/iatijii.  of  Koiilt/i/'riUz. 

While  the  Guards  were  thus  engaged  in  repairing  the 
defeat  of  the  1st  Corps,  the  Vth  Corps  was  battling  with  the 
Austrians  at  Skalitz.  Baron  Ramming,  commanding  the  Aus- 
trian Vlth  Corps,  having  called  for  reinforcements,  Benedek 
ordered  the  Vlllth  Corps  to  Dolan,  about  four  miles  west  of 
Skalitz,  and  gave  the  command  of  both  corps  to  the  Archduke 
Leopold.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  the  Vlllth  Corps 
relieved  the  Vlth  in  its  position  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Aupa, 
in  front  of  Skalitz,  and  the  latter  took  up  a  position  as  a  reserve 
in  rear  of  the  right  wing.  The  IVth  Corps  was  stationed  at 
Dolan.  On  the  Prussian  side,  Steinmetz  had  been  reinforced 
by  a  brigade  of  the  Vlth  Corps.  The  Austrians  had  begun  a 
retrograde  movement  before  the  Prussian  attack  commenced ; 
and  the  corps  of  Baron  Ramming  was  already  too  far  to  the 
rear  to  give  efficient  support  to  the  Vlllth  Corps.  After  a 
severe  action,  the  Austrians  were  driven  from  their  position, 
and  retreated  upon  Lanzow  and  Salney;  the  IVth  Corps,  as  a 
rear  guard,  holding  Dolan.  The  Prussian  loss  in  the  battle  of 
Skalitz  was  1365  killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  the  Austrians 
lost  nearly  6000  men,  of  whom  2500  were  prisoners. 

The  battles  of  Soor  and  Skalitz  opened  the  passes  qf 
Trautenau  and  Nachod  to  the  unimpeded  advance  of  the  1st 
and  Vlth  Corps.  During  these  battles  the  Crown  Prince  was 
stationed  at  Kosteletz,  from  which  point  he  might  easily  reach 
either  battle-field,  if  his  presence  should  become  necessary. 
In  the  night  he  went  to  Trautenau. 

The  distance  between  the  advance  guard  of  Frederick 
Charles,  at  Ztowa,  and  that  of  the  Crown  Prince,  at  Burkers- 
dorf  (near  Soor),  was  only  twenty-seven  miles. 


The  J iifa-'^ioii  of  lloh&mia.  51 

JUNE  29th.* 

Intelligence  received  at  the  Prussian  headquarters  of  the 
battles  in  which  the  armies  had  been  engaged,  rendered  it 
certain  that  of  the  seven  Austrian  army  corps,  the  IVth,  Vlth, 
Vlllth,  and  Xth  were  opposed  to  the  Crown  Prince,  and  that 
only  the  1st  Corps  and  the  Saxons  were  arrayed  against  Fred- 
erick Charles.  The  position  of  the  Illd  Corps  was  unknown  ; 
but  it  was  clear  that  it  was  the  only  one  that  could  come  to 
the  assistance  of  Count  Clam-Gallas,  as  the  lid  Corps  was 
known  to  be  far  to  the  rear.  The  necessity  of  relieving  the 
Crown  Piince  from  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  Benedek,t 
and  the  prospect  of  being  able  to  deliver  a  crushing  blow 
upon  the  inferior  force  in  his  front,'alike  rendered  it  of  the  ut- 
most importance  that  Frederick  Charles  should  move  promptly 
upon  Gitschin.  Apparently  impatient  at  the  Prince's  delay, 
Moltke  reiterated  the  instructions  already  given  him,  saying, 
in  a  telegram  from  Berlin  on  June  29th:  "His  Majesty  ex- 
pects that  a  speedy  advance  of  the  First  Army  will  disengage 
the  Second  Army,  which,  notwithstanding  a  series  of  success- 
ful actions,  is  still  momentarily  in  a  precarious  situation." 

Frederick  Charles,  who  had  already  decided  to  advance 
without  further  delay,  at  once  moved  as  follows: 

The  Left,  from  Turnau,  via  Rowensko; 

The  Center,  from  Podol,  via  Sobotka; 

The  Right,  from  Miinchengratz,  via  Ober  Bautzen  and 
Sobotka; 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  from  Miinchengratz,  via  Unter 
Bautzen  and  lyibau. 


*See  Maps  7  and  S. 

fit  should  be  remembered  that,  in  addition  to  the  four  corps  immediately  op- 
posed to  the  Crown  Prince,  the  Hid  and  lid  Austrian  Corps  were  at  Benedek's  dis- 
posal; the  latter  being  scarcely  more  than  two  marches  distant  from  Josephstadt. 


52  The  Cainpdigii  of  Kuniggrdtz. 

The  adv'auce  of  the  army  was  rendered  difficult  by  the 
small  number  of  roads  available.  The  leading  divisions  were 
started  as  early  as  possible,  to  make  a  long  march,  in  order 
that  the  other  divisions  might  proceed  in  the  evening  on  the 
same  routes.  It  was,  even  then,  necessary  for  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  to  make  a  long  detour. 

Count  Clam-Gallas,  having  been  promised  the  assistance 
of  the  Illd  Corps,  resolved  to  make  a  stand  near  Gitschin. 
His  position  was  on  a  range  of  hills  west  and  north  of  that 
village,  his  right  resting  upon  the  village  of  Eisenstadl,  his 
left  on  the  Anna  Berg,  near  Lochow.  In  front  of  the  center 
were  the  rocky  heights  of  Prywicin,"  which,  being  almost 
impassable  for  ordinary  pedestrians,  would  isolate  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy,  while,  terminating  in  front  of  the  Austrian  po- 
sition, they  could  not  interfere  with  the  free  movements  of  the 
troops  on  the  defensive.  In  front  of  the  hills  were  ravines, 
gullies  and  broken  ground.  The  position  was  thus  very  strong 
for  an  army  whose  role  was  a  purely  defensive  one. 

Tiimpling's  division  (5th),  leaving  Rowensko  at  1:30  p.m., 
came  in  contact  with  the  enemy  shortly  after  3  o'clock.  Wer- 
der's  division  (3d)  left  Zehrow  at  noon;  but,  having  a  greater 
distance  to  march,  did  not  strike  the  enemy  until  5:30.  Tiimp- 
ling  immediately  attacked  the  Austrian  right,  with  a  view  to 
cutting  off  Count  Clam-Gallas  from  the  main  armyof  Benedek. 
The  action  continued,  with  varying  fortune,  until  7:80,  when, 
Tiimpling  having  carried  the  villageof  Dielitz,  in  the  center  of 
the  Austrian  right  wnng,  Werder  having  gained  ground  on  the 
left,  and  Benedek  having  sent  word  that  the  assistance  of  the 
I  lid  Corps  could  not  be  given.  Count  Clam-Gallas  ordered  a 
retreat.  The  Austrians  retired  in  good  order  upon  Gitschin; 
the  retreat  of  the  right  wing  being  covered  by  an  attack  of  a 


The  lurasion  of  Boliemia.  53 

brigade  upon  the  Prussians  at  Dielitz;  that  of  the  left  by  an 
attack  of  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  battalion  of  rifles.  Both 
attacks  were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Following  the  enemy, 
the  Prussians,  after  a  sharp  fight  with  the  Austrian  rear  guard 
in  the  streets,  occupied  Gitschin  after  midnight.  The  Prussian 
I0.SS  was  2612  killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  the  Austrians  lost 
about  7000  men,  of  whom  4000  were  prisoners.  Count  Clam- 
Gallas  reported  to  Benedek  that  he  had  been  defeated,  that  he 
was  no  longer  able  to  oppose  Frederick  Charles,  and  that  he 
was  retreating  upon  Koniggratz. 

Benedek  now  determined  to  throw  his  main  force  on 
Frederick  Charles,  leaving  a  "containing"  force  to  oppose  the 
Crown  Prince.  But,  with  this  object  in  view,  his  dispositions 
were  faulty.  Strangely  ignoring  the  results  of  the  battles  of 
Nachod,  Soor,  and  Skalitz,  he  seems  to  have  thought  that  one 
corps  would  suffice  to  hold  the  Crown  Prince  in  check;  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  29th  he  issued  orders  for  the  advance 
of  the  Hid  Corps  to  Gitschin,  and  the  Reserve  Cavalry  to  Hor- 
zitz.  The  lid,  Vlth,  Vlllth,  and  Xth  were  to  follow  on  the 
next  day  in  the  direction  of  lyomnitz  and  Turnau.  But  during 
the  day  events  occurred  which  necessitated  a  complete  change 
of  plan. 

In  the  Second  Army  the  1st  Corps  marched  via  Trautenau 
to  Pilnikau,  and  the  cavalry  division  following  it  halted  at 
Kaile,  where  the  Crown  Prince  established  his  headquarters. 

The  Guards  advanced  upon  Koniginhof,  from  which  place 
they  drove  out  a  brigade  of  the  Austrian  IVth  Corps,  captur- 
ing about  400  prisoners. 

The  Vth  Corps  (with  one  brigade  of  the  Vlth),  marching 
upon  Gradlitz,  encountered  the  other  brigades  of  the  Austrian 
IVth   Corps  at  Schweinschadel,  and,  after  an  action  of  three, 


54  The  Cam jiiiujii  of  KihiujuriUz. 

hours,  drove  them  from  the  field  with  a  loss  of  nearly  7)000 
meu,  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  The  Austrians  retreated 
to  Salney.     The  Crown  Prince  had  now  reached  the  Elbe. 

During  the  day  Benedek,  becoming  alarmed  at  the  prog- 
ress of  the  Second  Army,  countermanded  the  order  for  the 
Hid  Corps  to  move  upon  Oitschin,  and  directed  it  to  remain 
at  Miletin.  The  1st  Corps  and  the  Saxons  were  ordered  to 
join  the  main  army  via  Horzitz  and  Miletin;  but  the  orders, 
as  we  have  seen,  came  too  late  to  save  them  from  their  defeat 
at  Gitschin.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  concentrated  before 
night  upon  the  plateau  of  Dubenetz,  against  the  army  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  as  follows: 

The  IVth  Corps  at  Salney,  with  the  1st  Reserve  Cavalry 
Division,  and  the  2d  Light  Cavalry  Division  on  its  right  and 
rear; 

The  lid  Corps  at  Kukus,  on  the  left  of  the  IVth; 

The  Vlllth  Corps  near  Kasow  (one  brigade  in  line  on 
the  left  of  the  lid  Corps,  the  other  brigades  as  reserve); 

The  Vlth  Corps  on  the  left  of  the  Vlllth; 

The  3d  Reserve  Cavalry  Division  on  the  left  of  the  Vlth 
Corps; 

The  2d  Reserve  Cavalry  Division  on  the  extreme  left 
wing; 

The  Xth  Corps,  in  reserve,  between  Stern  and  Liebthal. 

Five  army  corps  and  four  cavalry  divisions  were  thus 
concentrated  on  a  line  five  and  one-half  miles  long.  The 
nature  of  the  ground  was  unfavorable  to  the  interior  com- 
munications of  the  line,  but  it  was,  in  the  main,  a  strong  posi- 
tion, with  the  Elbe  on  its  front  and  the  fortress  of  Josephstadt 
protecting  its  right  flank. 


Tlte  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  55 

The  junction  of  the  Prussian  armies  now  seemed  assured, 
and  the  strategical  situation  was  decidedly  against  Benedek. 
His  great  fault  was  his  failure  to  decide  promptly  in  regard 
to  the  army  which  he  should  "contain"  while  throwing  his 
weight  upon  the  other.  Placing  an  exaggerated  value  upon 
his  interior  position,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  considered  that 
every  hour  of  Prussian  advance  diminished  his  advantages; 
and  he  was,  apparently,  unable  to  make  his  choice  of  the  two 
plans  of  operations  which  presented  themselves.  His  best 
move,  if  made  in  time,  w^ould  have  been  against  Frederick 
Charles.  True,  his  communications  could  have  been  quickly 
cut,  in  this  case,  by  a  successful  advance  of  the  Second  Army 
across  the  Elbe:  while  in  moving  against  the  Crown  Prince, 
his  communications  could  not  so  readily  have  been  seized  bj^ 
Frederick  Charles.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  topographical 
features  made  it  an  easier  matter  to  "contain"  the  Second  Army 
than  the  B'irst  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe.  If  the  Feld- 
zeugmeister  had  learned  the  lesson  taught  at  Atlanta,  Frank- 
lin, and  Petersburg,  he  would  have  made  use  of  hasty  intrench- 
ments.  The  Xth  Corps  and  Vlth  Corps,  strongly  intrenched, 
could  certainly  have  held  the  passes  against  the  assaults  of 
the  Crown  Prince.  The  ground  was  admirably  adapted  to 
defense,  and  the  intrenchments  would  have  more  than  neu- 
tralized the  superiority  of  the  needle-gun  over  the  Lorenz 
rifle.  To  have  invested  and  reduced  the  intrenched  camps, 
if  possible  at  all,  would  have  required  much  more  time  than 
Benedek  would  have  needed  for  disposing  of  Frederick 
Charles.  To  have  advanced  by  the  road  leading  to  Olmiitz 
or  Bomisch  Triibau,  the  Crown  Prince  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  mask  the  passes  with  at  least  as  many  troops  as  gar- 
risoned the  camps  at  their  outlets,  or  his  own  communications 


56  The  Campaign  of  Koniggrdtz. 

would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  Austrians.  This  would 
have  left  him  only  two  corps;  and  an  invasion  of  Moravia 
with  this  small  force,  every  step  of  the  advance  carrying  him 
farther  away  from  Frederick  Charles,  would  have  been  an  act 
of  suicidal  madness,  which  he  would  not  have  seriously  con- 
templated for  a  moment.  When  Osman  Pasha,  eleven  years 
later,  paralyzed  the  advance  of  110,000  Russians,  by  placing 
40,000  Turks  in  a  hastily  intrenched  position  on  their  right, 
at  Plevna,  he  showed  plainly  how  Benedek  might  have 
baulked  the  Second  Army  with  intrenched  positions  at  the 
Silesian  passes. 

lyeaviug,  then,  two  corps  to  take  care  of  the  Crown  Prince, 
the  Austrian  commander  would  have  had  (including  the  Sax- 
ons) six  corps,  and  nearly  all  of  the  reserve  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery, to  use  against  Frederick  Charles.  Count  Clam  Gallas, 
instead  of  undertaking  the  task  of  holding  the  line  of  the  Iser, 
should  have  destroyed  the  bridges;  and,  opposing  the  Prus- 
sians with  a  strong  rear  guard  at  the  different  crossings, 
obstructing  the  roads,  offering  just  enough  resistance  to  com- 
pel his  adversary  to  deploy  and  thus  lose  time,  but  avoiding 
anything  like  a  serious  action,  he  should  have  fallen  back  via 
Gitschin  to  form  a  junction  with  Benedek.  He  could  thus 
have  gained  sufiScient  time  for  his  chief  to  arrive  at  Gitschin 
as  soon  as  Frederick  Charles;  and  the  army  of  the  latter,  num- 
bering not  more  than  130,000  men,*  would  have  been  opposed 
by  an  army  of  fully  200,000  Austrians.  What  the  result 
would  have  been  we  can  best  judge  from  the  course  of  the 


*At  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  Frederick  Charles  had  128,918  men.  His  losses  at 
Gitschin  aggregated  2612  men.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  130,000  men  is  a  high  esti- 
mate of  the  maximum  force  which  he  would  have  been  able  to  oppose  to  Benedek 
at  Gitschin,  had  the  latter  made  a  junction  with  Clam-Gallas  at  that  point. 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  57 

battle  of  Koniggratz  before  the  Crown  Prince  arrived  upon 
the  field. 

Hozier,  Adams,  Derrecagaix,  and  (above  all)  the  Prus- 
sian Official  History  of  the  Campaign  of  1866,  claim  tl  at  the 
best  move  of  Benedek  would  have  been  against  the  Crown 
Prince.  If  we  consider  the  successful  passage  of  the  defiles 
by  the  Second  Army  as  a  thing  to  be  taken  for  granted  in 
Benedek's  plan  of  campaign,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
Austrian  commander  should  have  turned  his  attention  to  the 
Crown  Prince,  and  that  he  should  have  attacked  him  with  six 
corps,  as  soon  as  the  Prussians  debouched  from  the  defiles  of 
Trautenau  and  Nachod.  The  line  of  action  here  suggested 
as  one  that  would  probably  have  resulted  in  Austrian  success 
is  based  entirely  on  the  condition  that  the  Second  Army 
should  be  "contained"  at  the  defiles,  by  a  force  strongly 
intrenched  after  the  American  manner  of  1864-5;  a  condition 
not  considered  by  the  eminent  authorities  mentioned  above. 
After  the  Crown  Prince  had  safely  passed  the  defiles,  Benedek 
had  either  to  attack  him  or  fall  back.  The  time  for  a  success- 
ful move  against  Frederick  Charles  had  passed. 

The  Austrian  commander  had  carefully  planned  an 
invasion  of  Prussia.  Had  he  been  able  to  carry  the  war  into 
that  country,  his  operations  might,  perhaps,  have  been  admir- 
able; but  when  the  superior  preparation  of  the  Prussians 
enabled  them  to  take  the  initiative,  he  seems  to  have  been 
incapable  of  throwing  aside  his  old  plans  and  promptly  adopt- 
ing new  ones  suited  to  the  altered  condition  of  affairs.  Bene- 
dek was  a  good  tactician  and  a  stubborn  fighter;  but  when  he 
told  the  Emperor,  "Your  Majesty,  I  am  no  strategist,"  and 
wished  to  decline  the  command  of  the  ajmy,  he  showed  a 
power  of  correct  self-analysis  equal  to  that  displayed  by  Burn- 


58  The  Cani/xiign  <if  hiiitif/f/nilz. 

side  when  he  expressed  an  opinion  of  his  own  unfitness  for 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  brave  old 
soldier  did  not  seem  to  appreciate  the  strategical  situation, 
and  was  apparently  losing  his  head.*  With  all  the  advan- 
tages of  interior  lines,  he  had  everywhere  opposed  the  Prus- 
sians with  inferior  numbers;  he  had  allowed  the  Crown  Prince 
to  pass  through  the  defiles  of  the  mountains  before  he  opposed 
him  at  all;  six  of  his  eight  corps  had  suffered  defeat ;  he  had 
lost  more  than  30,000  men;  and  now  he  was  in  a  purely  defen- 
sive position,  and  one  which  left  open  the  road  from  Arnau 
to  Gitschin  for  the  junction  of  the  Prussian  armies. 

It  would  have  been  better  than  this  had  the  Austrians 
everywhere  fallen  back  without  firing  a  shot,  even  at  the 
expense  of  opposing  no  obstacles  to  the  Prussian  concentra- 
tion; for  they  could  then,  at  least,  have  concentrated  their  own 
army  for  a  decisive  battle  without  the  demoralization  attend- 
ant upon  repeated  defeats. 

JUNE  30th. 
A    detachment   of  cavalry,    sent    by    Frederick    Charles 


*Col.  C.  B.  Brackenbury,  R.A.,  who  accompanied  the  Austrian  headquarters 
during:  the  campaign,  says  that  on  one  occasion  he  heard  Benedek  say,  hotly,  to  his 
disputing  staff,  "For  God's  sake,  do  something!"  and  mentions  tlie  following  inci- 
dent: "After  the  battles  of  Nachod  and  Traut*^nau,  the  second  officer  of  the  Intelli- 
gence Department  examined  all  the  prisoners,  and  obtained  clear  information  of  the 
whereabouts  of  all  the  columns  of  the  Crown  Prince,  then  struggling  through  the 
mountain  passes.  He  wrote  his  report  and  took  it  to  the  officer  who  had  been  sent  to 
Benedek  to  decide  the  strategy  of  the  campaign.  At  that  time  several  Austria'n  corps 
were  close  by.  The  general  looked  at  the  paper  and  had  all  the  facts  explained  to 
him.  He  then  dismissed  the  captain,  who,  however,  remained  and  said,  i)robab]y 
in  that  tone  of  distrust  which  prevailed,  '  Now,  Herr  General,  I  have  shown  you  that 
t  he  Crown  Prince  can  be  beaten  in  detail  if  attacked  by  our  great  force  within  half 
a  day's  march;  may  I  ask  what  you  propose  to  do  with  the  Austrian  army?'  The 
g  eneral  replied,  'I  shall  send  it  against  Prince. Frederick  Charles.'  The  captain  put 
liis  hands  together  in  an  attitude  of  supplication  and  said,  'For  God's  sake,  sir,  do 
not,'  but  was  ordered  out  of  the  room.  I  did  not  know  this  fact  when  Benedek  said, 
t  he  day  after  the  defeat  of  Koniggratz,  '  Did  you  ever  see  such  a  fine  army  so  thrown 
a  way?  '  "— "  Field  Works,"  by  Col.  C.  B.  Brackenbury,  B.A.,  p.  205  and  note. 


The  Invcmon  of  BoJifmia.  5^ 

towards  Arnau,  met  the  advance  guard  of  the  1st  Corps  at 
that  place.  Comniuuication  was  thus  opened  between  the  two 
armies. 

It  was  evident  that  the  advance  of  Frederick  Charles 
would,  by  threatening  the  left  and  rear  of  the  Austrians,  cause 
them  to  abandon  their  position  on  the  Elbe,  and  thus  loosen- 
ing Benedek's  hold  on  the  passages  of  the  river,  permit  the 
Crown  Prince  to  cross  without  opposition. 

The  following  orders  were  therefore  sent  by  Moltke: 

"The  Second  Army  will  hold  its  ground  on  the  Upper 
Elbe;  its  right  wing  will  be  prepared  to  effect  a  junction  with 
the  left  wing  of  the  First  Army,  by  way  of  Koniginhof,  as  the 
latter  advances.  The  First  Army  will  press  on  towards  Kon- 
iggratz  without  delay. 

"  Any  forces  of  the  enemy  that  may  be  on  the  right  flank 
of  this  advance  will  be  attacked  by  General  Herwarth,  and 
separated  from  the  enemy's  mam  force." 

On  this  day  the  armies  of  Frederick  Charles  marched  as 
follows: 

The  Illd  Corps,  to  Aulubitz  and  Chotec; 

The  IVth  Corps,  to  Konetzchlum  and  Milicowes; 

The  lid  Corps,  to  Gitschin  and  Podhrad; 

The  Cavalry  Corps,  to  Dworetz  and  Robaus; 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  to  the  vicinity  of  Libau ; 

The  Landwehr  Guard  Division,  which  had  been  pushed 
forward  from  Saxony,  arrived  at  Jung  Buntzlau* 

The  Second  Army  remained  in  the  position  of  the  preced- 
ing day. 

■■'■  Gitschiu,  .Jung  Buntzlau,  and  Libau  are  shown  on  Map  No.  fi.  The  positions 
of  the  other  places  here  mentioned  are,  in  reference  to  Gitschin,  as  follows:  Aulu 
bitz,  nearly  4  miles  east;  Chotec,  about  IV2  miles  east;  Konetzchlum,  about  6i4  miles 
east-south-east :  Milicowes,  about  4V4  miles  south-south-east ;  Podhrad,  about  2  miles 
south-west;  Robaus,  about  2  miles  east:  Dworetz,  near,  and  north  of,  Robaus. 


60  The  Catnjuiujn  of  Koniggrdtz. 

Benedek's  army  remained  in  its  position  on  the  plateau 
of  Dubenetz. 

JULY  1st.® 

At  1  o'clock  in  the  morning  Benedek  began  his  retreat 
towards  Koniggratz. 

The  Hid  Corps  moved  to  Sadowa; 

The  Xth  Corps,  to  lyipa ; 

The  3d  Reserve  Cavalry  Division,  to  Dohalica ; 

The  Vlth  Corps,  to  Wsestar; 

The  2d  Reserve  Cavalry  Division,  to  a  position  between 
Wsestar  and  Koniggratz; 

The  Vlllth  Corps,  to  Nedelist,  on  left  of  the  village; 

The  IVth  Corps,  to  Nedelist,  on  right  of  the  village; 

The  lid  Corps,  to  Trotina ; 

The  2d  Light  Cavalry  Division,  to  the  right  of  the  lid 
Corps; 

The  1st  Reserve  Cavalry  Division,  behind  Trotina; 

The  1st  Corps  took  up  a  position  in  front  of  Koniggratz ; 

The  1st  Light  Cavalry  Division,  on  the  left  of  the  1st 
Corps; 

The  Saxons  were  stationed  at  Neu  Prim. 

The  Prussian  armies,  though  at  liberty  to  concentrate, 
remained  separated  for  tactical  considerations.  The  armies 
were  to  make  their  junction,  if  possible,  upon  the  field  of 
battle,  in  a  combined  front  and  flank  attack  upon  the  enemy. 
In  the  meantime,  as  they  were  only  a  short  day's  march  from 
each  other,  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  separation  was 
reduced  to  a  minimum. 

Frederick  Charles'  armies  moved  as  follows: 


'  See  Map  No.  9. 


llic  hirasion  of  Bohemia.  61 

The  Illd  Corps,  to  Miletin  and  Dobes; 

The  IVth  Corps,  to  Horzitz  and  Gutwasser; 

The  lid  Corps,  to  Aujezd  and  Wostromer; 

The  1st  Cavalry  Division,  to  Baschnitz; 

The  2d  Cavalry  Division,  to  Liskowitz; 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  to  a  position  between  Libau  and 
Hochweseley. 

In  the  Second  Army,  the  1st  Corps  was  thrown  across  the 
Elbe  to  Prausnitz,  and  the  Vlth  Corps  arrived  at  Gradlitz. 

JULY  2d.» 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe  moved  forward  to  Chotetitz,  Lhota, 
and  Hochwe^seley,  with  an  advance  guard  at  Smidar. 

The  Guard  Landwehr  Division  advanced  to  Kopidlno,  a 
few  miles  w'est  of  Hochweseley. 

The  Austrians  remained  in  the  positions  of  the  preceding 
day,  but  sent  their  train  to  the  left  |Dank  of  the  Elbe. 

Incredible  as  it  seems,  the  Prussians  were  ignorant  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Austrians  from  the  plateau  of  Dubenetz,  and 
did  not,  in  fact,  even  know  that  Benedek  had  occupied  that 
position.  The  Austrians  were  supposed  to  be  behind  the 
Elbe,  between  Josephstadt  and  Koniggratz.  On  the  other 
hand,  Benedek  seems  to  have  been  completely  in  the  dark  in 
regard  to  the  movements  of  the  Prussians.  The  Prussian 
Stafif  History  acknowledges  that  "the  outposts  of  both  armies 
faced  each  other  on  this  day  within  a  distance  of  four  and  one- 
half  miles,  without  either  army  suspecting  the  near  and  con- 
centrated presence  of  the  other  one."  Each  commander  was, 
in  fact,  ignorant  of  the  presence,  almost  in  cannon-shot,  of  an 
enormous  hostile  army. 


*See  Map  No.  9. 


62  The  Caiii/iaiijii  of  K<)nii/</r'Uz. 

Supposing  the  Aiistriaus  to  be  between  Josephstadt  and 
Koniggratz,  two  plans  were  open  to  Moltke's  choice.  First: 
To  attack  the  Austrian  position  in  front  with  the  First  Army 
and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  and  on  its  right  with  the  Second 
Army.  This  would  have  necessitated  forcing  the  passage  of 
a  river  in  the  face  of  a  formidable  enemy;  but  this  passage 
would  have  been  facilitated  by  the  flank  attack  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  whose  entire  army  (except  the  1st  Corps)  was  across 
the  river.  It  would  have  been  a  repetition  of  Magenta  on  a 
gigantic  scale,  with  the  Crown  Prince  playing  the  part  of 
McMahon,  and  Frederick  Charles  enacting  the  rS/e  of  the 
French  Emperor.  Second:  To  maneuver  the  enemy  out  of 
his  position  by  moving  upon  Pardubitz,  the  occupation  of 
which  place  would  be  a  serious  menace  to  his  communications. 
The  latter  movement  would  necessitate  the  transfer  of  the 
Second  Army  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  and  then  the  exe- 
cution of  a  flank  march  in  dangerous  proximity  to  the  enemy; 
but  its  successful  execution  might  have  produced  decisive 
results.  This  movement  by  the  right  would  have  been  strik- 
ingly similar  to  Moltke's  movement  by  the  left  across  the  Mo- 
selle, four  years  later.  The  resulting  battle  might  have  been 
an  antedated  Gravelotte.  and  Benedek  might  have  found  a 
Metz  in  Koniggratz  or  Josephstadt.  At  the  very  least,  the 
Austrians  would,  probably,  have  been  maneuvered  out  of  their 
position  behind  the  Elbe. 

Before  determining  upon  a  plan  of  operations,  it  was 
decided  to  reconnoiter  the  Elbe  and  the  Aupa.  The  Army  of 
the  Elbe  was  directed  to  watch  the  country  towards  Prague, 
and  to  seize  the  passages  of  the  river  at  Pardubitz.  The  First 
Army  was  ordered  to  take  up  the  line  Neu  Bidsow-Horzitz 
and  to  send  a  detichment  from  its  left  wing  to  Sadowa,  to 


The  Invasion  of  Bohemia.  63 

reconnoiter  the  line  of  the  Elbe  between  Koniggriitz  and 
Josephstadt.  The  1st  Corps  was  to  observe  the  latter  fortress, 
and  to  cover  the  flank  march  of  the  Second  Army,  if  the 
movement  in  question  should  be  decided  upon.  The  remain- 
ing corps  of  the  Second  Army  were,  for  the  present,  to  remain 
in  their  positions,  merely  reconnoitering  towards  the  Aupa  and 
the  Metau. 

These  orders  were  destined  to  be  speedily  countermanded. 

Colonel  Zychlinsky,  who  commanded  an  outpost  at  the 
castle  of  Cerakwitz,  reported  an  Austrian  encampment  near 
Lipa,  and  scouting  parties,  which  were  then  sent  out,  returned, 
after  a  vigorous  pursuit  by  the  Austrian  cavalry,  and  reported 
the  presence  of  the  Austrian  army  in  force,  behind  the  Bist- 
ritz,  extending  from  Problus  to  the  village  of  Benatek.  These 
reports,  received  after  6  o'clock  p.  m.,  entirely  changed  the 
aspect  of  matters. 

Under  the  influence  of  his  war  experience,  Frederick 
Charles  was  rapidly  developing  the  qualities  of  a  great  com- 
mander; his  self-confidence  was  increasing,  and  his  actions 
now  displayed  the  vigor  and  military  perspicacity  of  Mars  la- 
Tour  rather  than  the  hesitation  of  Miinchengratz.*  He  be- 
lieved that  Benedek,  with  at  least  four  corps,  was  about  to 
attack  him;    but  he  unhesitatingl}'  decided  to  preserve    the 


*  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  srowth  of  great  generals  under  the  influence  of 
their  actual  experience  in  war.  The  Frecierick  of  Rossbach  and  Leuthen  was  very 
different  from  tlie  Frederick  of  Mollwitz.  In  1796  we  find  Napoleon  calling  a  coun- 
cil of  war  before  hazarding  a  secind  attempt  upon  Colli's  position  at  St.  Michel, 
and  showing,  even  in  that  vigorous  and  brilliant  campaign,  a  hesitation  never 
shown  by  the  Mapoleon  of  Ulm  and  Austerlitz.  The  Grraut  of  Vicksburg  was  not  the 
Grant  of  Shiloh ;  and  Lee  at  Chancellorsville  and  Petersburg  does  not  seem  like  the 
same  commander  who  conducted  the  impotent  campaign  of  1861  in  West  Virginia. 
The  old  saying,  "Great  generals  are  born,  not  made."  is  not  altogether  true.  It 
would  be  more  correct  to  say,  Men  naturally  gifted  with  the  mental,  moral,  and 
physical  r4ualities  requisite  for  the  exercise  of  high  command  become  great  generals 
through  training  and  experience. 


64  The  Cdiiipdujii  II f  Ki'iii'ujiiviltz. 

advantages  of  the  initiative,  by  himself  attacking  the  Austri- 
ans  in  front,  in  the  early  morning,  while  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  should  attack  their  left.  The  cooperation  of  the  Crown 
Prince  was  counted  upon  to  turn  the  Austrian  right,  and  thus 
secure  victory. 

With  these  objects  in  view,  the  following  movements  were 
promptly  ordered: 

The  ^th  Division  to  be  in  position  at  Milowitz  at  2  a.  m.; 

The  7th  Division  to  take  post  at  Cerakwitz  by  2  a.  m.; 

The  5th  and  6th  Divisions  to  start  at  1:30  a.  m.,  and  take 
post  as  reserves  south  of  Horzitz,  the  5th  west,  and  the  6th 
east,  of  the  Koniggratz  road; 

The  3d  Division  to  Psanek,  and  the  4th  to  Bristan;  both 
to  be  in  position  by  2  a.  m.; 

The  Cavalry  Corps  to  be  saddled  by  daybreak,  and  await 
orders; 

The  reserve  artillery  to  Horzitz. 

General  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld,  with  all  available  troops 
of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  to  Nechanitz,  as  soon  as  possible. 

Lieutenant  Normand  was  sent  to  the  Crown  Prince  with 
a  request  that  he  take  post  with  one  or  two  corps  in  front  of 
Josephstadt,  and  march  with  another  to  Gross  Burglitz. 

The  chief-of-staff  of  the  First  Army,  General  Voigts-Rhetz, 
hastened  to  report  the  situation  of  matters  to  the  King,  who 
had  assumed  command  of  the  armies  on  June  30th,  and  now 
had  his  headquarters  at  Gitschin.  The  measures  taken  by 
Frederick  Charles  were  approved,  and  Moltke  at  once  issued 
orders  for  the  advance  of  the  entire  Second  Army,  as  requested 
by  that  commander.  These  orders  were  sent  at  midnight,  one 
copy  being  sent  through  Frederick  Charles  at  Kamenitz;  the 
other  being  carried  by  Count  Finkenstein  direct  to  the  Crown 


The  Invas'wn  of  Bohemia.  65 

Prince  at  Koniginhof.  The  officer  who  had  been  sent  by 
Frederick  Charles  to  the  Crown  Prince  was  returning,  with  an 
answer  that  the  orders  from  army  headquarters  made  it  im- 
possible to  support  the  First  Army  with  more  than  the  1st 
Corps  and  the  Reserve  Cavalry.  Fortunately,  he  met  Fink- 
enstein  a  short  distance  from  Koniginhof.  Comparing  notes, 
the  two  officers  returned  together  to  the  Crown  Prince,  who  at 
once  issued  orders  for  the  movement  of  his  entire  armj^  to  the 
assistance  of  Frederick  Charles. 

In  order  to  deliver  his  dispatches  to  the  Crown  Prince, 
Finkenstein  had  ridden  twent5'-two  and  one-half  miles,  over 
a  strange  road,  on  a  dark,  rainy  night.  Had  he  lost  his  way, 
had  his  horse  suflfered  injury,  had  he  encountered  an  Aus- 
trian patrol,  the  history  of  Germany  might  have  been  diifer- 
ent.  It  is  almost  incredible  that  the  Pru-sian  general  should 
have  diverged  so  widely  from  the  characteristic  German  pru- 
dence as  to  make  success  contingent  upon  the  life  of  an  aid- 
de-camp,  or  possibly  the  life  of  a  horse.  Even  had  the  other 
courier,  riding  via  Kamenitz,  reached  his  destination  safely, 
the  time  that  must  have  elapsed  between  the  Crown  Prince's 
declination  of  cooperation  and  his  later  promise  to  render  full 
assistance  would  have  been  sufficient  to  derange,  and  perhaps 
destroy,  the  combinations  of  Moltke. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  Austrian  position.  Derrecagaix 
describes  it  as  follows: 

"  In  front  of  the  position,  on  the  west,  ran  the  Bistritz,  a 
little  river  difficult  to  cross  in  ordinary  weather,  and  then  very 
much  swollen  by  the  recent  rains. 

"On  the  north,  between  the  Bistritz  and  the  Trotina,  was 
a  space  of  about  five  kilometers,  by  which  the  columns  of  the 
assailants  might  advance.     Between  these  two  rivers  and  the 


66  The  CamjiaKjn  nf  Ki'iniiif/rnlz. 

Elbe  the  ground  is  broken  with  low  hills,  covered  with  villages 
and  woods,  which  gave  the  defense  advantageous  points  of  sup- 
port. In  the  center  the  hill  of  Chlum  formed  the  key  of  the 
position,  and  commanded  the  road  from  Sadowa  to  Konig- 
gratz.  The  heights  of  Horenowes  covered  the  right  on  the 
north.  The  heights  of  Problus  and  Hradek  constituted  a  solid 
support  for  the  left.  At  the  south  the  position  of  Liebau 
afforded  protection  on  this  side  to  the  communications  of  the 
army.* 

"The  position  selected  had,  then,  considerable  defensive 
value;  but  it  had  the  defect  of  having  at  its  back  the  Elbe 
and  the  defiles  formed  by  the  bridges." 

On  this  subject,  however,  Hozier  says:  "The  Austrian 
commander  took  the  precaution  to  throw  bridges  over  the 
river.  With  plenty  of  bridges,  a  river  in  rear  of  a  position 
became  an  advantage.  After  the  retreating  army  had  with- 
drawn across  the  stream,  the  bridges  were  broken,  and  the 
river  became  an  obstacle  to  the  pursuit.  Special,  as  well  as 
general,  conditions  also  came  into  play.  *  *  *  *  The 
heavy  guns  of  the  fortress  scoured  the  banks  of  the  river,  both 
up  and  down   stream,    and,    with  superior  weight   of    metal 


*The  author's  own  obs<»rvations  of  the  topography  of  the  field  correspond,  in 
the  main,  with  the  description  given  above.  The  Bistritz,  however,  is  not  such  a 
formidable  obstacle  as  one  might  infer  from  the  description  quoted.  At  the  village 
of  Sadowa  it  is  a  mere  ditch,  not  much  larger  than  some  of  the  acequias  in  Colorado 
or  Utah.  It  is  perhaps  eight  feet  wide  and  three  feet  in  depth.  It  could  hardly  have 
been  an  obstacle  to  infantry.  Its  muddy  bottom  and  marshy  banks  doubtless  ren- 
dered it  a  considerable  obstacle  for  artillery,  but  the  eight  villages  through  which  it 
flows,  within  the  limits  of  the  battle-field,  certainly  could  have  furnished  abundant 
material  for  any  number  of  small  bridges  required  for  crossing  it.  In  the  vicinity  of 
Nechanitz,  the  Bistritz,  having  received  the  waters  of  a  tributary  creek,  becomes  a 
true  obstacle,  as  it  spreads  out  to  a  width  of  about  thirty  yards,  and  the  banks  are 
swampy.  It  should  be  remarked  that  at  the  time  of  the  author's  visit  to  Koniggratz, 
there  had  been  very  heavy  rains,  and  the  condition  of  the  stream  was  probably  the 
same  as  on  the  day  of  the  battle. 


The  Inrosion  of  Bohemia.  67 

and  length  of  range,  were  able  to  cover  the  passage  of  the 
Austriaus." 

In  considering  the  Austrian  retreat,  we  shall  find  that 
neither  of  these  distinguished  authorities  is  entirely  right,  or 
wholly  wrong,  in  regard  to  the  defects  and  advantages  of  the 
position  described. 

The  following  dispositions  were  ordered  by  Benedek: 

The  Saxons  to  occupy  the  heights  of  Popowitz,  the  left 
wing  slightly  refused,  and  covered  by  the  Saxon  Cavalry: 

The  1st  I/ight  Cavalry  Division,  to  the  rear  and  left,  at 
Problus  and  Prim; 

The  Xth  Corps  on  the  right  of  the  Saxons; 

The  Illd  Corps  to  occupy  the  heights  of  Lipa  and  Chlum. 
on  the  right  of  the  Xth  Corps ; 

The  Vlllth  Corps  in  reserve,  in  rear  of  the  Saxons. 

In  case  the  attack  should  be  confined  to  the  left  wing, 
the  other  corps  were  merely  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness. 
If,  however,  the  attack  should  extend  to  the  center  and  right, 
the  following  dispositions  were  to  be  made : 

The  IVth  Corps  to  move  up  on  the  right  of  the  Hid  to 
the  heights  of  Chlum  and  Nedelist; 

The  lid  Corps  on  the  right  of  the  IVth,  constituting  the 
extreme  right  flank ; 

The  2d  Light  Cavalry  Division,  to  the  rear  of  Nedelist ; 

The  Vlth  Corps  to  be  massed  on  the  heights  of  Wsestar; 

The  1st  Corps  to  be  massed  at  Rosnitz; 

The  1st  and  3d  Cavalry  Divisions  to  take  position  at 
Sweti; 

The  2d  Reserve  Cavalry  Division,  at  Briza; 

The  Reserve  Artillery  behind  the  1st  and  Vlth  Corps. 


08  The  Ccunpa if/lb  of  Kdni(/(/ratz. 

The  1st  and  Vlth  Corps,  the  five  cavalry  divisions,  and  the 
Reserve  Artillery  were  to  constitute  the  general  reserve. 

A  slight  attempt  was  made  to  strengthen  the  position  by 
throwing  up  intrenchments.  Six  batteries  were  constructed 
on  the  right,  as  well  as  breastworks  for  about  eight  companies 
of  supporting  infantry.  The  infantry  breastworks,  as  well  as 
the  batteries,  were  constructed  by  engineer  soldiers,  and  were 
of  strong  profile,  with  traverses,  and  had  a  command  of  eight 
feet.  There  was  not  the  slightest  attempt  to  have  the  infantry 
shelter  themselves  with  hasty  intrenchmeuts.  Even  the  earth- 
works that  were  constructed  were  of  no  use ;  for  a  misundei- 
standing  of  orders  caused  the  line  of  battle  to  be  established 
far  in  advance  of  them.  On  the  left  but  little  was  done  to 
strengthen  the  position  before  the  Prussian  attack  began. 


The  Bailie  of  Koniggrdtz.  69 


Chapter  V. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  KONIGGRATZ,  JULY  3d.* 

Notwithstanding  the  heavy  rain,  the  muddy  roads,  and 
the  late  hour  at  which  the  orders  had  been  received,  the  divis- 
ions of  the  First  Army  were  all  at  their  appointed  places  soon 
after  dawn.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe  pushed  forward  energet- 
ically, and  at  5:45  o'clock  its  commander  notified  Frederick 
Charles  that  he  would  be  at  Nechanitz  between  7  and  9  o'clock , 
with  thirty-six  battalions.  The  First  Army  was  at  once  or- 
dered forward. 

The  8th  Division  marched  on  the  left  of  the  high  road,  as 
the  advance  guard  of  the  troops  moving  upon  Sadowa. 

The  4th  and  3d  Divisions  advanced  on  the  right  of  the 
road,  abreast  of  the  8th. 

The  5th  and  6th  Divisions  followed  the  8th  on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  road  respectively,  while  the  Reserve  Artillery 
moved  on  the  road  itself. 

The  Cavalry  Corps  had  started  from  Gutwasser  at  5 
o'clock,  and  it  now  marched  behind  the  right  wing  to  main- 
tain communication  with  the  Army  of  the  Elbe. 

The  7ih  Division  was  to  leave  Cerekwitz  as  soon  as  the 
noise  of  the  opening  battle  was  heard,  and  was  to  join  in  the 
action  according  to  circumstances. 

The  divisional  cavalry  of  the  5th  and  6th  Divisions  was 
formed  into  a  brigade,  and  a  brigade  of  the  Cavalry  Division 
was  attached  to  the  lid  Corps. 

*See  Map  No.  10. 


70  The  Cattipaign  of  Knniqijratz. 

About  7:80  the  advance  guard  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe 
reached  Nechanitz,  where  it  encountered  a  Saxon  outpost, 
which  retired  after  destroying  the  bridges. 

About  the  same  time  the  8th  Division  advanced  in  Hne 
of  battle  upon  Sadowa,  The  Austrian  artillery  opened  fire  as 
soon  as  the  Prussians  came  in  sight.  The  latter  took  up  a 
position  near  the  Sadowa  brickfield,  and  skirmishing  began. 

The  4th  Division  took  up  a  position  at  Mzan,  on  the  right 
of  the  8th,  and  its  batteries  engaged  in  combat  with  the  Aus- 
trian artillery. 

The  3d  Division  formed  on  the  right  of  the  Fourth,  near 
Zawadilka, 

The  5th  and  6th  Divisions  formed  line  at  Klenitz;  one  on 
each  side  of  the  road. 

The  Reserve  Cavalry  was  stationed  at  Sucha- 

At  the  first  sound  of  the  cannon  Fransecky  opened  fire 
upon  the  village  of  Benatek,  which  was  soon  set  on  fire  by  the 
Prussian  shells.  The  village  was  then  carried  by  assault  by 
the  advance  guard  of  the  7th  Division. 

There  was  now  a  heavy  cannonade  all  along  the  line. 
The  heavy  downpour  of  the  last  night  nad  given  place  to  a 
dense  fcjg  and  a  drizzling  rain,  and  the  obscurity  was  height- 
ened by  the  clouds  of  smoke  which  rose  from  the  guns. 
Frederick  Charles  rode  along  the  right  wing,  giving  orders  to 
respond  to  the  Austrian  batteries  with  a  slow  fire,  and  forbid- 
ding the  crossing  of  the  Bistritz.  His  object  was  merely  to 
contain  Benedek,  while  waiting  for  the  weather  to  clear  up, 
and  for  the  turning  armies  to  gain  time. 

At  8  o'clock  loud  cheering  announced  the  arrival  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  upon  the  battle-field.  As  soon  as  Frederick 
Charles  reported  to   him   the  condition   of  affairs,  the  King 


The  Bailie  of  Konif/r/rdlz.  71 

ordered  an  advance  upon  the  line  of  the  Bistritz.  The  object 
of  this  movement  was  to  gain  good  points  of  support  for  the 
divisions  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Kistritz,  from  which  they 
might  launch  forth,  at  the  proper  time,  upon  the  main  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy.  The  divisions  were  cautioned  not  to 
advance  too  far  beyond  the  stream,  nor  up  to  the  opposite 
heights. 

The  Austrian  position  differed  slightly  from  the  one 
ordered  on  the  eve  of  the  battle.  The  Saxons,  instead  of 
holding  the  heights  eastward  of  Popowitz  and  Tresowitz. 
found  a  more  advantageous  position  on  the  heights  between 
Problus  and  Prim,  with  a  brigade  holding  the  hills  behind 
Lubno,  Popowitz,  and  Tresowitz.  Nechanitz  was  held  merely 
as  an  outpost.  The  remaining  dispositions  of  the  center  and 
left  were,  on  the  whole,  as  ordered  the  night  before;  on  the 
right  they  differed  materially  from  the  positions  designated. 

Instead  of  the  line  Chlum-Nedelist,  the  IVth  Corps  took 
up  its  position  on  the  line  Cistow^es-Maslowed  Horenowes, 
2000  paces  in  advance  of  the  batteries  that  had  been  thrown  up. 

The  lid  Corps  formed  on  the  right  of  the  IVth,  on  the 
heights  of  Maslowed-Horenow^es. 

The  1st  and  Vlth  Corps  and  the  Cavalry  took  their 
appointed  positions,  and  the  Reserve  Artillery  was  stationed 
on  the  heights  of  Wsestar  and  Sweti. 

In  the  language  of  the  Prussian  Staff  History:  "Instead 
of  the  semi-circle  originally  intended,  the  Austrian  line  of 
battle  now  formed  only  a  very  gentle  curve,  the  length  of 
which,  from  Ober  Prim  to  Horenowes,  was  about  six  and 
three-fourths  miles,  on  which  four  and  three-fourths  corps 
d\irmte  were  drawn  up.  The  left  wing  had  a  reserve  of  three 
weak  brigades  behind  it,  and  on  the  right  wing  only  one  brig- 


72  Tlie  Campaign  of  Kdiiigt/ratz. 

ade  covered  the  ground  between  the  right  flank  and  the  Elbe. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  main  reserve  of  two  corps  of  infantry 
and  five  cavalry  divisions  stood  ready  for  action  fully  two 
miles  behind  the  center  of  the  whole  line  of  battle." 

The  strength  of  the  Austrian  army  was  206,100  men  and 
770  guns.  At  this  period  of  the  battle  it  was  opposed  by  a 
Prussian  army  of  128,918  men,  with  444  guns.  The  arrival 
of  the  Second  Army  would,  however,  increase  this  force  to 
220,984  men  and  792  guns. 

The  7th  Division,  which  had  already  occupied  the  village 
of  Benatek,  was  the  first  to  come  into  serious  conflict  with 
the  Austrians.  The  attack,  beginning  thus  on  the  left,  was 
successively  taken  up  by  the  8th,  4th,  and  3d  Divisions;  and 
the  advance  guard  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  being  engaged  at 
the  same  time,  the  roar  of  battle  extended  along  the  entire 
line. 

In  front  of  the  7th  Division  were  the  wooded  heights 
of  Maslowed,  known  also  as  the  Swiep  Wald.  This  forest, 
extending  about  2000  paces  from  east  to  west,  and  about  1200 
from  north  to  south,  covered  a  steep  ridge  intersected  on  its 
northern  slopes  by  ravines,  but  falling  off  more  gradually 
towards  the  Bistritz.  Against  this  formidable  position  Fran- 
secky  sent  four  battalions,  which  encountered  two  Austrian 
battalions,  and,  after  a  severe  struggle,  drove  them  from  the 
wood.  Now  was  the  time  to  break  the  Austrian  line  between 
Maslowed  and  Cistowes,  and,  turning  upon  either  point,  or 
both,  roll  up  the  flanks  of  the  broken  line.  The  advanced 
battalions  were  quickly  reinforced  by  the  rest  of  the  division; 
but  all  attempts  to  debouch  from  the  wood  were  baffled. 
Heavy  reinforcements  were  drawn  from  the  Austrian  IVth 
and  lid  Corps,  and  a  furious  counter-attack  was  made  upon 


The  Balth  of  Koniggrdtz.  73 

the  Prussians.  Calling  for  assistance,  Fransecky  was  rein- 
forced by  two  battalions  of  the  8th  Division;  but  he  was  still 
struggling  against  appalling  odds.  With  fourteen  battalions 
and  24  guns,  he  was  contending  against  an  Austrian  force 
of  forty  battalions  and  128  guns.  Falling  back  slowly, 
contesting  the  ground  inch  by  inch,  the  Prussian  division, 
after  a  fierce  struggle  of  three  hours,  still  clung  stubbornly  to 
the  northern  portion  of  the  wood.  Still  the  Austrians  had 
here  a  reserve  of  eleven  battalions  and  24  guns,  which 
might  have  been  hurled  with  decisive  effect  upon  the  ex- 
hausted Prussians,  had  not  other  events  interfered. 

As  soon  as  the  7th  Division  had  advanced  beyond 
Benatek,  the  8th  Division  advanced  against  the  woods  of 
Skalka  and  Sadowa.  Two  bridges  were  thrown  across  the 
Bistritz,  west  of  the  Skalka  wood,  by  the  side  of  two  perma- 
nent bridges,  which  the  Austrians  had  neglected  to  destro3\ 
The  reserve  divisions  (5th  and  6th)  advanced,  at  the  same 
time,  to  Sowetitz,  and  the  Reserve  Artillery  to  Roskosberg. 
As  soon  as  the  8th  Division  crossed  the  Bistritz,  it  was  to 
establish  communication  with  the  7th  Division,  and  turn 
towards  the  Koniggratz  highroad.  The  woods  of  Skalka  and 
Sadowa  were  occupied  without  much  difficulty;  the  Austrian 
brigade  which  occupied  them  falling  back  in  good  order  to 
the  heights  of  Lipa,  where  the  other  brigades  of  the  1 1  Id  Aus- 
trian Corps  were  stationed.  On  these  heights,  between  lyipa 
and  Langenhof,  160  guns  were  concentrated  in  a  great  bat- 
tery, which  sent  such  a  "hailstorm  of  shells"  upon  the  advanc- 
ing Prussians  as  to  check  effectually  all  attempts  to  debouch 
from  the  forests. 

The  4th  Division  advanced  from  Mzan,  and  the  3d  from 
Zawadilka,  soon  after  the  8th  Division  moved  forward.      The 


74  The  Campaign  of  Kiinif/j/ralz. 

retreat  of  the  Austrian  brigade  from  Sadowa  had  uncovered 
the  flank  of  the  outposts,  and  compelled  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  successively  from  Dohalitz,  Dohalica,  and  Mokrowous 
to  the  main  position  westward  of  Langenhof  and  Stresetitz, 
and  these  outposts  were  consequently  gained  by  the  Prussians 
with  slight  loss.  Further  advance  of  the  4th  and  3d  Divis- 
ions was,  however,  prevented  by  the  rapid  and  accurate  fire 
of  the  Austrian  batteries.     * 

The  advance  guard  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  had  gained 
the  left  bank  of  the  Bistritz,  part  of  the  left  wing  crossing  by 
the  bridge  of  Nechanitz  (which  had  been  repaired  with  gates 
and  barn  doors)  and  part  by  wading  breast-deep  across  the 
stream.  The  right  wing  of  the  advance  guard  was  obliged  to 
march  down  stream  to  Kuncitz,  where  it  cro.ssed,  after  dislodg- 
ing a  small  force  of  Saxons  and  repairing  the  bridge.  The 
Saxon  outposts  were  all  driven  back  to  the  main  position,  and 
the  Prussian  advance  guard  occupied  the  line  Hradek-Lubno, 
thus  covering  the  crossing  of  the  main  body.  The  Prussians 
succeeded  in  throwing  only  one  bridge  at  this  part  of  the  field; 
and  as  the  main  body  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  obliged  to 
cross  upon  it  and  defile  through  Nechanitz,  the  deployment 
was  necessarily  slow. 

At  11  o'clock  the  Prussian  advance  had  been  checked. 
The  Army  of , the  Elbe  was  slowly  forming  in  rear  of  the  line 
Hradek-Eubno.  The  First  Army,  advancing,  as  we  have 
seen,  by  echelon  of  divisions  from  the  left,  had  gained  the 
position  Maslowed-Sadowa-wood-Mokrowous,  thus  executing 
a  wheel  of  about  ati  eighth  of  a  circle  to  the  right.  The 
immediate  object  of  the  advance  had  been  practically  gained, 
it  is  true,  by  the  occupation  of  the  line  of  the  Bistritz,  and  the 
conversion  of  the  strong  advanced  posts  of  the  Austrians  into 


The  Battle  of  Koniggrdtz.  75 

good  points  of  support  for  the  Prussians.  Yet  Fransecky 
was  sorely  pushed  on  the  left,  and  the  8th  Division  was  suf- 
fering so  severely  from  the  fire  of  the  Austrian  guns  that 
Frederick  Charles  deemed  it  necessary  to  order  the  5th  and 
6th  Divisions  to  move  up  to  the  Sadowa  wood.  All  attempts 
of  these  fresh  troops  to  gain  ground  towards  the  heights  of 
lyipa  w^ere  repulsed,  and  the  Prussian  advance  again  came  to 
a  standstill.  A  counter- attack  by  a  single  Austrian  brigade 
against  the  Sadowa  wood  (made  without  Benedek's  permis- 
sion) was  repulsed. 

The  position  of  the  First  Army  was  now  critical.  The 
last  battalion  of  the  infantry  reserves  had  been  brought  into 
action.  Fransecky  was  on  a  desperate  defensive.  The  other 
divisions  were  all  subjected  to  a  furious,  crushing  fire  from 
nearly  250  pieces  of  artillery,  which  the  Austrianshad  brought 
into  action  on  the  heights  from  Lipa  to  Problus;  while,  owing 
partly  to  the  wooded  ground,  partly  to  the  diflSculty  of  cross- 
ing the  stream,  and  partly  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  Prussian 
artillery  officers,  only  42  guns  were  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Bistritz  to  reply  to  this  formidable  cannonade.  Only  a  por- 
tion of  Frederick  Charles'  guns  were  brought  into  action  at 
all;  and  their  long-range  fire  from  the  positions  west  of  the 
Bistritz  was  ignored  by  the  Austrian  batteries,  whose  entire 
energy  was  devoted  to  a  merciless  pelting  of  the  Prussian 
infantry. 

The  statement  of  the  Prussian  Staff  History,  that  the  center 
was  in  no  danger,  seems,  therefore,  to  savor  more  of  patriot- 
ism than  of  candor.  To  advance  was  impossible.  The  infantry 
was  suffering  terribly  from  the  Austrian  fire,  the  artillery  was 
feebly  handled,  and  the  cavalry  could  render  no  assistance. 
There  was  danger  that  the  army  would  be  shaken  to  pieces 


76  The  Campaign  of  Koiilt/i/r'ilz. 

by  Benedek's  artillery,  and  that  the  demoralized  troops  would 
then  be  swept  from  the  field  by  the  comparatively  fresh 
infantry  and  cavalry  of  the  Aiiifctrians.  The  King  and  his 
generals  eagerly  scanned  the  northern  horizon  with  their 
glasses,  and,  with  the  intense  anxiety  of  Wellington  at 
Waterloo,  waited  for  tidings  from  the  army  on  the  left,  and 
strained  their  vision  for  a  sight  of  the  advancing  columns. 
The  question  of  retreat  was  discussed.  The  Reserve  Cavalry 
was  ordered  up  to  Sadowa,  apparently  with  a  view  to  covering 
the  withdrawal  of  the  army  to  the  right  bank  of  the  stream. 
It  was  now  past  1  o'clock.  It  was  resolved  to  hold  the  line 
of  the  Bistritz  at  all  hazards,  and  a  heavy  artillery  fire  was 
kept  up.  In  the  meantime,  events  on  other  parts  of  the  field 
were  already  beginning  to  extricate  the  First*  Army  from  its 
perilous  situation. 

At  11:30,  the  14th  and  loth  Divisions  of  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  having  come  upon  the  field,  an  attack  was  ordered  upon 
both  flanks  of  the  Saxons.  The  15th  Division,  followed  by  a 
brigade  of  cavalry,  moved,  through  Hradek,  against  Ober- 
Prim,  The  14th  Division  moved  on  the  heights  east  of  Popo- 
witz,  through  the  forest,  againt  Problus.  The  advance  guard, 
between  the  two  divisions,  moved  to  the  attack,  pushing  its 
flanks  forward,  for  the  double  purpose  of  avoiding  the  heavy 
fire  from  the  enemy's  front  and  masking  the  movements  ot 
the  turning  divisions.  The  Prince  of  Saxony,  believing  it  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  assume  the  off"ensive,  assailed  the 
Prussian  advance  guard  with  a  Saxon  brigade;  but  the  attack, 
though  made  with  great  spirit,  was  repulsed.  Again  the  Prince 
attacked,  this  time  with  two  brigades;  but  the  advancing  Sax- 
ons, being  struck  on  the  left  flank  by  the  loth  Division,  were 
driven   back   with  heavy  loss,  and  Ober  Prim  was  carried  by 


The  Battle  of  Koniggrdtz.  77 

the  Prussians.  General  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld  had  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  66  guns  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Bistritz, 
and  he  now  pushed  them  forward  to  within  2000  paces  of 
Nieder  Prim,  upon  which  they  concentrated  a  heavy  fire, 
under  cover  of  which  the  place  was  carried  by  a  regiment  of 
the  15th  Division.  The  14th  Division,  having  gained  posses- 
sion of  Popowitz  and  the  wood  east  of  that  village,  now  joined 
the  15th  Division  in  a  concentric  attack  upon  Problus.  The 
Prince  of  Saxony  had  not  only  observed  the  preparations  for 
this  assault,  but  he  had  also  observed  the  arrival  of  the  Prus- 
sian Second  Army  at  Chlum ;  and  he  now,  at  3  o'clock,  ordered 
a  retreat  to  the  heights  south-west  of  Rosnitz.  The  troops  at 
Problus,  acting  as  a  rear  guard,  offered  a  stubborn  resistance 
to  the  advancing  Prussians;  but  they  were  driven  from  the 
village,  and  the  advance  of  the  14th  and  15th  Divisions  was 
checked  only  by  the  artillery  fire  of  the  Saxons  and  the  Vlllth 
Corps,  stationed  on  the  hills  north-east  of  Problus. 

During  this  time  the  Second  Army  had  been  working 
great  results.  At  8  o'clock  Alvensleben,  commanding  the 
advance  guard  of  the  Guard  Corps,  at  Daubrowitz,  heard  the 
cmnonade  in  the  direction  of  Benatek.  Without  waiting  for 
orders,  he  at  once  put  his  command  in  march  for  the  scene  of 
conflict,  notifying  his  corps  commander  of  his  departure,  and 
sending  word  to  Fransecky  that  he  would  be  at  Jericek  by 
11:30.  The  rest  of  the  corps  quickly  followed,  marching 
stright  across  country,  up  hill  and  down  hill,  pushing  through 
the  heavy  mud  with  such  restless  energy  that  several  of  the 
artillery  horses  dropped  dead  from  fatigue.  The  advance 
guard  arrived  at  Jericek  at  11  o'clock,  and  at  the  same  hour 
the  heads  of  the  columns  of  the  main  body  arrived  at  Chote- 


78  The  Caiii/)iii(/ii  of  Ki'niitn/ratz. 

borek.  to  which  point  the  Crown    Prince  had  hurried   in   ad- 
vance of  the  troops. 

The  Vlth  Corps  advanced  from  its  position,  near  Gradlitz, 
in  two  columns.  The  12th  Division  marched,  via  Kukus  and 
Ertina.  to  the  heights  east  of  Rosnow,  detaching  a  battalion 
and  a  squadron  to  mask  the  fortress  of  Josephstadt.  The  llth 
Division  marched,  via  Schurz  to  Welchow.  As  soon  as  it 
neared  the  latter  place,  Mutius,  commanding  the  corps,  ordered 
both  divisions  to  keep  connection  and  march  to  the  sound  of  the 
cannonade.  The  troops  pushed  on  "over  hills,  meadows,  and 
ditches,  through  copses  and  hedgerows,"  across  the  swampy 
valley  of  the  Trotina,  part  of  the  troops  crossing  the  stream 
by  the  single  bridge,  and  part  wading  breast-deep  through  the 
water.  At  11  o'clock  the  llth  Division  arrived  at  the  heights 
north  of  Racitz,  and  came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
batteries. 

At  8  o'clock  the  Vth  Corps  began  its  march,  via  Schurz 
and  Dubenitz,  to  Choteborek;  and  at  11  o'clock  its  advance 
guard  was  approaching  that  village. 

The  1st  Corps  did  not  start  until  9:30.  It  marched,  via 
Zabres,  Gross  Trotin  and  Weiss  Polikau;  and  at  11  o'clock  it 
had  not  yet  reached  Gross  Burglitz. 

Thus,  at  11  o'clock,  the  only  troops  that  had  reached  the 
Trotina  were  the  Guards  and  the  Vlth  Corps ;  and  they  were 
still  two  and  one-half  miles  from  the  left  wing  of  the  First 
Army.  In  three  hours  the  Second  Army  had  been  so  concen- 
trated as  to  reduce  its  front  from  twenty-two  and  one-half 
miles  to  nine  miles,  and  it  now  occupied  the  line  Burglitz- 
Jericek-Choteborek-Welchow. 

The  Crown  Prince,  from  his  station  on  the  heights  of 
Choteborek,  about  four  and  one-half  miles  from   Maslowed, 


The  Baltic  of  Kdnif/f/rlilz.        '  79 

had  an  extended  view  towards  the  valley  of  the  Bistritz  ;  and 
notwithstanding  the  rain  and  fog,  he  could  trace  the  direction 
of  the  contending  lines  by  the  smoke  of  the  burning  villages 
and  flashes  of  the  guns.  It  was  evident  that  his  columns  were 
marching  in  such  a  direction  as  to  bring  them  directly  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Austrian  troops  already  engaged ; 
but,  though  the  formidable  heights  of  Horenowes  appeared  to 
be  occupied  by  only  one  battery,  it  seemed  probable  that  the 
passage  of  the  Elbe  by  the  Crown  Prince  was  known  by  Ben- 
edek,  and  that  the  troops  of  the  Austrian  right  were  waiting 
behind  the  crest  of  the  hills,  to  spring  forward  into  action 
when  the  Prussians  should  undertake  to  cross  the  swampy 
valley  between  ttie  Trotina  and  the  heights  of  Horenowes. 
The  different  divisions  were  ordered  to  direct  their  march 
upon  a  prominent  group  of  trees  on  the  Horenowes  hill. 

The  Austrians  were  now  in  a  position  of  extreme  danger. 
The  heights  of  Horenowes,  which  seemed  to  offer  such  a  for- 
midable obstacle  to  the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince,  had  been 
left  almost  defenseless.  As  we  have  seen,  the  Austrian  IVth 
and  lid  Corps  had  taken  up  the  line  Cistowes-Maslowed-Hore- 
nowes,  and  the  space  between  the  right  flank  and  the  Elbe 
was  guarded  by  only  one  brigade  and  two  battalions  To  make 
matters  worse,  the  IVth  and  lid  Corps  had  been  drawn  into 
the  fight  with  Fransecky  in  the  Swiep  Wald,  and,  facing  west, 
they  now  presented  a  flank  to  the  advancing  columns  of  the 
Crown  Prince.  The  advance  of  these  two  corps  beyond  the 
line  Chlum-Nedelist  had  carried  them  far  beyond  support;  and 
now,  with  the  Prussian  Second  Army  within  two  and  one-half 
miles  of  them,  their  reserves  were  fully  three  miles  away. 

Benedek,  discovering  that  these  two  corps  had  not  taken 
up  their  designated  positions,  sent  orders,  before  1 1  o'clock. 


80  The  Campaign  of  Kdnifjr/rdtz. 

to  their  commanders,  to  fall  back  to  the  positions  originally 
assigned  to  them.  Unfortunately,  the  commander  of  the  IVth 
Corps,  ignorant  of  the  approach  of  the  Crown  Prince,  and 
flushed  with  his  success  against  Fransecky,  thought  it  an  oppor- 
tune moment  to  assume  a  vigorous  offensive  against  the  Prus- 
sian left,  and  would  not  make  the  movement  ordered  until  he 
had  sent  a  report  to  that  effect  to  his  chief.  The  projected 
offensive  was  disapproved,  and  the  former  order  was  repeated. 
The  two  corps  now  retired  to  the  positions  originally  designa- 
ted, the  movement  being  covered  by  the  fire  of  64  pieces  of 
artillery  posted  on  the  plateau  of  Nedelist.  The  withdrawal 
had  been  delayed  too  long,  for  the  Crown  Prince  already  had 
48  guns  in  position  between  Racitz  and  Horenowes,  the  Prus- 
sian infantry  was  advancing,  and  the  Austrian  movement  par- 
took, consequently,  of  the  nature  of  a  retreat.  Yet  it  is  greatly 
to  the  credit  of  the  Austrian  troops  that  they  were  able  to 
execute  a  flank  movement — and  a  retrograde  movement,  too — 
under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  though  they  had  been  in  action 
fully  three  hours. 

At  noon  Benedek  received  a  telegram  from  Salney,  via 
Josephstadt,  announcing  the  approach  of  the  Second  Army. 
At  this  very  moment  the  guns  of  the  Crown  Prince  were 
playing  upon  the  Austrian  right  flank. 

The  advance  guard  of  the  1st  Division  of  Guards  had 
debouched  from  Zizilowes  at  11:15  a.  m.;  its  right  flank  being 
covered  by  the  cavalry  brigade  which  had  covered  the  left  of 
the  7th  Division.  The  advance  guard  of  the  2d  Guard  Divis- 
ion (which  had  been  separated  from  the  main  body  by  the 
Reserve  Artillery  of  the  1st  Division  cutting  into  the  column 
on  the  road),  without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  its  comrades, 
joined  the  1st  Division  in    its  attack  upon  Horenowes.     At 


77/r  Jhil/lr   (if   h'iinli/iiriih..  81 

noon  the  12th  Division  had  captured  the  Horicka  Berg,  the 
11th  Division  had  driven  the  Austrians  from  Racitz,  and  the 
Guards  were  advancing  upon  Horenowes.  The  withdrav^^al 
of  the  Austrian  lid  Corps  had  been  covered  by -40  guns  posted 
east  of  Horenowes,  which  kept  up  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  Prus- 
sians. But  the  Guards  easily  carried  Horenowes,  the  position 
of  the  great  battery  was  turned,  the  hostile  infantry  was  advanc- 
ing upon  its  flank,  and  the  artillery  was  forced  to  retire.  The 
12th  Division,  in  the  meantime,  had  captured  Sendrasitz,  cut- 
ting off  the  Austrian  brigade  which  had  been  covering  the 
right  flank.  The  11th  Division  then  moved  up  to  a  position 
north  of  Sendrasitz,  on  the  left  of  the  Guards,  and  the  latter 
advanced  to  Maslowed  The  Prussians  now  had  90  guns  on 
the  heights  of  Horenowes,  and  most  of  these  pieces  were  hur- 
ried forward  beyond  Maslowed,  within  1800  paces  of  the  Aus- 
trian position,  where  they  prepared  the  way  for  the  infantry 
assault  by  a  vigorous  cannonade. 

When  the  Guards  advanced,  the  Austrian  IVth  Corps 
was  still  engaged  in  taking  up  its  new  position.  Unchecked 
by  the  fire  of  more  than  100  guns  in  position  west  of  Nedelist, 
the  Guards  crushed  the  two  battalions  on  the  left  of  the  IVth 
Corps,  and  penetrated  into  the  gap;  the  left  wing  rolling  up 
the  flank  of  an  Austrian  brigade,  and  pushing  on  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Sweti,  while  the  right  wing,  changing  front  to  the 
right,  stormed  the  village  of  Chlum,  which,  though  the  key  of 
the  Austrian  position,  was  occupied  by  only  a  single  battalion. 
As  the  Guards  advanced,  the  force  under  Alvensleben,  which 
had  constituted  the  advance  guard  in  the  morning,  moved 
forward  in  echelon  on  their  right.  A  brigade  of  the  Austrian 
IVth  Corps,  which,  by  some  mistake,  had  been  left  at  Cistowes, 
and  was   now  marching  to  the  new  position  of  its  corps,  was 


82  The  Lkunpaigii  of  h'iniif/i/ratz. 

struck  by  Alvensleben,  and  driven  to  the  westward  of  Clilum 
with  heavy  loss.  Simultaneously  with  the  Guards,  the  Vlth 
Corps  advanced  upon  the  enemy,  the  lUh  Division  capturing 
Nedelist,  and  the  12th  driving  the  cut-off  Austrian  brigade  into 
Lochenitz.  The  Austrians  made  several  determined  attacks 
from  lyangenhof  and  the  Lipa  wood  upon  the  Prussians  in 
Chlum;  but,  though  they  fought  with  great  bravery  and  pene- 
trated into  the  village,  they  were  repulsed  by  the  Guards,  who 
then  seized  Rosberitz  and  the  forest  of  L,ipa.  The  1st  Aus- 
trian Reserve  Cavalry  Division,  consisting  of  five  regiments, 
charged  the  Prussians  south  of  Chlum.  The  brigade  on  the 
left  consisted  of  two  regiments  of  cuirassiers,  and  was  formed 
in  double  column:  the  one  on  the  right  was  composed  of  two 
regiments  (one  of  cuirassiers  and  one  of  lancers),  formed  in 
double  column,  with  a  regiment  of  cuirassiers  following  as  a 
second  line.  The  charge  was  repulsed  by  four  companies  of 
the  infantry  of  the  Guard.  It  is  remarkable  that  in  this  case 
the  cavalry  came  within  200  yards  of  the  infantry  before  the 
latter  opened  fire. 

At  3  o'clock  matters  had,  consequently,  changed  very 
much  for  the  worse  with  the  Austrians.  On  the  left,  the  Sax- 
ons had  been  driven  from  their  position;  on  the  right,  the 
Prussian  Guards  and  Vlth  Corps  occupied  the  line  Rosberitz- 
Nedelist-Ivochenitz.  The  Austrian  IVth  and  lid  Corps  had 
been  defeated,  and  were  retreating  upon  Wsestar,  Sweti,  Pred- 
meritz,  and  Lochenitz.  The  1st  Division  of  the  Guards  had 
captured  55  guns,  and  had  seized  the  key  of  the  Austrian  po- 
sition. The  Austrian  Illd  Corps  was  sandwiched  between  the 
Guards  and  the  First  Army.  Yet  the  position  of  the  Guards 
was  full  of  danger.  In  the  valley  of  Sweti-Wsestar-Rosnitz 
were  the  two  intact  corps  of  Austrian  reserves,  with  more  than 


The  Bailie  of  Kdnif/grdtz.  83 

70  squadrons  of  cavalry;  and  between  Wsestar  and  lyangen- 
hof  were  massed  the  powerful  batteries  of  the  Reserve  Artil- 
lery, which  kept  Rosberitz  and  Chlum  under  a  heavy  fire. 
The  main  body  of  the  2d  Division  of  the  Guards  was  just 
ascending  the  heights  of  Maslovved.  There  were  no  other 
troops  within  a  mile  and  a  quarter  upon  whom  they  could 
depend  for  assistance. 

Benedek,  who  had  taken  his  position  between  Lipa  and 
Chlum,  hearing  of  the  occupation  of  the  latter  village  by  the 
Prussians,  could  scarcely  believe  the  surprising  news.  As  he 
rode  hurriedly  toward  Chlum,  the  information  was  rudely 
corroborated  by  a  volley  from  the  Prussians,  which  mortally 
wounded  an  aid-de-camp,  and  seriously  injured  several  other 
members  of  his  escort.  There  was  no  longer  any  doubt. 
Victory  was  now  out  of  the  question,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
take  prompt  measures  to  save  the  right  wing  from  annihila- 
tion, and  to  prevent  the  retreat  of  the  rest  of  the  army  from 
being  cut  oflf. 

A  brigade  of  the  Austrian  1st  Corps  was  sent  to  reinforce 
the  Saxons  near  Problus,  and  another  brigade  of  the  same 
corps  w^as  sent  against  the  Lipa  wood  and  the  heights  west  of 
Chlum.  The  latter  brigade,  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of  the 
Illd  Corps  and  fragments  of  the  IVth  Corps,  made  three  des- 
perate attacks  upon  the  advance  guard  of  the  2d  Division  and 
part  of  the  1st  Division  of  the  Prussian  Guards  at  these  points, 
only  to  recoil,  completely  baffled,  before  the  deadh'  fire  of  the 
needle-gun.  The  Illd  Corps  no  longer  had  any  intact  troops; 
it  was  between  two  fires;  it  began  its  retreat,  and  abandoned 
the  village  of  Lipa  to  the  Prussians.  On  the  left,  the  main 
body  of  the  1st  Division  of  the  Guards  was  engaged  at  Ros- 
beritz with  the  x\ustrian  Vlth  Corps.     Advancing  resolutely 


84  The  C(HNi>(il(jii  of  KlJitiuf/rdlz. 

to  the  attack,  the  Austrians  dislodged  the  Guards  from  the 
village  after  a  bloody  struggle;  but  as  they  halted  at  the  out- 
skirts of  the  town  to  re-form  for  another  assault,  the  Guards 
were  reinforced  by  the  advance  guard  of  the  1st  Corps.  At 
the  same  time,  the  commander  of  the  Prussian  Vlth  Corps, 
leaving  the  12th  Division  engaged  with  the  Austrians  at  Loche- 
uitz,  half-wheeled  the  11th  Division  to  the  right,  and  advanced 
from  Nedelist  upon  Rosberitz.  The  Austrian  lid  Corps  was 
already  in  retreat.  A  counter-attack  of  the  Guards  and  the 
1st  Corps  drove  the  Austrians  out  of  Rosberitz,  and  the  11th 
Division,  striking  them  on  the  flank,  routed  them  with  heavy 
loss.  The  11th  Division  then  attacked  a  brigade  of  the  Aus- 
trian IVth  Corps,  which  had  taken  up  a  position  near  Sweti 
to  protect  the  reserve  artillery.  The  brigade  and  the  artillery 
were  driven  back  to  the  village,  which  was  carried  by  assault, 
many  cannon  being  captured.  The  Vth  Corps  reached  Hore- 
nowes  at  4  o'clock,  and  was  designated  as  the  general  reserve 
of  the  army. 

The  full  tide  of  Prussian  success  had  now  set  in.  The 
16th  Division  had  not  yet  crossed  at  Nechanitz,  but  the  14th 
and  15th  Divisions  had  defeated  the  Saxons  and  the  Austrian 
Vlllth  Corps  and  the  Allies  were  in  retreat.  Both  of  the  Aus- 
trian flanks  had  been  crushed,  and  the  First  Army  was  now 
actively  engaged  in  an  attack  upon  Benedek's  front. 

The  aid-de-camp  sent  by  the  Crown  Prince  to  announce 
his  approach  had  been  delayed  by  the  condition  of  the  roads 
and  the  necessity  of  making  a  long  detour,  and  did  not  arrive 
at  the  royal  headquarters  until  late  in  the  afternoon.  The 
Crown  Prince's  advance  was  first  made  known  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  First  Army  by  the  flashes  of  the  Prussian  guns 
on  the  heights  of  Horenowes.     Soon  after,  the  Prussian  col- 


The  Hallle  of  K(jniij;/riilz.  85 

umns  were  seen  ascending  the  heights  of  Maslowed.  The  fire 
of  the  Austrian  guns  in  front  perceptibly  diminished,  and  it 
was  evident  that  some  of  the  batteries  had  changed  front  to 
the  right.  It  was  clear  that  the  Second  Army  had  struck  the 
Austrian  flank;  and  at  3:80  o'clock  the  King  ordered  the  First 
Army  to  "advance  all  along  the  line  "  The  retreat  of  the  Aus- 
trian Xth  Corps  had  begun,  but  it  was  concealed  by  the  nature 
of  the  ground,  and  covered  by  the  line  of  artillery,  which 
devotedly  maintained  its  position,  and  kept  up  a  heavy  fire, 
until  its  own  existence  was  imperiled  by  the  advance  of  the 
foe.  The  Xth  Corps  had  passed  well  beyond  the  danger  of 
infantry  pursuit  when  the  advance  of  the  First  Army  was 
ordered.  The  Austrian  artillerists  held  to  their  position  until 
the  enemy  was  almost  at  the  muzzle  of  the  cannon,  and  then 
withdrawing  to  Rosnitz  and  Briza,  with  all  the  guns  that  their 
stubborn  defense  had  not  compelled  them  to  sacrifice,  again 
opened  fire  upDU  the  Prussians.  The  cavalry,  too,  devoted 
itself  to  the  task  of  covering  the  retreat.  The  Prussian  cav- 
alry, which  had  been  delayed  by  the  blocking  of  the  bridges 
by  the  artillery,  and  the  crowding  of  the  roads  by  the  infantry, 
now  appeared  in  the  front  of  the  pursuers,  and  fierce  cavalry 
combats  took  place  near  I,angenhof,  Stresetitz,  and  Problus. 
The  Austrian  cavalry  displayed  reckless  courage,  and  in  many 
instances  beat  back  its  adversary,  only  to  be  received  by  a 
destructive  fire  from  the  Prussian  infantry  and  artillery.  It 
made  a  noble  fight  against  hopeless  odds,  and  at  the  sacrifice 
of  its  best  blood  it  succeeded  in  temporarily  checking  the 
Prussian  advance,  and  greatly  assisted  in  covering  the  retreat 
of  the  army.'^^ 

Frederick  Charles,  bringing  up  54  guns  to  the  heights  of 

*See  Appendix,  Note  A. 


8()  The  Campaign  of  Knnif/i/riilz. 

Wsestar  and  Sweti,  opened  fire  upon  the  new  line  of  Austrian 
artillery.  The  Austrian  batteries  replied  with  spirit,  until  the 
advance  of  the  11th  Division  upon  Rosnitz  and  Briza  com- 
pelled them  to  withdraw,  with  the  loss  of  36  guns.  Still  un- 
daunted, the  artillery  took  up  a  new  position  on  the  line 
Stosser-Freihofen-Zeigelshag.  Here  all  available  guns  were 
brought  into  action,  and  under  their  fire  the  Prussian  pursuit 
virtually  ended.  Withdrawing  in  excellent  order  to  the  line 
Placitz-Kuklena,  the  Austrian  artillery  kept  up  a  duel  with 
the  Prussian  guns  on  the  line  Klacow-Stezerek  until  long 
after  darkness  had  set  in. 

The  Prussian  Stafif  History  says:  "The  behavior  of  the 
cavalry  and  the  well-sustained  fire  of  the  powerful  line  of 
artillery  at  Placitz  and  Kuklena,  proved  that  part,  at  least,  of 
the  hostile  army  still  retained  its  full  power  of  resistance. 

"It  is  truelhat  affairs  behind  this  line  of  artillery  bore  a 
very  different  aspect.  At  first  the  corps  had,  for  the  most 
part,  taken  the  direction  of  the  bridges  northward  of  Konig- 
gratz,  but  were  prevented  from  using  them  by  the  advance  of 
the  Prussian  extreme  left  wing.  This  caused  the  different 
bodies  of  troops  to  become  promiscuously  and  confusedly 
mingled  together.  The  flying  cavalry,  shells  bursting  on  all 
sides,  still  further  increased  the  confusion,  which  reached  its 
climax  when  the  commandant  of  Koniggratz,  closed  the  gates 
of  the  fortress. 

"Hundreds  of  wagons,  either  overturned  or  thrust  oflf  from 
the  highroad,  riderless  horses,  and  confused  crowds  of  men 
trying  to  escape  across  the  inundated  environs  of  the  fortress 
and  the  river,  many  of  them  up  to  their  necks  in  water — this 
spectacle  of  wildest  flight  and  utter  rout,  immediately  before 


The  Ittilllc  of  Kdnifjgralz.  87 

the  gates  of  Koniggriitz,  was  naturally  hidden  from  the  view 
of  the  pursuing  enemy." 

A  prompt  pursuit  would,  however,  hive  been  impractica- 
ble, even  if  the  Prussians  had  fully  appreciated  the  extent  of 
the  Austrian  demoralization.  The  concentric  attacks,  so 
magnificently  decisive  on  the  field,  had  produced  an  almost 
chaotic  confusion  on  the  part  of  the  victors  themselves.  Ow- 
ing to  the  direction  of  their  attacks,  the  Second  Army  and  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  were  "telescoped"  together;  and  the  advance 
of  the  First  Army  had  jammed  it  into  the  right  flank  of  the 
former  and  the  left  flank  of  the  latter.  At  noon  the  front  of 
the  combined  Prussian  armies  had  been  more  than  sixteen 
miles  long.  The  front  of  this  great  host  was  now  but  little 
more  than  two  miles,  and  men  of  different  regiments,  brigades, 
divisions,  corps,  and  even  armies,  were  indiscriminately  min- 
gled together.  Aside  from  this  confusion,  the  exhaustion 
of  the  Prussian  soldiers  precluded  pursuit,  ^^ost  of  them  had 
left  their  bivouacs  long  before  dawn,  and  it  had  been  a  day 
of  hard  marching  and  hard  fighting  for  all.  Many  had  been 
entirel)^  without  food,  all  were  suffering  from  extreme  fatigue, 
and  several  officers  had  fallen  dead  on  the  field  from  sheer 
exhaustion. 

As  a  result  of  the  exhaustion  of  the  Prussians  and  the 
excellent  conduct  of  the  Austrian  cavalry  and  artillery,  Bene- 
dek  slipped  across  the  Elbe,  and  gained  such  a  start  on  his 
adversaries  that  for  three  days  the  Prussians  lost  all  touch 
with  him,  and  were  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  direction  of 
his  retreat. 

Thus  ended  the  great  battle  of  Koniggratz.  The  Prussian 
losses  were :  1935  killed,  6959  wounded,  and  278  missing. 
The  Austrians  lost  4861   killed,  13,920  wounded,  and  25,419 


88  The  ( 'dill juiKjii  (if  h'i'iiiii/i/riitz. 

missing,  including  in  the  last  classification  19,800  prisoners. 
They  also  lost  101  guns,  five  stands  of  colors,  several  thousand 
muskets,  several  hundred  wagons,  and  a  ponton  train.  The 
sum  total  of  the  killed  and  vi^ounded  in  this  battle  was  27,675. 
No  sketch  of  the  campaign  of  Koniggratz  could  be 
complete  without  a  consideration  of  the  retreat  of  the  Aus- 
trian army  upon  Olmiitz  and  Vienna,  the  masterly  march  of 
Moltke  to  the  Danube,  the  Italian  disasters  of  Custozza  and 
lyissa,  and  the  campaign  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Main 
defeated  the  Bavarians  and  the  Vlllth  Federal  Corps;  but 
Koniggratz  was  the  decisive  battle  of  the  war.  Austria  could 
not  rally  from  her  disaster,  and  twenty-three  days  alter  the 
battle  the  truce  of  Nikolsburg  virtually  ended  the  contest. 


Cuinmeiils  on   (he  Cainpavjn   and  Jlallle.  89 


Chapter  VI. 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE. 

It  is  not  only  on  account  of  its  great  and  far-reaching 
results  that  Koniggratz  must  be  rated  as  one  of  the  greatest 
battles  of  the  world.  In  point  of  numbers  engaged,  it  was  the 
greatest  battle  of  modern  times,  for  the  two  contending  armies 
aggregated  nearly  half  a  million  men.  In  this  respect  it  ex- 
ceeded Gravelotte,  dwarfed  Solferino,  and  even  surpassed  the 
"Battle  of  Nations,"  fought  on  the  plains  of  Leipsic,  fifty-two 
years  before. 

Yet,  considering  the  numbers  engaged,  the  loss  of  life  was 
not  great.  The  sum  total  of  the  killed  and  wounded  was  nearly 
6000  less  than  at  Gettysburg,  though  in  that  sanguinary  strug- 
gle the  combined  strength  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
armies  was  less  than  that  of  the  Austrian  army  alone  at 
Koniggratz.*  In  fact,  of  all  the  battles  of  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion, Fredericksburg,  Chattanooga,  and  Cold  Harbor  were  the 
only  ones  in  which  the  losses  of  the  victors,  in  killed  and 
wounded,  did  not  exceed,  in  proporiion  to  the  numbers  en- 
gaged, the  losses  of  the  defeated  army  at  Koniggratz.  A  bit 
of  reflection  upon  these  facts  might  convince  ceitain  European 
critics  that  the  failure  of  victorious  American  armies  to  pur- 
sue their  opponents  vigorously  was  due  to  other  causes  than 
inefficient  organization  or  a  lack  of  military  skill.  In  the  words 
of  Colonel  Chesney:     "In  order  to  pursue,  there  must  be  some 


*The  strength  of  the  Union  army  at  Gettysburg  was  93,500.  The  Confederate 
army  numbered  about  70,000.  The  Union  army  lost  3072  killed,  and  14,497  wounded. 
The  Confederates  lost  2592  killed,  and  12,709  wounded. 


90  The  Cai)ipiii<jti  of  K('iiii(j(/riilz. 

one  to  run  away;  and,  to  the  credit  of  the  Americans,  the 
ordinary  conditions  of  European  warfare  in  this  respect  were 
usually  absent  from  the  great  battles  fought  across  the  Atlan- 
tic. Hence,  partly,  the  frequent  repetition  of  the  struggle, 
almost  on  the  same  ground,  of  which  the  last  campaign  of 
Grant  and  Lee  is  the  crowning  example."  It  is,  perhaps,  not 
too  much  to  say,  that,  had  Benedek  been  a  Lee,  and  had  his 
army  been  of  the  nature  of  Lee's  army,  the  next  sunrise  after 
the  battle  would  have  found  him  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe, 
under  the  shelter  of  hasty  intrenchments,  presenting  a  bold 
front  to  the  Prussians;  for  there  was  no  reason,  aside  from 
demoralization,  for  the  retreat  of  the  Austrians  far  from  the 
scene  of  their  defeat.  Their  communications  were  neither 
intercepted  nor  seriously  endangered;  their  losses  had  not 
been  excessive;  and,  but  for  their  discouragement  and  loss  of 
morale,  there  is  no  reason  why  their  defeat  at  Koniggratz 
should  have  been  decisive. 

Not  the  least  of  the  causes  of  the  Austrian  defeat  was  the 
autocratic  policy  of  Benedek,  which  caused  the  entire  man- 
agement of  the  army  to  be  centralized  in  his  own  person,  and 
the  plan  of  battle  to  be  locked  up  in  his  own  mind.  However 
brave,  willing,  and  obedient  a  subordinate  officer  may  be,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  his  duties  will  be  better  done,  because 
more  intelligently  done,  if  he  has  a  clear  knowledge  of  the 
part  he  is  called  upon  to  perform.  The  higher  the  rank,  and 
the  more  important  the  command,  of  the  subordinate  officer, 
the  more  certainly  is  this  the  case.  Yet  Benedek  seems  to 
have  desired  from  his  corps  commanders  nothing  more  than 
the  blind  obedience  of  the  private  soldier.     Oa  the  day  before 


Commciilti  on  the  Campaif/n  and  Ballk.  91 

the  battle  of  Kouiggratz  all  the  corps  commanders  were  sum- 
moned to  headquarters;  but  the  Feldzeugmeister,  after  alluding 
merely  to  unimportant  matters  of  routine,  dismissed  them 
without  a  word  of  instruction  as  to  the  part  to  be  performed 
by  them  in  the  battle  which  he  must  have  known  to  be  immi- 
nent. On  the  day  of  the  battle  the  commanders  of  the  corps 
and  divisions  on  the  right  were  not  informed  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  batteries,  and  were  not  notified  that  these  intrench - 
ments  were  intended  to  mark  their  line.  Instead  of  being 
thrown  up  by  the  divisions  themselves,  these  works  were  con- 
structed by  the  chief  engineer,  without  one  word  of  consulta- 
tion or  explanation  with  the  corps  commanders.  Had  the  com- 
manders of  the  Hid,  IVth,  and  lid  Corps  been  informed  that 
their  principal  duty  would  be  to  guard  against  a  possible,  if 
not  probable,  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince,  it  is  not  likely 
that  the  line  Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes  would  have  been 
occupied  by  the  right  wing ;  but  these  generals  seem  to  have 
taken  up  their  positions  with  no  more  idea  of  their  object  or 
of  their  influence  upon  the  result  of  the  battle  than  had  the 
men  in  the  ranks. 

The  selection  made  by  Benedek  of  a  field  for  the  coming 
battle  cannot  be  condemned.  On  the  whole,  the  position  was 
a  strong  one,  and  the  fault  lay  in  the  dispositions  purposely 
made,  or  accidentally  assumed,  rather  than  in  any  inherent 
weakness  in  the  position. 

According  to  some  writers,  Benedek  committed  an  error 
in  holding  his  advanced  posts  in  the  villages  on  the  Bistritz 
with  small  forces  (which  in  some  cases  did  not  exceed  a  bat- 
talion), while  the  Prussian  advance  guards  generally  consisted 


92  The  ('(iin/)ii ii/n  of  k'iinuji/riUz. 

of  a  brigade,  at  least.  Derrecagaix  says:  "It  was  of  import- 
ance to  the  Imperial  Army  to  compel  the  Prussian  forces  to 
deploy  at  the  earliest  moment;  to  tire  them  before  their  arrival 
at  the  Bistritz;  to  dispute  the  passage  of  that  river,  which 
constituted  an  obstacle,  in  order  that  they  might  approach  the 
main  position  only  after  having  exhausted  their  efforts  and 
lost  their  elan  through  heavy  casualties."  To  this  end,  he 
suggests  that  the  Austrians  should  have  established  west  of 
the  Bistritz,  on  the  two  roads  by  which  the  Prussians  must 
necessarily  have  advanced,  two  strong  advanced  posts,  com- 
posed of  troops  of  all  three  arms,  and  sufficiently  strong  to 
resist  the  enemy's  advance  guards.  He  continues:  "The 
Bistritz  formed  a  first  line  of  defense,  on  which  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  check  the  assailant's  efforts.  It  possessed 
the  peculiarity  of  having  all  along  its  course  villages  distant 
from  1000  to  1500  meters,  and  separated  by  marshy  meadows 
with  difficult  approaches.  With  some  batteries  in  rear  of  the 
intervals  which  separated  the  villages,  it  would  have  been 
possible  to  hold  them  a  certain  time,  and  compel  the  enemy 
to  execute  a  complete  deployment.  The  Imperial  Army  had, 
it  is  true,  on  the  Bistritz  and  beyond,  detachments  of  consid- 
erable strength.  But  they  played  an  insignificant  part,  by 
reason  of  the  orders  given,  or  modified  their  positions  in  the 
morning.  As  a  result,  the  line  of  the  Bistritz,  its  banks,  the 
villages,  and  the  woods  bej^ond,  were  occupied  by  the  Prus- 
sians without  great  effijrts,  and  they  had  from  that  moment 
defensive  points  d'appni  on  which  it  was  possible  to  await 
events  and  sustain  the  fight." 

It  is  impossible  to  agree  fully  with  Derrecagaix  on  this 
point.  Speaking  of  defensible  points  in  front  of  a  position, 
Hamley  says:     "A  feature  of  this  kind  will  be  especially  val- 


Cdiiniiciils  (til    III!'   ( 'din  /iiil(/ii    (I  ml   J  In /lie.  03 

uable  in  front  of  what  would  otherwise  be  a  weak  part  of  the 
position.  Strong  in  itself,  and  its  garrison  constantly  reinforced 
from  the  line,  while  the  ground  in  front  is  swept  by  batteries, 
such  a  point  is  difficult  to  attack  directly;  the  enemy  can  not 
attempt  to  surround  it  without  exposing  the  flank  and  rear  of 
the  attacking  troops;  and  to  pass  by  it  in  order  to  reach  the 
position,  the  assailants  must  expose  their  flank  to  its  fire.  If 
several  such  points  exist,  they  support  each  other,  isolate  the 
parts  of  the  enemy's  attack,  and  force  him  to  expend  his 
strength  in  costly  attacks  on  them;  in  fact,  they  play  the  part 
of  bastions  in  a  line  of  fortification.  But  it  is  important  that 
they  should  be  within  supporting  distance  and  easy  of  covered 
access  from  the  rear;  failing  these  conditions,  they  had  better 
be  destroyed,  if  possible,  as  defenses,  and  abandoned  to  the 
enemy." 

Now,  none  of  the  advanced  posts  in  question  were  in  front 
of  a  weak  part  of  the  position  (  for  the  line  adopted  by  Bene- 
dek  was  incomparably  stronger  than  anything  on  the  line  of 
the  Bi.stritz),  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  use  artil- 
lery in  them  with  anything  like  the  murderous  effect  produced 
by  the  batteries  on  the  line  Lipa-Problus.  They  were  more 
than  a  mile  and  a  quarter  in  front  of  the  position,  and  were 
not  "easy  of  covered  access  from  the  rear."  They  were,  it  is 
true,  within  supporting  distance  of  each  other;  but,  while 
attacking  them,  the  Prussians  would  have  been  beyond  the 
best  effect  of  the  powerful  artillery  in  the  main  Austrian  line. 
The  preliminary  combats  would  have  largely  fallen  on  the 
infantry;  and,  owing  to  the  inferior  arms  and  impaired  morale 
of  his  infantry,  it  was,  doubtless,  the  first  aim  of  the  Austrian 
commander  to  use  his  artillery  to  the  fullest  extent,  for  in  that 
arm  he  knew  that  he  was  superior  to  the  Prussians.     Bene- 


94  Hie  Campaign  of  Koitifif/ralz. 

dek's  plan  was,  apparently,  to  lure  Frederick  Charles  into  a 
po-ition  where  he  should  have  the  Bistritz  at  his  back;  where 
he  should  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  Austrian  artillery;  and  where 
he  could  be  overwhelmed  by  the  attack  of  superior  numbers 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  after  he  had  been  demoralized  and 
shattered  by  a  crushing  cannonade.  The  Bistritz  (above  Lub- 
no)  is  an  insignificant  obstacle;  but  it  might  have  been  a 
troublesome  obstruction  in  the  rear  of  a  defeated  army.  Had 
the  Crown  Prince  been  delayed  five  or  six  hours,  it  is  probable 
that  Benedek's  plan  would  have  succeeded.  The  terrible  bat- 
tering which  Frederick  Charles  received,  as  it  actually  was,  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  his  losses  exceeded  those  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  combined.  In  fact,  the 
event  pioved  that,  so  far  as  the  repulse  of  a  front  attack  "was 
concerned,  the  Austrian  position  fulfilled  every  condition  that 
could  be  desired,  and  it  does  not  seem  that  anything  could 
have  been  gained  b)'  the  occupation  in  force  of  the  villages  on 
the  Bistritz  above  Lubno.  They  should  rather  have  been 
abandoned  and  destroyed,  and  everything  left  to  depend  on 
the  magnificent  position  in  rear — a  position  scarcely  inferior 
in  strength  to  Marye's  Heights  or  St.  Privat. 

The  only  village  on  the  Bistritz  that  had  any  real  value 
was  Nechanitz.  Benedek's  weak  points  were  his  flanks.  Had 
Nechanitz  been  occupied  in  strong  force,  the  turning  of  the 
Austrian  left  by  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  would  have  been  a  mat- 
ter of  extreme  difficulty,  if  not  a  downright  impossibility.  We 
have  seen  that  the  retreat  of  the  Austrian  brigade  from  Sad- 
owa  uncovered  the  flanks  of  the  advanced  posts,  and  com- 
pelled the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  successively  from  Doha- 
litz,  Dohalica,  and  Mokrowous;  and  it  might  seem,  at  first,  that 
the  abandonment  of  Nechanitz  might  have  been  caused  in  a 


Comments  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle.  95 

similar  manner;  but  such  is  not  the  case.  The  heights  in 
rear  of  that  village,  and  between  it  and  Hradek,  should  have 
been  held  by  two  corps,  from  which  a  strong  detachment 
should  have  been  placed  in  Nechanitz.  This  detachment 
could  easily  have  been  reinforced  as  occasion  demanded.  Any 
attempt  to  make  a  flank  attack  upon  the  village,  from  the 
direction  of  Popowitz,  would  have  been  made  over  unfavora- 
ble ground,  and  the  attacking  force  could  have  been  assailed 
in  flauk  by  Austrian  troops  from  the  heights.  Attempts  to 
cross  at  Kuncitz  or  Boharna  could  have  been  promptly  met 
and  repulsed;  and  attempts  to  cross  further  down  would  have 
extended  the  Prussian  front  to  such  a  degree  as  to  expose  it 
to  a  dangerous  counter-attack  through  Nechanitz.  This  occu- 
pation of  Nechanitz  would,  it  is  true,  have  thrust  the  Aus- 
trian left  flank  forward,  towards  the  enemy;  but  that  flank 
would  have  been  strong  in  numbers  and  position;  it  would 
have  been  covered  by  the  Bistritz  (where  that  stream  is  swol- 
len into  a  true  obstacle);  and  it  would  have  occupied  a  position 
commanding  Nechanitz  and  Kuncitz,  and  within  easy  reinforc- 
ing distance  of  each.  Nechanitz  would  have  been  to  Bene- 
dek's  left  what  Hougomont  was  to  Wellington's  right;  and  in 
the  event  of  Austrian  success,  it  would  have  given  the  same 
enveloping  front  that  the  British  had  at  Waterloo.  The  neg- 
lect of  Benedek  to  hold  Nechanitz  in  force  is  surprising;  for 
the  position  of  his  reserves  indicates  that  he  expected  an  attack 
upon  his  left — a  not  unsound  calculation,  as  his  main  line  of 
retreat  lay  in  rear  of  his  left  wing. 

On  the  right  there  were  three  positions,  any  one  of  which 
might  have  been  so  occupied  as  to  check  the  attack  of  the 
Crown  Prince;  namely:  1.  The  line  Trotina-Horenowes; 
2.  The  line  Trotina-Sendrasitz-Maslowed;  3.  The  line  Loche- 


96  The  Cam jinitjn  of  Kiin ii/i/n'ilz. 

nitz-Nedelist-Chlum.  The  first  is  regarded  as  the  best  by  the 
Austrian  Staff.  The  third  is  the  one  actually  chosen  by  Bene- 
dek,  but  not  taken  up,  owing  to  a  misunderstanding  of  orders. 
Without  undertaking  to  discuss  in  detail  the  dispositions  that 
should  have  been  made  by  the  Austrian  commander,  or  the 
relative  merits  of  the  three  defensive  positions  available  on 
the  right,  the  assertion  may  be  ventured  that,  in  order  to 
make  them  well  suited  to  the  ground  and  the  circumstances 
of  the  battle,  the  Austrian  dispositions  actually  made  needed 
only  to  be  modified  so  as  to  make  the  left  strong  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Nechanitz  and  the  heights  of  Hradek,  and  to  occupy 
anyone  of  the  three  defensive  positions  on  the  right  with  two 
corps,  with  another  corps  in  reserve  within  easy  supporting 
distance.  If  then,  profiting  by  American  experience,  Bene- 
dek  had  covered  his  position  with  hasty  intrenchments  (for 
the  construction  of  which  the  battle-field  afforded  every  facil- 
ity), he  should  have  been  able  to  repulse  the  combined  Prus- 
sian armies;  for  the  numerical  odds  against  him  were  not  great 
at  any  time;  his  reserves  would  have  been  in  a  position  to 
push  forward  promptly  to  any  point  seriously  endangered; 
and  his  intrenchments  would  have  fully  counterbalanced  the 
superior  firearms  of  the  Prussian  infantry.  Though  he  could 
not.  in  all  probability,  have  gained  a  decisive  victory,  he  could 
have  inflicted  greater  losses  than  he  received,  he  could  have 
given  his  adversaries  a  bloody  check,  and  the  mere  posses- 
sion of  a  hard-fought  field  would  have  raised  the  morale  of 
his  depressed  army. 

For  a  defensive  battle,  the  formation  on  a  salient  angle 
would,  in  this  case,  have  been  deprived  of  its  usual  objections. 
Considering  the  nature  of  the  country,  and  the  enormous 
armies  engaged,  it  is  plain  that  the  whole  force  of  the  assail- 


Coiiiinenb  on  (he  Campaujn  and  Baltic.  97 

aut  could  not  be  brought  to  bear  on  one  face  of  the  angle;  and 
the  heights  of  Chlum  would  have  served  as  a  huge  traverse  to 
protect  the  lines  from  enfilade  fire  by  the  enemy's  artillery." 

A  serious  defect  of  the  Austrian  position  was  its  want  of 
proper  extent.  As  we  have  seen,  the  entire  army  occupied  a 
position  only  six  and  three-quarters  miles  long.  Including 
the  reserves,  there  were,  then,  more  than  30,000  men  to  a 
mile.  The  entire  army  was  crowded,  and  the  cavalry  had  no 
room  for  action  until  the  retreat  began.  The  cavalry  should 
have  operated  acros.3  the  Bistritz  against  the  Prussian  right; 
or  (sacrificing  itself  if  necessary)  it  should  have  operated 
against  the  Prussian  left,  opposing  the  advance  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  and  gaining  time  for  the  infantry  to  take  up  the  new 
position. 

The  "spectacle  of  wildest  flight  and  utter  rout''  in  the 
passage  of  the  defeated  army  over  the  Elbe*  would  surely 
seem  to  support  the  views  of  Derrecagaix,  rather  than  those 
of  Hozier,  in  regard  to  a  position  with  a  river  at  its  back,  even 
though  the  river  be  spanned  by  many  bridges.  Yet  Benedek 
undoubtedly  derived  considerable  advantage  from  having  the 
Elbe  at  his  back;  for  the  Prussian  Staff  History  says:  "The 
Elbe  formed  a  considerable  barrier  to  any  further  immediate 
pursuit.  As  soon  as  the  bridges  over  the  river  were  once 
reached  by  the  enemy — to  whom,  moreover,  the  fortress  of 
Koniggratz,  which  commands  so  large  a  tract  of  the  surround- 
ing country,  afibrded  a  perfectly  secure  place  of  crossing — the 
pursuers  were  obliged  to  make  the  detour  by  way  of  Pardu- 
bitz  "     If  Benedek  had  encountered  only  a  front  attack,  and 

*See  page  86. 


98  'riw  Ctiinfj((i(jn  of  KiJitif/f/rdtz. 

had  been  defeated,  it  is  probable  that  the  Elbe  at  his  back 
would  have  been  advantageous  to  him  in  the  highest  degree; 
for  the  superb  behavior  of  his  artillery  and  cavalry  would  have 
effectually  covered  the  retreat  of  his  infantry  over  the  numer- 
ous bridges,  and  the  Elbe  would  have  played  the  same  part  in 
favor  of  the  Austrians  that  the  Mincio  did  after  Solferino. 
But  the  direction  of  the  Crown  Prince's  attack  destroyed  the 
value  of  the  bridges  noith  of  Koniggratz;  and,  but  for  the 
protection  afforded  by  the  fortress,  the  Elbe,  instead  of  being 
of  the  slightest  advantage,  would  have  completely  barred  the 
retreat  of  a  great  part  of  the  Austrian  army. 


Benedek's  selection  of  his  individual  position  for  watch- 
ing the  progress  of  the  battle  was  unfortunate.  From  his  sta- 
tion on  the  slope  between  Lipa  and  Chlum,  his  view  of  the 
field  was  limited  by  the  Swiep  Wald  on  the  north,  and  Prob- 
lus  on  the  south;  and  his  view  of  the  entire  northeastern  por- 
tion of  the  field  was  cut  off  by  the  hill  and  village  of  Chlum. 
The  hill  of  Chlum  was  his  proper  place,  and  the  church  tower 
in  that  hamlet  should  have  been  used  as  a  lookout  by  some 
officer  of  his  staff.  From  that  point  the  Horicka  Berg,  the 
heights  of  Horenowes,  the  Swiep  Wald,  the  village  and  wood 
of  Sadowa,  the  villages  on  the  Bistritz  (almost  as  far  as  Necha- 
nitz),  the  villages  of  lyangechof  and  Problus — in  brief,  every 
important  part  of  the  field— can  be  plainly  seen.  Had  this 
important  lookout  been  utilized,  Benedek  could  not  have  been 
taken  by  surprise  by  the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince.  Even 
the  rain,  mist,  and  low-hanging  smoke  could  not  have  wholly 
obscured  the  advance  of  the  Second  Army  from  view;  for  the 
Crown  Prince  was  able  to  trace  the  direction  of  the  contending 


Comments  on  Ihe  Campair/n  and  Battlr  1*9 

lines  from  the  heights  of  Choteborek,  a  point  much  farther 
from  the  scene  of  action  than  Maslowed  and  Horenowes  are 
from  Chlum.  Benedek's  neglect  to  make  use  of  the  church 
tower  of  Chlum  probably  had  not  a  little  to  do  with  the  extent 
of  his  defeat."'- 

Among  the  causes  of  Prussian  success  in  this  campaign, 
the  needle-gun  has  been  given  a  high  place  by  all  writers;  and 
Colonel  Home,  in  his  admirable  "Precis  of  Modern  Tactics," 
says:  "It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that  rapidity  of  fire  has 
twice  placed  Prussia  at  the  head  of  the  military  nations  of 
Europe — in  1749  and  1866."  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of 
the  breech-loader  in  this  campaign  has  probably  been  over- 
estimated. The  moral  and  physical  effects  of  the  needle-gun 
upon  the  Austrian  soldiers  were  tremendous,  and  were  felt 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  campaign.  All  other  things 
equal,  the  needle-gun  would  have  given  the  victory  to  the 
Prussians;  but  all  other  things  were  7/of  equal.  The  strategy 
and  tactics  of  the  Prussians  were  as  much  superior  to  those  of 
their  opponents  as  the  needle-gun  was  to  the  Austrian  muzzle- 
loader.  In  every  case,  the  Prussian  victory  was  due  to  greater 
numbers  or  better  tactics,  rather  than  to  superior  rapidity  of 
fire;  and  when  we  consider  the  tactical  features  of  each  en- 
gagement, it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  result  could  have  been 
different,  even  if  the  Prussians  had  been  no  better  armed  than 
their  adversaries.  The  needle-gun,  undoubtedly,  enabled  the 
Prussian  Guards  to  repulse  the  attacks  of  the  Austrian  reserves 
at  Chlum;  but  the  battle  had  already  gone  irretrievably  against 


♦Although  the  above  comment  coincides  in  its  main  features  with  the  criticism 
of  Hozier  on  the  same  subject,  it  is  based  upon  the  author's  own  observation  of  the 
views  of  the  field  afforded  from  the  church  tower  of  Chlum,  and  from  Benedek's  po- 
sition near  Lipa. 


100  The  < 'aiiipdif/n  of  Kirnlggriitz. 

the  Austrians,  and  if  they  had  driven  back  the  Guards,  the  1st 
and  Vth  Corps  would  have  quickly  recovered  the  lost  ground, 
and  the  result  would  have  been  the  same.  Derrecagaix,  too, 
over-estimates  the  influence  of  the  needle-gun  when  he  points, 
for  proof  of  its  value,  to  the  great  disparity  of  loss  between  the 
Prussians  and  Austrians  at  Koniggratz.  The  same  enormous 
disproportion  of  loss  existed  in  favor  of  the  Germans  at  Sedan, 
though  the  needle-gun  was  notoriously  inferior  to  the  Cliasse- 
pot.  This  inequality  of  loss  is  to  be  attributed  mainly  to  the 
superior  strategical  and  tactical  movements  of  the  Prussians, 
by  which,  in  both  these  battles,  they  crowded  their  opponents 
into  a  limited  space,  and  crushed  them  with  a  concentric  fire. 
It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  moreover,  that  the  superiority  of 
the  needle-gun  over  the  muzzle-loader  did  not  arise  so  much 
from  the  greater  rapidity  of  fire  as  from  the  greater  rapidity 
and  security  of  loading.  Baron  Stoffel  says:  "On  the  29th 
of  June,  1866,  at  Koniginhof,  the  Prussians  had  a  sharp  action 
with  the  enemy.  After  the  action,  which  took  place  in  fields 
covered  with  high  corn.  Colonel  Kessel  went  over  the  ground, 
and,  to  his  astonishment,  found  five  or  six  Austrian  bodies  for 
every  dead  Prussian.  The  Austrians  killed  had  been  mostly 
hit  in  the  head.  His  [Kessel's]  men,  far  from  firing  fast,  had 
hardly  fired  as  many  rounds  as  the  enemy.  The  Austrian 
officers  who  were  made  prisoners  said  to  the  Prussians:  'Our 
men  are  demoralized,  not  by  the  rapidity  of  your  fire,  for  we 
could  find  some  means,  perhaps,  to  counterbalance  that,  but 
because  you  are  always  ready  to  fire.  This  morning  your 
men,  like  ours,  were  concealed  in  the  corn;  but,  in  this  posi- 
tion, yours  could,  without  being  seen,  load  their  rifles  easily 
and  rapidly;  ours,  on  the  other  hand,  were  compelled  to  stand 
up  and  show  themselves  when  they  loaded,  and  then  you  took 


Commenls  on  fhe  Ccunpahjn  and  Baltic.  101 

the  opportunity  of  firing  at  them.  Thus  we  had  the  greatest 
difficulty  in  getting  our  men  to  stand  up  at  all;  and  such  was 
their  terror  when  they  did  stand  up  to  load  that  their  hands 
trembled,  and  they  could  hardly  put  the  cartridge  into  the 
barrel.  Our  men  fear  the  advantage  the  quick  and  easy  load- 
ing of  the  needle-gun  gives  you;  it  is  this  that  demoralizes 
them.  In  action  they  feel  themselves  disarmed  the  greater 
part  of  the  time,  whereas  you  are  always  ready  to  fire.'"-'' 

As  to  rapidity  of  fire,  it  only  remains  to  add  that  in  the 
battle  of  Koniggratz  the  number  of  cartridges  fired  by  the 
infantry  averaged  scarcely  more  than  one  round  per  man. 
This,  however,  is  largely  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  during 
a  great  part  of  the  battle  the  Austrian  artillery  kept  most  of 
Frederick  Charles'  army  beyond  effective  infantry  fire,  as  well 
as  by  the  circumstance  that  a  large  part  of  the  Crown  Prince's 
army  did  not  fire  a  shot — the  Vth  Corps  not  coming  into  action 
at  all. 

The  needle-gun  was  of  inestimable  value  to  the  Prussians, 
but  it  was  by  no  means  the  principal  cause  of  their  triumph. 
The  great  cause  of  the  success  of  Prussia  was,  without  doubt, 
the  thorough  military  preparation  which  enabled  her  to  take 
the  field  while  her  adversaries  w^ere  yet  unprepared,  and  to 
begin  operations  the  minute  war  was  declared.  This,  com- 
bined with  the  able  strategy  of  Moltke,  enabled  the  Prussians 
to  seize  the  initiative;  to  throw  the  Austrians  everywhere 
upon  the  defensive;  and  to  strike  them  with  superior  num- 
bers at  every  move,  so  that  Benedek's  troops  were  demoral- 
ized before  the  decisive  battle  was  fought. 


■•"Military  Reports,"  translated  by  Colonel  Home,  R.E. 


102  The  Cainpaiijii  nf  Konigi/rdtz. 

Probably  nothing  contributed  so  much  to  the  success  of 
the  campaign  as  the  excellent  staff  of  the  Prussian  army. 
Holding  everything  thoroughly  in  hand,  Moltke  nevertheless 
found  it  necessary  to  issue  only  five  orders  in  the  course  of 
the  entire  campaign,  knowing  well  that  his  subordinates  could 
manage  all  details  without  his  interference.  The  curse  of 
"political  generals"  was  unknown  in  the  Prussian  army,  and 
though  in  some  cases  high  and  responsible  commands  were 
bestowed  upon  men  because  of  their  royal  blood,  the  princes 
selected  were  in  every  case  trained  and  educated  soldiers  who 
had  at  least  ability  enough  to  appreciate  and  defer  to  the  wis- 
dom of  their  accomplished  chiefs  of  staff. 

The  first  oider  issued  by  Moltke,  written  on  June  22d, 
directed  both  armies  to  advance  into  Bohemia  and  to  seek  to 
unite  in  the  vicinity  of  Gitschin.  The  other  orders  were 
issued  on  June  2{hh  and  30th  and  July  2d,  and  are  mentioned 
in  the  foregoing  text  under  the  given  dates.  The  order  issued 
on  the  night  of  June  2d  for  the  movement  of  the  Second 
Army  was  written  by  General  Blumenthal,  the  Crow^n  Prince's 
chief  of  staff,  and  consisted  merely  of  five  sentences  of  two 
lines  each.  The  four  corps  commanders  and  the  commander 
of  the  cavalry  division  arranged  all  the  necessary  details. 

With  educated  soldiers  in  command,  assisted  by  an  able 
staff  composed  of  officers  selected  solely  because  of  their  mili- 
tary merit,  such  brief  orders  and  simplicity  of  action  are 
possible. 

The  tactics  of  the  Prussians  can  be  best  described  in  the 
words  of  Derrecagaix: 

"In  advancing  to  the  attack,  the  Prussian  divisions  gen- 
erally adopted,  in  this  battle,  a  formation  in  three  groups:  the 


Commenls  on  Ihe  Campaign  and  Balllr.  103 

advance  guard,  the  center,  and  the  reserve.  In  the  7th  Divis- 
ion, for  instance,  the  advance  guard  consisted  of  four  battal- 
ions, four  squadrons,  one  battery,  and  one-half  company  of 
pioneers.  The  center,  or  main  bod)^,  was  composed  of  six 
battalions  and  one  battery.  In  the  reserve  there  were  one 
and  three- fourths  battalions,  two  batteries,  and  one  and  one- 
half  companies  of  pioneers. 

"These  dispositions  enabled  them  to  launch  against  the 
first  points  assailed  a  succession  of  attacks,  which  soon  gave 
a  great  numerical  superiority  to  the  assailants.  This  accounts 
for  the  rapidity  with  which  the  points  of  support  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Prussians.  Their  groups  gained  the  first  shelter 
by  defiling  behind  the  rising  ground,  and  when  a  point  was 
stubbornly  defended,  the  artillery  opened  fire  upon  it,  while 
the  infantry  sought  to  turn  it  by  pushing  forward  on  the 
flanks." 

On  this  point  Hamley  says:  "When  it  is  said  that  the 
Prussians  are  specially  alive  to  the  necessity  of  flank  attacks, 
it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  turning  of  the  enemy's  line 
alone  is  meant;  for  that  is  a  matter  for  the  direction  of  the 
commanding  general,  and  concerns  only  a  fraction  of  the 
troops  engaged.  The  common  application  lies  in  the  attack 
of  all  occupied  ground  which  is  wholly  or  in  part  disconnected 
from  the  general  line,  such  as  advanced  posts,  hamlets,  farm 
buildings,  woods,  or  parts  of  a  position  which  project  bastion- 
like, and  are  weakly  defended  in  flank." 

The  Prussians  seem,  in  almost  every  case,  to  have  advanced 
to  the  attack  in  company  columns,  supported  by  half-battalion 
columns,  or  even  by  battalions  formed  in  double  column  on 
the  center.  Though  the  columns  were  preceded  by  skirmish- 
ers, the    latter  seem   to   have  played  only  the  comparatively 


104  The  Campaign  of  Ki'niif/f/rdtz. 

unimportant  part  of  feeling  and  developing  the  enemy;  and 
the  present  system  by  which  a  battle  is  begun,  continued,  and 
ended,  by  a  constantly  reinforced  skirmish  line,  was  not  3'et 
dreamed  of.  It  is  remarkable  that,  after  witnessing  the 
destructive  effects  of  the  needle-gun  upon  their  adversaries, 
the  Prussians  should  have  retained  their  old  attack  formation, 
until,  four  years  later,  the  thickly  strewn  corpses  of  the  Prus- 
sian Guards  at  St.  Privat  gave  a  ghastly  warning  that  the  time 
had  come  for  a  change. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  tactical  features  of  the 
campaign  of  1 860  with  those  of  our  own  war.  The  necessity  of 
launching  upon  the  points  assailed  a  succession  of  attacks  was 
recognized  in  the  tactical  disposition  frequently  made,  during 
the  War  of  Secession,  in  which  the  assaulting  divisions  were 
drawn  up  in  three  lines  of  brigades,  at  distances  of  about  150 
yards,  the  leading  brigade  being  preceded  by  one,  or  sometimes 
two,  lines  of  skirmishers.*  The  skirmishers  being  reinforced 
by,  and  absorbed  in,  the  first  line,  the  latter,  if  checked,  being 
reinforced  and  pushed  forward  by  the  second,  and  the  third 
line  being  similarly  absorbed,  the  assaulting  force,  at  the  mo- 
ment of  collision,  generally  consisted  of  all  the  successive  lines 
merged  into  one  dense  line.  This  formation  was  the  out- 
growth of  costly  experience  in  attacking  in  column,  though 
the  attack  with  battalions  ployed  in  close  column  had  not 
altogether  disappeared  in  1864. f  In  comparison  with  the 
tactics  of  the  present  day,  the  attack  formation  used  in  the 
Civil  War  seems  far  from  perfect;  but  it  was  certainly  supe- 
rior to  the  Prussian  attack  formation  of  1866,  for  it  recognized 


*For  example,  the  formation  of  Sedgwick's  division  at  Antietam,  Meade's  at 
Fredericksburg,  Pickett's  at  Gettysburg,  and  Sheridan's  at  Chattanooga. 

fAttacks  in  heavj'  columns  were  made  by  the  Union  troops  at  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain and  Spottsylvania,  and  by  the  Confederates  at  Dallas  and  Atlanta. 


Comments  on  lite  Campaign  and  Batlh.  105 

the  hopelessness  of  attacks  iu  column,  and  provided  for  the  suc- 
cessive reinforcement  of  an  attacking  line.  General  Sherman, 
in  describing  the  tactics  in  use  in  his  campaign,  says:  "The 
men  generally  fought  in  strong  skirmish  lines,  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  shape  of  the  ground,  and  of  every  cover."  Dispo- 
sitions being,  of  course,  made  for  the  constant  reinforcement 
of  these  lines,  we  find  Sherman's  army  habitually  using  tactics 
embracing  the  essential  features  of  the  German  tactics  of  the 
present  day.-'' 

The  Austrian  infantry  tactics  possessed  the  double  attri- 
bute of  antiquity  and  imbecility.  Major  Adams,  of  the  Royal 
Military  and  Stafif  College,  says:  "Since  the  Italian  war, 
when  Napoleon  III.  declared  that  'arms  of  precision  were 
dangerous  only  at  a  distance,'  it  had  been  the  endeavor  of 
Austria  to  imitate  the  tactics  to  which  she  attributed  her  own 
defeat.  If  the  uniform  success  of  the  French  in  1859  had 
established  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Emperor's  theory,  how 
much  more  necessary  must  it  now  be  to  arrive  at  close  quar- 
ters, where  precision  was  accompanied  by  unusual  rapidity  of 
fire?  The  more  recent  experiences  of  the  American  war  would 
seem  indeed  to  have  excited  but  little  interest  in  Austria. 
Could  it  really  be  reasonably  expected  that  Austrian  soldiers 
should  effect  what  American  generals  had  long  discarded  as 
no  longer  to  be  attained?  The  advocacy  of  the  bayonet,  so 
loudly  proclaimed  in  Austrian  circles,  would  surely  have  elic- 
ited a  contemptuous  smile  from  the  veterans  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  During  three  years  of  war,  but  148  cases  of 
bayonet  wounds  were  treated  in  the  Northern  hospitals;  of 
these,  but  two-thirds  were  received  in  action,  and  six  only 
proved  eventually  fatal.     How,  then,  could  it  be  imagined  that 


•'See  Appendix,  Note  B. 


106  Tlic  ('(inipdijjn  of  Kdnif/fjratz. 

tactics  which  had  already  failed  a.g;ainst  the  common  rifle, 
*  *  *  should  now  prevail  against  the  Prussian  breech- 
loaders? The  manner  in  which  these  naked  Austrian  battal- 
ions were  ignorantly  flung  against  the  murderous  fire  of  the  en- 
emy soon  produced  results  which  every  novice  in  the  art  of  war 
will  readily  appreciate.  Even  under  cover,  the  dread  of  the 
Prussian  weapon  became  such  that,  as  the  enemy  approached, 
the  Austrian  infantry  either  broke  or  surrendered." 

*  *  * 
The  important  aid  that  the  Austrians  might  have  derived 
from  hasty  intrenchments  has  already  been  pointed  out.*  In 
not  one  single  instance  did  they  make  use  of  such  shelter- 
trenches  or  breastworks  as  were  habitually  used  by  the  Amer- 
ican armies,  though  the  theater  of  war  offered  the  best  ot 
opportunities  for  the  quick  construction  and  valuable  use  of 
such  works.  Such  attempts  at  the  construction  of  intrench- 
ments as  were  made  savor  more  of  the  days  of  Napoleon  than 
of  the  era  of  arms  of  precision.  But  the  Austrians  were  not 
alone  in  their  neglect  to  profit  by  American  experience  in  this 
respect.  It  was  not  until  Osman  Pasha  showed  on  European 
soil  the  value  of  hasty  intrenchments,  that  European  military 
men  generally  took  note  of  a  lesson  of  war  that  they  might 
have  learned  thirteen  )'ears  earlier.f 


*See  pages  55  and  96. 

fin  Clery's  "Minor  Tactics"  occurs  the  following  astonishing  passage  :  "The 
use  made  of  intrenchments  by  the  Turks  was  not  the  least  remarkable  feature  of 
the  war  of  1877.  Field  works,  as  aids  in  defense,  had  been  used  with  advantage  in 
previous  wars,  but  no  similar  instance  exists  of  an  impregnable  system  of  earth- 
works being  improvised  under  the  very  noses  of  the  enemy."  Gen.  Clery's  book  is  an 
evidence  of  his  intelligent  study  and  thorough  knowledge  of  European  military 
history  ;  yet  this  scholarly  British  soldier  seems  never  to  have  heard  of  Johnston's 
works  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  or  the  fortifications  constructed  at  Spottsylvania  and 
Petersburg. 


Conimeuls  on  Ike  Campaign  and  lUillJe.  107 

The  great  value  of  hasty  intrenchments,  and  the  immeas- 
urable superiority  of  fire-action  over  "cold  steel,"  were  not  the 
only  lessons  taught  by  our  war  which  were  unheeded  by  Aus- 
trian soldiers  steeped  in  conservatism  and  basking  serenely  in 
the  sunshine  of  their  own  military  traditions.  Their  use  of 
cavalry  showed  either  an  ignorance  of,  or  contempt  for,  the 
experience  of  the  American  armies;  but,  in  this  respect,  the 
Austrians  were  not  less  perspicacious  than  their  adversaries. 
The  campaign  produced  some  fine  examples  of  combats  be- 
tween opposing  forces  of  cavalry;  but  it  also  produced  many 
instances  in  which  the  Austrians  hurled, their  cavalry  against 
intact  infantry  armed  with  breech-loaders,  only  to  learn  from 
their  own  defeat  and  an  appalling  list  of  killed  and  wounded 
that  they  had  applied  the  tactics  of  a  past  age  to  the  conditions 
of  a  new  era.  Both  armies  seem  to  have  been  afraid  to  let 
their  cavalry  get  out  of  sight,  and  to  have  reserved  their 
mounted  troops  solely  for  use  on  the  field  of  battle.  If  they 
had  studied  the  great  raids  of  the  American  cavalry  leaders, 
they  would  have  learned  a  lesson  which  there  were  excellent 
opportunities  to  apply. 

It  would,  probably,  have  been  impossible  for  the  Austrian 
cavalry  to  cut  the  Prussian  communications  before  the  junc- 
tion of  the  invading  armies  was  eflfected.  A  cavalry  column 
attempting  to  move  around  the  left  of  Frederick  Charles  would 
almost  certainly  have  been  caught  between  the  First  Army 
and  the  impassable  Isergebirge,  and  captured  before  doing  any 
damage.  A  column  moving  around  the  Prussian  right,  into 
Saxony,  would  have  encountered  the  cavalry  division  of 
Miilbe's  reserve  corps,  to  say  nothing  of  the  infantry  and  artil- 
lery; and  the  movement  would,  doubtless,  have  come  to  naught. 
A  movement  against  the  communications  of  the  Crown  Prince 


108  The  Campaign  of  Konif/graiz. 

could  have  been  made  only  via  the  valley  of  the  Oder,  where 
it  could  have  been  effectually  opposed.     But  it  is  certain  that 
after  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  the  Austrians  had  it  in  their 
power  to  balk  the  advance  of  Moltke  by  operating  with  cav- 
alry against  his  communications.     In    this  case   the   raiders 
would  have  been  operating  in  their  own  country,  and  among 
a  friendly  population;  the  railways  could  have  been  cut  with- 
out difficulty,  and  the  cavalry  could  have  retreated  without 
serious  danger  of  being  intercepted.     The  effect  upon  the  in- 
vading army  does  not  admit  of  doubt.     We  have  seen   that, 
with   unobstructed   communications,  the  Prussian  army  was 
subjected  to  no  slight  distress,  after  the  battle  of  Miinchen- 
gratz,  for  want  of  rations.     Even  two  days  after  peace  had 
been  agreed  upon,  the  Austrian  garrison  of  Theresienstadt, 
ignorant  of  the  termination  of  the  war,  by  a  successful  sally 
destroyed  the  railway  bridge  near  Kralup.     The  line  of  com- 
munications of  the  Prussians  with  the  secondary  base  of  sup- 
plies at  Turnau  was  thus  broken;  and,  though  hostilities  were 
at  an  end,  the  invaders  were  subjected  to  much  inconvenience. 
It  is  easy  to  imagine  what  would  have  been  the  effect  upon  the 
Prussians  during  their  advance  to  the  Danube,  if  a  Stuart,  a 
Forrest,  or  a  Grierson  had  operated  against  the  railways  upon 
which  the  supply  of  the  invading  army  necessarily  depended. 
Nor  were  the  raiding  opportunities  altogether  on  the  side 
of  the  Austrians.     The  Prague-Olmiitz  line  of  railway,  of  the 
most  vital  importance  to  Benedek,  ran  parallel  to  the  Silesian 
frontier,   and   in  close  proximity  to  it.     This  line  of  railway 
should  have  been  a  tempting  object  to  a  raiding  column  of  cav- 
alry.    If  it  had  been  cut  at  any  point  near  Bomisch-Triibau, 
the  Austrian  army  would  have  been  in  sore  straits  for  supplies. 
Vigorous  and  determined  cavalry  raids  against  the  railroad 


Commenls  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle.  109 

between  Bomisch-Triibau  and  Olmiitz  would  surely  have 
been  productive  of  good  results,  even  if  the  road  had  not  been 
cut;  for  Benedek  was  extremely  solicitous  about  his  commu- 
nications in  this  part  of  the  theater  {as  is  shown  by  his  long 
detention  of  the  lid  Corps  in  this  region),  and  an  alert  and 
enterprising  raider  might  have  found  means  of  detaining  from 
the  main  Austrian  army  a  force  much  larger  than  his  own. 

But  neither  the  Austrian  nor  the  Prussian  cavalry  was  so 
armed  as  to  be  able  to  make  raiding  movements  with  much 
hope  of  success.  Cavalry  without  the  power  of  using  effect- 
ive fire-action  can  never  accomplish  anything  of  importance 
on  a  raid;  for  a  small  force  of  hostile  infantry  can  easily  thwart 
its  objects  The  dragoon  regiments  were  armed  with  the  car- 
bine, it  is  true,  but  they  seem  to  have  been  studiously  taught 
to  feel  a  contempt  for  its  use.  At  Tischnowitz  (on  the  advance 
from  Koniggratz  to  Briinn)  a  Prussian  advance  guard,  consist- 
ing of  dragoons,  kept  off  a  large  force  of  Austrian  cavalry  by 
means  of  carbine  fire,  until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  ena- 
bled the  dragoons  to  charge  with  the  saber.  According  to 
Hozier,  the  Austrian  cavalry  pulled  up  sharply,  "half  sur- 
prised, half  frightened,  to  find  that  a  carbine  could  be  of  any 
use,  except  to  make  noise  or  smoke,  in  the  hands  of  a  mounted 
man."  Yet  nothing  seems  to  have  been  learned  from  this 
incident,  and  it  was  not  until  a  brigade  of  German  cavalry, 
consisting  of  three  regiments,  was  stopped  at  the  village  of 
Vibray,  in  December,  1870,  by  a  bare  dozen  of  riflemen,  and 
the  Uhlans  were  everywhere  forced  to  retire  before  the  undis- 
ciplined Frayics-tireurs,  that  the  necessity  of  fire-action  on  the 
part  of  all  cavalry  was  forced  home  to  the  Germans.  Even 
3'et  the  strategical  value  of  the  American  cavalry  raids  seems 
to  be  under- estimated  by  European  military  critics,  who  appar- 


110  T}(r  ('tnii/xiif/u  of  Konlf/f/rulz. 

ently  regard  anything  like  extensive  fire-action  on  the  part 
of  cavalry  as  scarcely  short  of  military  heresy.  Von  der  Goltz 
says: 

"Much  has  been  spoken  in  modern  times  of  far-reaching 
excursions  of  great  masses  of  cavalry  in  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy,  which  go  beyond  the  object  of  intelligence,  and 
have  for  their  aim  the  destruction  of  railways,  telegraph  wires, 
bridges,  magazines,  and  depots.  The  American  War  of  Seces- 
sion made  us  familiar  with  many  such  'raids,'  on  which  the 
names  of  a  Stuart,  an  Ashby,  a  Morgan,  and  others,  attained 
great  renown.  But,  in  attempting  to  transfer  them  to  our 
theaters  of  war,  we  must  primarily  take  into  consideration 
the  different  nature,  civilization,  and  extent  of  most  European 
countries,  but  more  especially'  those  of  the  west.  Then,  re- 
gard must  be  paid  to  the  difiFerent  constitution  of  the  forces. 
If  a  squadron  of  horse,  improvised  by  a  partisan,  was  defeated 
in  such  an  enterprise,  or  if,  when  surrounded  by  the  enemy, 
it  broke  itself  up,  that  was  of  little  consequence.  It  was  only 
necessary  that  it  was  first  paid  for  by  some  successes.  Quite 
a  diflferent  impression  would  be  caused  by  the  annihilation  of 
one  of  our  cavalry  regiments,  that  by  history  and  tradition  is 
closely  bound  up  with  the  whole  army,  and  which,  when  once 
destroyed,  cannot  so  easily  rise  again  as  can  a  volunteer  asso- 
ciation of  adventurous  farmers'  sons. 

"The  thorough  organization  of  the  defensive  power  of 
civilized  nations  is  also  a  preventive  to  raids.  Even  when  the 
armies  have  already  marched  away,  squadrons  of  horse  can,  in 
thickly  populated  districts,  with  a  little  preparation,  be  suc- 
cessfully repulsed  by  levies.  The  French  Franc s-tireurs  in 
the  western  departments  attacked  our  cavalry,  as  soon  as  they 
saw  it  isolated." 


Comments  on  the  Catnpaif/n  and  Battle.  HI 

With  all  deference  to  the  great  military  writer  here 
quoted,  it  is  impossible  to  concede  that  he  has  grasped  the 
true  idea  of  cavalry  raids.  The  slight  esteem  in  which  he 
holds  "a  volunteer  association  of  adventurous  farmers'  sons" 
is  not  surprising,  for  Europeans  have  rarely  formed  a  just  idea 
of  American  volunteers,  and  the  effective  fire-action  of  the 
American  cavalry  seems  to  be  taken  by  foreign  critics  as  proof 
positive  that  those  troops  were  not  cava /ry, hut  merely  mounted 
infantry — a  view  not  shared  by  those  who  participated  in  the 
saber  charges  of  Merritt,  Custer,  and  Devin.  As  to  the  annihi- 
lation of  a  Prussian  cavalry  regiment,  there  should  be  no 
objection  to  the  annihilation  of  any  regiment,  however  rich 
it  may  be  in  glorious  history  and  tradition,  provided  that  the 
emergency  demands  it,  and  the  results  obtained  be  of  sufficient 
value  to  justify  the  sacrifice.  Bredow's  charge  at  Mars-la- 
Tour  was  deemed  well  worth  the  sacrifice  of  two  superb  cav- 
alry regiments;  yet  the  results  obtained  by  that  famous  charge 
certainly  were  not  greater  than  those  achieved  by  Van  Dorn 
in  the  capture  of  Holly  Springs.  The  former  is  siipposed  to 
have  stopped  a  dangerous  French  attack;  the  latter  is  known 
to  have  checked  a  Federal  campaign  at  its  outset.  Even  had 
Van  Dorn's  entire  force  been  captured  or  slain  (instead  of  es- 
caping without  loss)  the  result  would  have  justified  the  sacri- 
fice. Nor  is  the  danger  of  annihilation  great,  if  the  cavalry 
be  properly  armed  and  trained.  That  cavalry  untrained  in 
fire-action  can  be  successfully  repulsed  by  levies,  in  thickly 
populated  districts,  is  undoubtedl}'  true;  but  such  cavalry  as 
that  which,  under  Wilson,  dismounted  and  carried  intrench- 
ments  by  a  charge  on  foot,  would  hardly  be  stopped  by  such 
troops  as  Fraytcs-tireurs  or  any  other  hasty  levies  that  could  be 
raised  in  a  country  covered  with  villages.     Superior  mobility 


112  21ie  Campaign  nf  Koniggratz. 

should  enable  cavalry  to  avoid  large  forces  of  infantry,  and  it 
should  be  able  to  hold  its  own  against  any  equal  force  of 
opposing  cavalry  or  infantry.  The  objections  of  Von  der 
Goltz  and  Prince  Hohenlohe  to  raids  by  large  bodies  of  cavalry 
lose  their  force  if  we  consider  the  cavalry  so  armed  and  trained 
as  to  be  capable  of  effective  fire-action.  When  cavalry  is  so 
armed  and  organized  as  to  make  it  possible  for  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe to  state  that  a  cavalry  division  of  six  regiments  "could 
put  only  1400  carbines  into  the  firing  line,"  and  that  "in  a 
difficult  country  it  could  have  no  chance  against  even  a  bat- 
talion of  infantry  decently  well  posted,"  we  must  acknowledge 
that  a  respectable  raid  is  out  of  the  question. 

We  do  not  find,  in  1866,  the  cavalry  pushed  forward  as  a 
strategic  veil  covering  the  operations  of  the  army.  On  the 
contrary,  we  find  the  cavalry  divisions  kept  well  to  the  rear, 
and  the  divisional  cavalry  alone  entrusted  with  reconnaissance 
duty,  which  it  performed  in  anything  but  an  efficient  manner. 
At  Trautenau,  Bonin's  cavalry  does  not  seem  to  have  followed 
the  retreat  of  Mondl,  or  to  have  discovered  the  approach  of 
Gablentz.  If  it  was  of  any  use  whatever,  the  fact  is  not 
made  apparent  in  history.  At  Nachod,  Steinmetz's  cavalry 
did  better,  and  gave  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy;  but  generally,  throughout  the  campaign,  the  Prussian 
cavalry  did  not  play  a  part  of  much  importance  either  in  screen- 
ing or  reconnoitering.  It  profited  greatly  by  its  experience, 
however,  and  in  the  Franco  German  war  we  find  it  active, 
alert,  ubiquitous,  and  never  repeating  the  drowsy  blunder 
committed  when  it  allowed  Frederick  Charles  unwittingly  to 
bivouac  within  four  miles  and  a  half  of  Benedek's  entire  army, 
or  the  inertness  shown  when  it  permitted  the  Austrian  host 


Commeuls  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle.  113 

to  escape  from  all  touch,  sight,  or  hearing  for  three  days  after 
the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 

On  the  part  of  the  Austrians,  the  cavalry  was  even  more 
negligent  and  inefficient.  Outpost  and  reconnaissance  duties 
were  carelessly  performed;  and  Benedek  was  greatly  ham- 
pered by  a  want  of  timely  and  correct  information  of  the  ene- 
my's movements.  In  only  one  instance  does  the  Austrian  cav- 
alry seem  to  have  been  used  profitably;  namely,  in  covering  the 
retreat  of  the  defeated  army  at  Koniggratz.  In  the  words  of 
Hozier:  "Although  operations  had  been  conducted  in  its  own 
country,  where  every  information  concerning  the  Prussian 
movements  could  have  been  readily  obtained  from  the  inhab- 
itants, the  Austrian  cavaly  had  made  no  raids  against  the  flank 
or  rear  of  the  advancing  army,  had  cut  off  no  ammunition  or 
provision  trains,  had  broken  up  no  railway  communications 
behind  the  marching  columns,  had  destroyed  no  telegraph 
lines  between  the  front  and  the  base  of  supplies,  had  made  no 
sudden  or  night  attacks  against  the  outposts  so  as  to  make  the 
weary  infantry  stand  to  their  arms  and  lose  their  night's  rest, 
and,  instead  of  hovering  around  the  front  and  flanks  to  irritate 
and  annoy  the  pickets,  had  been  rarely  seen  or  fallen  in  with, 
except  when  it  had  been  marched  down  upon  and  beaten  up 
by  the  Prussian  advance  guards."  Surely  it  needed  all  the 
energy  and  valor  shown  in  the  last  hours  of  Koniggratz  to 
atone,  in  even  a  small  degree,  for  such  inefficiency. 

As  the  full  offensive  value  of  artillery  was  not  yet  un- 
derstood in  any  army,  it  is  not  surprising  to  notice  in  this 
campaign  the  utter  absence  of  the  tactics  which,  in  the  war 
with  France,  brought  the  German  guns  almost  up  to  the  skir. 


114  The  Campaif/n  of  Koiiif/firafz.. 

mish  line,  and  kept  them  actively  engaged  at  close  range  until 
the  end  of  the  battle.  It  is,  however,  amazing  to  observe  the 
slowness  and  general  inefficiency  of  the  Prussian  artillery  in 
every  action.  At  Trautenau,  though  there  were  96  guns 
belonging  to  Von  Bonin's  corps,  only  32  were  brought  into 
action,  while  42  remained  in  the  immediate  vicinity  without 
firing  a  shot.  The  remaining  22  guns  do  not  seem  to  have 
reached  the  field  at  all.  At  Soor  the  Austrians  brought  64 
guns  into  action;  but  of  the  72  guns  of  the  Prussians,  only  18 
were  brought  into  action  from  first  to  last.  At  Nachod,  Ska- 
litz,  and  Gitschin  it  is  the  same  story — plenty  of  Prussian 
artillery,  but  only  a  small  portion  of  the  guns  brought  into 
action,  and  these  without  appreciable  effect. 

Prince  Hohenlohe  says  that  in  the  entire  campaign  "the 
Prussian  artillery,  which  numbered  as  many  pieces  as  its  ad- 
versary, had  only  once  been  able  to  obtain  the  numerical 
superiority.  It  had,  on  all  occasions,  fought  against  forces 
two,  three,  or  even  four  times  superior  in  number."  At 
Koniggratz  the  Prussian  artillery  was  handled  with  surprising 
feebleness.  The  Crown  Prince  finally  succeeded  in  bringing 
to  bear  on  the  Austrian  right  a  force  of  artillery  superior  in 
numbers  to  that  opposed  to  him ;  but,  even  in  this  case,  his 
guns  accomplished  but  little.  As  to  the  artillery  of  Frederick 
Charles,  it  practically  accomplished  nothing  at  all;  and  it  was 
scarcely  of  more  use  on  the  Bistritz  than  it  would  have  been 
in  Berlin.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  battle,  the 
Austrians  had  everywhere  a  decided  superiority  of  artillery 
fire,  except  only  in  the  one  case  on  their  right. 

The  Prussian  Staff  History  says,  in  regard  to  the  engage- 
ment south  of  the  Sadowa  wood:  "A  want  of  unity  in  the 
direction  of  the  artillery  was  painfully  evident  on  this  part  of 


Comments  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle.  115 

the  field.  Two  commandants  of  regiments  were  on  the  spot, 
but  the  eleven  batteries  then  present  belonged  to  five  differ- 
ent artillery  divisions,  some  of  them  to  the  divisional  artillery 
and  some  to  the  reserve.  This  accounts  for  the  want  of  unity 
of  action  at  this  spot ;  some  batteries  advanced  perfectly  isola- 
ted, while  others  retired  behind  the  Bistritz  at  the  same  time." 
To  fhis  Colonel  Home  adds:  "A  great  deal  of  this  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  guns  came  into  action  on  one  side  of  a 
small,  muddy  stream,  over  which  there  w^ere  very  few  bridges, 
and  across  which  bridges  might  have  been  thrown  with  ease, 
while  the  wagons  remained  on  the  other."*  It  may  be  further 
added,  that  the  Prussian  artillery  seems  to  have  been  unduly 
afraid  of  encountering  infantry  fire,  and  to  have  had  a  bad 
habit  of  withdrawing  to  refit  and  to  renew  its  ammunition.  It 
is  said  of  the  Prussian  artillery,  that  "they  planted  themselves 
here  and  there  among  the  reserves,  and  never  found  places 
anywhere  to  engage. "t  On  the  march  the  artillery  was  kept 
too  far  to  the  rear,  and,  owing  to  its  inefficient  action,  the 
infantry,  long  before  the  close  of  the  campaign,  generally 
showed  a  disposition  to  despise  its  help,  and  to  hurry  into 
action  without  it,  crowding  the  roads,  and  refusing  to  let  the 
guns  pass.  Much  had  been  expected  of  their  artillery  by  the 
Prussians,  and  its  feeble  action  was  a  severe  disappointment 
to  them.  Its  inefl&ciency  was  largely  due  to  its  defective  organ- 
ization, the  army  artillery  reserve  proving  utterly  useless,  and 
never  coming  into  action  at  all.  This  campaign  was  the  last 
in  which  a  German  army  was  encumbered  with  an  artillery 
reserve,  all  the  guns  being  henceforth  assigned  as  corps  or 
divisional  artillery.     It  is  to  the  glory  of  the  Prussians   that 


""Precis  of  Modern  Tactics." 
fMay's  "Tactical  Retrospect." 


116  The  Cnmpnifjii  nf  Klinififinil:. 

they  were  quick  to  fathom  the  causes  of  the  inefficiency  of 
their  artillery,  and  that  they  were  able,  in  four  years,  to 
replace  the  impotence  of  Kouiggriitz  with  the  annihilating 
"circle  of  fire"  of  Sedan. 

The  Austrians  far  surpassed  the'r  adversaries  in  the  skill 
and  effectiveness  with  which  they  used  their  artillery.  The 
superiority  of  the  French  artillery  had  largely  contributed  to 
the  Austrian  disasters  in  Italy  seven  years  before,  and  the  les- 
son had  not  been  forgotten.  From  the  beginning  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1866,  the  Austrian  artillery  was  an  important  factor 
in  every  engagement,  and  at  Koniggratz  it  was  handled 
superbly.  But,  in  every  case,  it  was  used  defensively,  and  the 
Austrian  artillerists  originated  no  new  tactical  features,  and 
taught  no  lessons  that  could  not  have  been  learned  from 
Gettysburg,  Malvern  Hill,  Solferino,  or  even  Wagram.  The 
rocket  batteries  were  useless,  and  with  the  battle  of  Konig- 
gratz they  passed  from  the  stage  of  war  forever. 

The  concentration  of  the  Prussian  armies  preparatory  to 
hostilities  was  made  partly  by  marching,  and  partl}^  by  rail- 
road transportation.  The  work  accomplished  by  the  railroads 
may,  perhaps,  be  best  expressed  in  the  words  of  the  Prussian 
Stafif  History:  "The  whole  of  the  marches  and  of  the  railway 
movements  were  so  arranged  by  the  General  Staff,  in  harmony 
with  the  railway  department,  that  in  their  execution,  in  which 
both  the  military  and  civil  powers  were  concerned,  no  imped- 
iments or  delays  could  occur.  The  result  of  these  arrange- 
ments was,  that  in  the  twenty-one  days  allowed,  197,000  men, 
55,000  horses,  aud  5300  wagons  were  transported  for  distances 
varying  between  120  and  300  miles,  without  any  failure,  and 
in  such  a   manner  that  they  attained  the   required   spots  at 


Comments  on  the  Campaigii  and  Battle.  117 

the  very  hour  requisite."  Prussia  was  thus  enabled,  in  the 
short  space  of  three  weeks,  to  place  325,000  men  on  the  hos- 
tile frontiers,  of  which  number  267,000  were  ready  for  opera- 
tions against  Austria.  Yet,  great  as  this  achievement  was,  it 
shows  that  the  Prussian  military  system  had  not  yet  reached 
the  perfection  shown  in  1870,  when  nineteen  days  sufficed  for 
the  mobilization  of  an  army  of  440,000  Germans  and  its  con- 
centration on  the  frontier  of  France. 

Further  than  in  the  matter  of  mobilization  and  concen- 
tration, the  use  of  railways  in  the  Austro-Prussian  War  pre- 
sented no  new  features.  In  the  matter  of  supplying  armies 
in  the  field,  the  small  area  of  the  theater  of  war,  and  the  inert- 
ness of  the  cavalry  were  such  that  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  make  a  comparison  of  the  use  of  railways  in  this  campaign 
with  the  use  of  the  same  means  of  transport  in  the  War  of 
Secession.  If  we  imagine  a  Prussian  army  pushing  entirely 
through  the  Austrian  Empire,  to  the  vicinity  of  Belgrade,  and 
dependent  for  its  supplies  on  a  single  line  of  railway,  back  to 
a  base  on  the  Prussian  frontier;  and  if  we  imagine,  moreover, 
that  the  Austrian  cavalry  possessed  vigilance,  enterprise,  good 
firearms,  and  modern  ideas,  instead  of  being  a  mere  military 
anachronism,  we  can  picture  a  parallel  to  Sherman's  Atlanta 
campaign. 

,',  *  ± 

In  regard  to  the  use  of  the  electric  telegraph  by  the  Prus- 
sians, Hamley  says:  "  The  telegraphic  communication  between 
the  two  Prussian  armies  invading  Bohemia  in  1866  was  not 
maintained  up  to  the  battle  of  Koniggratz:  had  it  been,  and 
had  the  situation  on^oth  sides  been  fully  appreciated,  their 
joint  attack  might  have  been  so  timed  as  to  obviate  the  risk  of 
separate   defeat  which  the  premature  onset  of  Prince  Freder- 


118  2'he  Campaign  of  K'oii'KjijriUz. 

ick  Charles'  army  entailed."  Yet  Hozier  describes  in  glowing 
terms  the  equipment  of  Frederick  Charles'  telegraph  train, 
and  speaks  with  somewhat  amusing  admiration  of  the  feat  of 
placing  the  Prince's  headquarters,  at  the  castle  of  Grafenstein, 
in  direct  telegraphic  communication  with  Berlin,  though  the 
castle  was  five  miles  from  the  nearest  permanent  telegraph 
station.  With  each  of  the  Prussian  armies  was  a  telegraph 
train,  provided  with  the  wire  and  other  material  requisite  for 
the  construction  of  forty  miles  of  line.  Yet,  though  communi- 
cation was  opened  between  the  Crown  Prince  and  Frederick 
Charles  early  on  June  30th ;  though  there  were  three  Jays  in 
which  to  construct  a  telegraph  line;  though  the  headquarters 
at  Gitschin,  Kamenitz,  and  Koniginhof  could  have  been  put 
in  direct  communication  without  exhausting  much  more  than 
half  the  capacity  of  a  single  telegraph  train — the  Prussians 
neglected  even  to  preserve  telegraphic  communications  to  the 
rear  of  their  armies  (and  thus  with  each  other  via  Berlin),  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  staked  their  success  upon  the  safe  delivery 
of  a  message  carried  by  a  courier,  over  an  unknown  road,  on 
a  night  of  pitchy  darkness.  Here  again  a  valuable  lesson 
might  have  been  learned  from  the  Americans."^ 

Though  the  War  of  Secession  was  begun  without  military 
preparation  on  either  side,  an  1  though  its  earlier  operations 
sometimes  presented  features  that  would  have  been  ludicrous 
but  for  the  earnestness  and  valor  displayed  and  the  mournful 
loss  of  life  which  resulted,  our  armies  and  generals  grew  in  pro- 
ficiency as  the  war  continued;  and  before  the  close  of  the  con- 


*For  a  description  of  the  American  military  telegraph,  see  Grant's  Memoirs, 
Vol.  II.,  p.  205,  eiseg.  See  also  the  comments  on  the  military  telegraph  in  Sher- 
man's Memoirs,  Vol.  II.,  p.  398. 


Comments  on  the  Campaign  and  Battle.  119 

flict  the  art  of  war  had  reached  a  higher  development  in  America 
than  it  attained  in  Europe  in  1866,  and,  in  some  respects, 
higher  than  it  reached  in  1870. 

Notwithstanding  the  excellent  organization,  the  superior 
arms  and  thorough  preparation  of  the  Prussian  armies;  not- 
withstanding the  genius  of  Moltke  and  the  intelligence  and 
energy  of  his  subordinates— the  prime  cause  of  Austrian  fail- 
ure is  found  in  the  neglect  of  the  Austrian  generals  to  Avatch 
the  development  of  the  art  of  war  on  our  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
Had  they  profited  by  our  experience,  their  infantry  on  one 
side  of  the  theater  of  operations  would  have  been  able,  behind 
intrenchments,  to  contain  many  more  than  their  own  numbers 
of  the  Prussians;  and  Benedek,  profiting  by  his  interior  lines, 
could  then  have  thrown  superior  numbers  against  the  other 
armies  of  his  adversary.  Opposing  the  Prussian  columns  with 
heavy  skirmish  lines  constantly  reinforced  from  the  rear,  the 
men  of  the  firing  line  availing  themselves  of  the  cover  afforded 
by  the  ground,  he  would  have  neutralized,  by  better  tactics, 
the  superior  arms  of  his  opponent.  His  cavalry,  instead  of 
using  the  tactics  of  a  by  gone  age,  would  have  been  used,  in 
part,  in  cutting  the  Prussian  communications,  bringing  their 
advance  to  a  halt,  gaining  time  for  him,  when  time  was  of 
priceless  value,  and  enabling  him  to  seize  the  initiative. 

Possibly  the  war  might,  nevertheless,  have  resulted  in 
Prussian  success;  for  Moltke  always  displayed  a  power  to 
solve  quickly,  and  in  the  most  perfect  manner,  any  problem 
of  war  with  which  he  was  confronted,  while  Benedek  had 
only  the  half  development  of  a  general  possessing  tactical 
skill  without  strategical  ability.  But  the  great  Prussian  strat- 
egist would  have  failed  in  his  first  plan  of  campaign,  and  he 
could  have  been   successful  only  when,  like  his  opponent,  he 


120  The  Campaign  of  Klinim/ralz. 

availed  himself  of  the  new  developments  in  warfare  illustrated 
by  the  American  campaigns.  The  Seven  Weeks'  War  would 
have  been  at  least  a  matter  of  months;  Austria  would  not 
have  been  struck  down  at  a  single  blow;  other  nations  might 
have  been  drawn  into  the  prolonged  conflict,  and  the  entire 
history  of  Europe  might  have  been  different. 


The  Prussian  Advance.  121 


Chapter  VII. 


THE  PRUSSIAN  ADVANCE  FROM  KONIGGRATZ  TO  THE 
DANUBE. 

The  day  after  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  was  occupied  by 
the  Prussians  iu  resting  their  fatigued  troops,  and  in  separat- 
ing the  mingled  corps  and  detachments  of  the  different  armies. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  the  first  movements  in  advance  began. 

The  fortresses  of  Josephstadt  and  Koniggratz  were  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians.  They  were  well  garrisoned, 
and  could  only  be  taken  by  siege.  Both  were  summoned  to 
surrender,  and  both  refused.  These  fortresses  were  of  the 
greatest  importance,  as  they  commanded  the  line  of  railway 
on  which  the  Prussians  depended  for  supplies,  and  controlled 
the  passage  of  the  Elbe  in  the  vicinity  of  the  battle-field.  Strong 
detachments  were,  therefore,  left  to  mask  the  fortresses,  and 
on  the  5th  of  July  the  Prussian  armies  marched  to  Pardubitz 
and  Przelautsch,  at  which  points  they  crossed  the  Elbe.  A 
division  of  Eandwehr  was  sent  to  Prague,  which  city  surren- 
dered, without  resistance,  on  the  8th  of  July.  The  Prussians 
were  thus  able  to  open  communications  with  the  rear  by  rail, 
via  Pardubitz,  Prague,  Turnau,  and  Reichenberg,  in  spite  of  the 
fortresses  of  Theresienstadt,  Koniggratz,  and  Josephstadt. 

After  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  all  touch  with  the  Austrians 
had  been  lost,  and  for  three  days  the  Prussians  were  com- 
pletely in  the  dark  as  to  the  direction  taken  by  the  retreating 
army.  On  July  6th  it  was  learned  that  Benedek,  with  the 
greater  portion  of  his  army,  had  retreated  upon  Olmiitz 

*See  Map  No.  11. 


122  77(6  Campaign  of  Konir/f/i-dlz. 

After  the  battle  two  lines  of  retreat  were  open  to  Benedek. 
It  was  desirable  to  retreat  upon  Vienna,  for  the  double  pur- 
pose of  protecting  the  city,  and  effecting  a  junction  with 
the  troops  withdrawn  from  Italy  for  the  defense  of  the  cap- 
ital. But  Vienna  was  135  miles  distant;  the  army  had  been 
heavily  defeated;  and  there  was  danger  that  a  retreat  of 
such  a  distance  would  degenerate  into  a  demoralized  rout. 
Olmiitz  was  only  half  as  far  away;  its  fortress  would  afford 
the  necessary  protection  for  reorganizing  and  resting  the 
army;  and  its  position  on  the  flank  of  the  Prussians  would  be 
a  serious  menace  to  their  communications,  in  case  of  their 
advance  on  Vienna.  Benedek,  therefore,  retreated  upon 
Olmiitz,  sending  the  Xth  Corps  by  rail  to  Vienna,  and  the 
greater  part  of  his  cavalry  by  ordinary  roads  to  the  same  point. 

The  situation  was  now  favorable  to  Moltke.  He  had  the 
advantage  of  interior  lines,  and  he  did  not  hesitate  to  make 
use  of  them.  Yet  the  problem  was  by  no  means  devoid  of 
difl&culties.  The  Austrian  army  at  Olmiitz  was  still  formida- 
ble in  numbers;  the  extent  of  its  demoralization  was  not 
known;  the  Austrian  troops  had  a  high  reputation  for  effi- 
ciency, and  for  a  capacity  to  present  an  undaunted  front  after 
a  defeat;  and  it  was  thought  possible  that  Benedek  might 
assume  the  offensive.  To  leave  such  a  formidable  army 
unopposed  on  his  flank  was  not  to  be  thought  of;  yet  it  was 
desirable  to  reach  Vienna  before  the  arrival  at  that  city  of  the 
troops  recalled  from  Italy,  or,  at  any  rate,  before  a  considera- 
ble army  could  be  concentrated  for  the  defense  of  the  capital. 
A  division  of  the  Prussian  forces  was,  therefore,  necessary. 
The  Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the  First  Army  were  directed  upon 
Vienna:  the  former  to  move  via  Iglau  and  Znaym;  the  latter 
via  Briinn.     The  Crown  Prince  was  directed  upon  Olmiitz  to 


The   Prussian,  Advance.  12'S 

watch  Benedek.  There  were  three  courses  open  to  the  Aus- 
trian commander:  1.  To  attack  the  flank  of  the  First  Army 
between  Olmiitz  and  Vienna.  2.  To  withdraw  rapidly  to  the 
capital.  3.  To  attack  the  Crown  Prince.  Each  of  these  con- 
tingencies had  been  carefully  considered  by  Moltke.  In  the 
first  case,  the  First  Army  would  be  supported  by  the  Army  of 
the  Elbe,  and  the  combined  forces  would  be  able  to  take  care 
of  themselves.  In  the  second  case,  the  Crown  Prince  was  to 
attack  the  retiring  army  and  harass  its  march.  In  the  third 
case,  the  Crown  Prince,  who,  though  inferior  in  numbers,  was 
superior  in  morale,  might  be  more  than  a  match  for  the  Aus- 
trians.  In  case  of  defeat,  however,  he  was  to  retreat  into  Silesia, 
where  he  would  have  the  support  of  the  Prussian  fortresses; 
while  Moltke,  freed  from  Benedek,  could  seize  the  Austrian 
capital  and  command  peace. 

On  July  7th  the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Armj^  recovered 
touch  with  the  Austrians,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing 
with  their  rear  guards. 

On  July  8th  the  Austrian  Government  made  overtures  for 
an  armistice  of  not  less  than  eight  weeks,  nor  more  than  three 
months;  as  a  condition  to  which  the  fortresses  of  Koniggratz 
and  Josephstadt  were  to  be  surrendered.  The  proposition 
was  rejected  by  the  Prussians,  who  continued  to  advance. 

On  the  8th  of  July  Benedek  was  relieved  from  the  chief 
command  of  the  Austrian  army,  being  superseded  by  Archduke 
Albrecht,  who  had  won  the  victory  of  Custozza  over  the  Ital- 
ians. The  former  retained  command,  however,  until  the 
arrival  of  his  army  on  the  Danube.  The  Austrians  were  now 
straining  every  nerve  to  assemble  an  army  at  Vienna.  Leav- 
ing only  one  corps  and  one  division  in  Italy,  the  Archduke's 


124  The  (Uiuipdign  of  Ki'ui i(/(/nilz. 

army  had  been  recalled  from  Veiietia,  and  was  proceeding,  by 
rail  and  by  forced  marches,  to  the  Danube. 

On  the  llth  of  July  Benedek's  army  was  ordered  to 
Vienna.  This  army,  after  a  continuous  retreat  of  eight  day.?' 
duration,  had  just  completed  its  concentration  at  Olmiitz;  but 
the  movement  to  Vienna  was  begun  without  delay,  the  I  lid 
■  Corps  being  sent  on  the  day  the  order  was  received.  The 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  Olmiitz  to  Vienna  was  not  au 
easy  operation.  The  raihvay  was,  as  yet,  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  Prussians;  but  the  aid  that  it  could  lend  was  not  great. 
It  was  estimated  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  entire  army  by  the 
single  line  of  railway  would  require  a  full  month.  Part  of  the 
troops  were,  accordingly,  hurried  on  by  rail,  and  the  l)ulk  of 
the  army  was  ordered  to  proceed  by  the  valley  of  the  March  lo 
Pressburg.  This  was  the  most  direct  route,  and  the  one 
which  offered  the  best  roads  for  marching,  though  by  taking 
this  line  the  Austrian  army  would  expose  a  flank  to  the  attack 
of  the  Prussians.  Above  all  things,  celerity  was  necessary,  in 
order  that  the  movement  might  be  completed  without  fatal  in- 
terruption. Benedek's  army  marched  in  three  echelons.  The 
first  composed  of  the  lid  and  IVth  Corps,  with  the  greater 
part  of  the  Saxon  cavalry,  started  on  the  14th  of  July.  The 
second,  consisting  of  the  Vlllth  and  1st  Corps,  left  the  next 
day;  and  the  third,  made  lip  of  the  Vlth  Corps  and  the  Sax- 
ons, followed  on  the  16th. 

The  Austrian  cavalry  presented  a  bold  front  to  the  Prus- 
sian armies  moving  on  Vienna,  and  a  sharp  action  was  fought 
at  Tischnowitz,  on  the  llth  of  July,  between  the  cavalry  of 
Frederick  Charles'  advance  guard  and  a  division  of  Austrian 
lancers,  resulting  in  the  defeat  of  the  latter.  On  the  12th 
Frederick  Charles  took  possession  of  Briinn  without  resist- 


The    Prussian  Advance.  125 

ance.     The  next  day,  after  some  skirmishing  with  the  Aus- 
trian cavalry,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  occupied  Znaym. 

After  a  rest  of  two  days,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the 
First  Army  continued  their  march  towards  the  Danube;  the 
former  l^eing  directed  towards  Krems,  the  latter  moving  via 
Nikolsburg. 

The  Austrian  troops  from  Italy  began  to  arrive  at  Vienna 
on  the  14ih  of  July.  In  the  meantime  the  Crown  Prince 
hearing  of  Benedek's  withdrawal  from  Olmiitz,  directed  his 
march  on  Prerau,  and  on  the  14th  reached  Prosuitz,  about 
twelve  miles  south  of  Olmiitz.  The  first  Austrian  echelon, 
marching  by  the  right  bank  of  the  March,  just  escaped  seri- 
ous collision  with  the  Crown  Prince,  the  cavalry  of  the  Second 
Army  skirmishing  with  the  Saxon  cavalry,  and  becoming 
engaged  wdth  a  battalion  of  infantry  on  the  flank  of  the  Aus- 
trian lid  Corps. 

On  the  following  day  Bonin,  wath  the  1st  Corps  and  Hart- 
mann's  cavalry  division,  attacked  the  second  echelon  of  Bene- 
dek's arm}',  and  defeated  it  in  the  actions  of  Tobitschau  and 
Rokienitz.  As  a  result  of  these  actions,  the  right  bank  of  the 
March  was  no  longer  available  for  the  Austrian  retreat.  Ben- 
edek  had,  however,  succeeded  in  slipping  away  from  the  Crown 
Prince,  though  at  the  expense  of  losing  his  best  and  most 
direct  road  to  Vienna. 

Learning  that  large  bodies  of  Austrians  had  been  seen 
moving  south  from  Olmiitz  for  some  days,  Moltke  saw  at  once 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  bar  Benedek's  path  with  the 
Second  Army,  and  immediately  ordered  the  First  Army  to 
Lundenburg.  The  railway  and  telegraph  at  Coding  were  cut 
by  a  detachment  of  Prussian  cavalry  on  the  15th,  and  Freder- 
ick Charles  occupied  Eundenburg  the  next  day. 


126  The  Caiit/)iii(/n  of  Kiminf/riUz. 

This  was  a  severe  blow  to  Benedek,  for  he  thus  lost  his 
railway  communication  with  Vienna,  his  march  by  the  valley 
of  the  March  was  headed  by  the  Prussians,  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  make  a  detour  by  crossing  the  Carpathian  mountains 
and  following  the  valley  of  the  Waag.  To  compensate,  as  far 
as  possible,  for  the  loss  of  the  shorter  road,  Benedek  hastened 
his  troops  by  forced  marches.  Moltke  did  not  deem  it  prudent 
to  send  the  Second  Army  after  Benedek  into  the  valley  of  the 
Waag,  as  communication  between  the  Crown  Prince  and  Fred- 
erick Charles  would  thus  be  lost,  and  it  was  now  desirable  to 
concentrate  rather  than  separate.  It  was  accordingly  deter- 
mined to  push  forward  with  all  available  troops  to  the  Danube. 
The  Crown  Prince  had  already  seen  the  impossibility  of  thwart- 
ing Benedek's  retreat,  and,  as  early  as  the  15th,  had  left  the 
1st  Corps  to  mask  Olmiitz,  had  directed  the  Vth  Corps  and  a 
cavalry  division  to  follow  on  the  flank  of  Benedek,  and  had 
pushed  forward  with  the  rest  of  his  army  upon  Briinn,  where 
he  arrived  on  the  17th.  On  the  same  day  the  Army  of  the  Elbe 
and  the  First  Army  were  in  the  neighborhood  of  Nikolsburg. 

On  the  19th  the  heads  of  the  Prussian  armies  were  within 
less  than  two  days'  march  of  the  Austrian  capital,  but  part 
of  the  Prussian  forces  were  as  far  back  as  Briinn.  Moltke 
did  not  know,  to  a  certainty,  how  much  of  Benedek's  army 
had  been  brought  back  from  Olmiitz  before  the  obstruction  of 
the  railway.  A  large  part  of  it  might  already  be  in  his  front; 
he  knew  that  large  bodies  of  troops  had  come  in  from  Italy; 
the  fortifications  of  Florisdorf  were  extensive;  and  it  seemed 
possible  that  the  Austrians  might,  by  a  last  great  effort,  have 
assembled  an  army  large  enough  to  enable  them  to  push  for- 
ward from  Florisdorf,  to  deliver  battle  on  the  March feld  for 
the  defense  of  their  capital.     With  the  double  object  of  pre- 


The   Prussian  Advance.  127 

paring  to  attack  and  being  in  readiness  to  receive  an  attack, 
Moltke  ordered  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  to  Wolkersdorf,  the  First 
Army  to  Wagram,  and  the  Second  Army  in  reserve  at  Schon- 
kirchen.  The  Prussian  army  was  thus  concentrated  behind 
the  Russbach,  in  position  to  meet  an  attack  of  150,000  Austri- 
ans  from  Florisdorf;  to  reconnoiter  and  attack  the  Florisdorf 
iutrenchments;  or  to  leave  a  corps  of  observation  in  front  of 
them  and  push  to  the  left  and  seize  Pressburg.  The  Second 
Army,  with  the  exception  of  the  Vth  Corps,  was  to  be  in  po- 
sition to  support  the  other  two  by  the  21st.  The  Vth  Corps 
was  to  be  hurried  up  as  rapidly  as  possible,  in  order  that  the 
entire  army  might  be  concentrated  for  a  decisive  battle. 

The  only  troops  of  Benedek's  army  which  had  reached 
Vienna  by  the  20th  were  the  Xth  and  Illd  Corps,  part  of  the 
Saxons,  and  four  cavalry  divisions,  numbering  in  all  from 
55,000  to  60,000  men.  The  reinforcements  from  Italy  which 
had  arrived  at  the  capital  numbered  about  50,000  men. 

Although  the  occupation  of  Pressburg  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  secure  the  prompt  junciion  of  the  divided  Aus- 
trian armies,  that  important  point  was  held  by  only  a  single 
brigade.  As  soon  as  the  Austrian  lid  Corps  had  reached 
Tyrnau,  its  leading  brigade  was  pushed  forward  rapidly,  in 
country  carts,  to  reinforce  the  brigade  at  Pressburg,  and  the 
rest  of  the  corps  hastened  towards  the  same  place  by  forced 
marches.  If  Pressburg  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussians, 
the  force  still  with  Benedek,  constituting  the  bulk  of  his  army, 
would  not  be  able  to  reach  Vienna,  and  form  a  junction  with 
the  Archduke  Albrecht,  except  by  making  a  long  detour  via 
Komorn,  and  would  probably  be  delayed  so  long  as  to  be 
helpless  to  prevent  the  capture  of  the  capital. 

On  the  21st  of  July  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the  First 


128  Till'  ( 'mil /Kiii/ii  iif  KniTKjiiri'itz. 

Army  were  in  position  behind  tlie  Russbach,  and  the  Second 
Army  was  drawing  near,  its  two  advanced  corps  being  not 
more  than  one  day's  march  distant.  Tlie  situation  of  the 
Austrians  was  critical.  Their  lid  Corps  had  not  yet  reached 
Pressburg,  and  that  all- important  point  was  still  held  by  only 
two  brigades.  The  1st,  Vlth,  and  Vlllth  Corps  and  a  division 
of  Saxonshad  gotten  no  farther  than  Neustadtl  andTrentschin, 
nearly  sixty  miles  from  Pressburg.  On  the  same  day  Fran- 
secky,  with  the  Prussian  IVth  Corps  and  a  cavalry  division, 
crossed  the  March,  in  the  vicinity  of  Marchegg,  advancing 
upon  Pressburg.  Everything  portended  to  the  Austrians  the 
loss  of  that  valuable  strategic  point,  and  the  consequent  cut- 
ting off  of  Benedek  from  Vienna.  The  Prussian  army,  num- 
bering, at  least,  184,000  men,  was  concentrated  and  opposed 
to  an  army  of  not  more  than  110,000  men,  at  most,  at  Vienna. 
The  capture  of  the  capital  seemed  certain;  and  Moltke,  with 
his  forces  augmented  to  200,000  men,  by  the  reinforcements 
that  were  pushing  on  to  join  him,  could  then  turn  upon  Bene- 
dek and  give  a  coiip  de  grace  to  the  last  remnant  of  Austria's 
military  power. 

At  this  junction,  however,  diplomacy  stepped  in,  and, 
through  the  mediation  of  France,  a  five  days'  armistice,  as  a 
preliminary  to  peace,  was  agreed  upon;  the  armistice  to  go 
into  effect  at  noon  on  the  22d  of  July. . 

On  the  22d  Fransecky  struck  the  two  Austrian  brigades 
at  Blumenau,  just  in  front  of  Pressburg.  While  everything 
was  going  in  favor  of  the  Prussians,  and  they  seemed  to  be 
not  only  on  the  point  of  defeating  the  Austrians,  but  of  cap- 
turing their  entire  force,  the  hour  of  noon  arrived;  the  armis- 
tice went  into  effect;  the  action  was,  with  difficulty,  broken 


The  Prussian  Advance.  I'iQ 

oflf,  and,  after  the  sudden  termination  of  the  battle,  both  armies 
bivouacked  on  the  field. 

The  preliminary  terms  of  peace  were  signed  at  Nikols- 
burg  on  the  26th  of  July,  and  definitely  ratified  at  Prague  on 
the  30th  of  August.  The  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Prussian  armies  were  issued  on  the  25th  of  August,  and  the 
Austrian  territory  was  entirely  evacuated  by  them  by  the  20th 
of  September. 

By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  Venetia  was  ceded 
to  Italy;  the  old  Germanic  confederation  was  dissolved; 
Schleswig-Holstein  became  the  property  of  Prussia;  Austria 
consented  to  the  formation  of  a  North  German  confederation, 
and  a  union  of  the  South  German  States,  from  both  of  which 
confederations  she  was  to  be  excluded;  and  the  defeated 
power  agreed  to  pay  40,000,000  Prussian  thalers  to  the 
victor.  From  this  sum,  however,  15,000,000  thalers  were 
deducted  as  the  price  of  the  Austrian  claims  to  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  and  5,000,000  thalers  for  the  free  maintenance  of  the 
Prussian  army  in  the  Austrian  provinces  from  the  preliminary 
truce  to  the  final  establishment  of  peace.  Peace  with  the 
German  allies  of  Austria  was  made  at  about  the  same  time. 
As  a  result  of  the  war,  Prussia  annexed  the  territories  of  Han- 
over, Hesse-Cassel,  Nassau,  and  the  free  city  of  Frankfort. 
The  population  of  the  victorious  kingdom  was  increased  by 
4,285,700  people;  and  its  area,  by  nearly  25,000  square  miles 
of  land. 


-9  - 


130  The  Campaign  of  Kiinii/iiriitz. 


ChapTKR  VIII. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN  WESTERN  GERMANY  AND  IN  ITALY* 
The  surrender  of  the  Hanoverian  army  at  Langensalza, 
on  June  29,  1866,  left  Falckenstein  free  to  operate  against  the 
armies  of  the  South  German  States.  His  army,  now  desig- 
nated "The  Army  of  the  Main,"  numbered  45,000  men  and 
in  guns. 

Opposed  to  him  were  the  Bavarian  Corps,  numbering 
40,000  men  and  136  guns,  and  the  Vlllth  Federal  Corps, 
numbering  46,000  men  and  134  guns.  The  former,  under  the 
command  of  Prince  Charles  of  Bavaria,  had  concentrated  at 
Schweinfurt;  the  latter,  under  the  command  of  Prince  Alex- 
ander of  Hesse,  at  Frankfort. 

Having  been  informed  that  the  Hanoverians  were  march- 
ing on  Fulda,  Prince  Charles  began  a  forward  movement,  to 
effect  a  junction  with  them  at  that  point;  but  receiving  later 
news  to  the  effect  that  the  occupation  of  Hesse-Cassel  had 
caused  the  Hanoverians  to  turn  off  towards  Miihlhausen,  and 
that  Prussian  forces  were  concentrating  at  Eisenach, he  decided 
to  direct  his  march  more  to  the  right,  so  as  to  be  able  to  oper- 
ate either  by  way  of  Fulda  or  the  Thuringian  Forest  {1  hilr- 
inger  Wald),  as  circumstances  might  decide.  The  march  of 
the  Bavarians  was  begun  on  June  22d;  but  much  was  wanting 
to  complete  their  organization  and  equipment,  and  their  prog- 
ress was  so  slow  that  on  the  26th  their  most  advanced  divis- 
ion had  only  reached  Neustadt,  on  the  Saale,  scarcely  twenty 
miles  from  Schweinfurt. 


*See  Map  No.  12. 


Western  German;/  and  Italy.  131 

A  prompt  union  of  the  separated  forces  of  the  Allies  was 
of  the  utmost  importance.  Yet  the  most  precious  time  was 
aimlessly  wasted,  and  it  was  not  until  June  26th  that  any  defi- 
nite steps  were  taken  towards  efifecting  a  junction  of  the  Bava- 
rians and  the  Vlllth  Corps.  On  that  day  Prince  Charles  and 
Prince  Alexander  held  a  conference,  at  which  it  was  decided 
to  move  forward  and  effect  the  junction  of  the  two  corps  at 
Hersfeld,  about  twenty-one  miles  north  of  Fulda.  They  over- 
looked the  important  fact  that  they  were  twice  as  far  away 
from  the  designated  point  as  the  Prussians  were. 

Nothing  but  the  most  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Allies  could  overcome  the  disadvantages  of  their  strategical 
situation.  Yet  Prince  Charles,  learning  that  negotiations  were 
being  conducted  between  the  Hanoverians  and  the  Prussians, 
delayed  his  march,  evidently  losing  confidence  in  the  sincerity 
of  his  allies,  and  fearing  that  a  surrender  of  the  Hanoverians 
might  leave  him  to  contend  alone  with  Falckenstein.  For 
three  days  the  Bavarians  remained  inactive;  then,  hearing  of 
the  battle  of  Langensalza,  Prince  Charles  advanced  towards 
Gotha.  On  June  30th  the  Bavarians  had  advanced  to  Meinin- 
gen,  Schleusingen,  and  Hildburghausen,  where  they  received 
news  of  the  surrender  of  the  Hanoverian  army.  The  Vlllth 
Corps,  in  the  meantime,  had  continued  its  march  towards 
Hersfeld. 

The  march  of  Prince  Charles  towards  Gotha  had  been 
utterly  fruitless.  He  had  not  only  failed  to  assist  the  Hano- 
verians, but  time  had  been  lost,  and  the  direction  of  his  march 
had  carried  him  away  from,  instead  of  towards,  the  Vlllth 
Corps.  The  latter  corps  was  now  at  Friedburg,  more  than  eighty 
miles  from  Meiningen,  and  the  problem  of  effecting  a  junction 
now  presented  many  difficulties.     The  union  of  the  two  corps 


132  The  Cani/Jdiijii  uf  h'diili/i/rdi:. 

could  have  been  easily  and  safely  effected  by  falling  back  to 
the  line  of  the  Main;  and  this  should  have  been  done,  though 
it  was  feared  that  a  retreat,  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign, 
and  before  the  enemy  had  been  seen,  might  have  <in  injurious 
effect  on  the  morale  of  the  troops.  To  effect  a  junction 
without  falling  back  would  necessitate  a  flank  march  of  more 
than  eighty  miles,  over  difficult  mountain  roads,  in  the  imme- 
diate front  of  the  enemy.  Such  a  hazardous  movement  should 
not  have  been  undertaken  except  as  a  last  resort. 

Nevertheless,  Prince  Charles  decided  to  form  line  at  Mein- 
ingen,  facing  Eisenach,  hoping  to  join  the  Vlllth  Corps  via 
Hilders-Fulda  and  Geisa-Hiinfeld,  and  requesting  Prince  Alex- 
ander to  draw  towards  him  wnth  all  available  forces,  partly  via 
Hanau-Fulda-Hiinfeld,  and  partly  by  rail  from  Frankfort  to 
Oemiinden,  and  thence  via  Haraelburg  to  Kissingen.  The 
commander  of  the  Vlllth  Corps  consented  to  move  on  Fulda, 
but  did  not  see  fit  to  send  a  force  via  Kissingen  to  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Schweinfurt,  evidently  for  the  military  reason  that 
he  did  not  wish  to  divide  his  force  while  executing  a  danger- 
ous movement,  and  for  the  political  reason  that  the  movement 
urged  by  Prince  Charles,  while  it  would  cover  Bavaria,  would 
expose  the  territories  of  the  contingents  which  composed  the 
Vlllth  Corps.  Prince  Charles  showed  a  disposition  to  ignore 
the  interes's  of  his  allies;  Prince  Alexander  exhibited  decided 
insubordination;  both  commanders  displayed  a  lack  of  military 
ability;  and  the  want  of  hearty  cooperation  between  the  two 
generals  already  portended  disaster  to  the  allied  cause. 

On  July  1st  the  Bavarians  concentrated  at  Meiningen,  and 
began  their  march  to  Fulda.  Prince  Alexander,  marching 
east,  occupied  Lauterbach  and  Alsfeld  on  July  3d.  His  force 
had  been  diminished  by  detachments  left  on  the  Lahn,  both  to 


Wcster7i  Germamj  and  Italy.  133 

cover  Frankfort  from  a  possible  attack  from  the  direction  of 
Cassel,  and  to  protect  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  army  march- 
ing towards  Fulda. 

On  Jul}- 3d  a  Bavarian  advance  guard  found  Dernibach  in 
possession  of  the  Prussians,  and  was  driven  back  with  some 
loss.  On  the  other  hand,  a  Prussian  detachment  was  driven 
out  of  Wiesenthal.  Falckenstein  had  advanced  from  Eise- 
nach on  July  1st,  and  he  was  now  in  the  immediate  front  of 
the  Bavarians;  Beyer's  division  in  and  around Geisa;  Goeben's 
division  at  Dermbach,  and  Manteuflfel's  division  following  in 
reserve. 

On  July  4th  one  of  Goeben's  brigades  struck  a  Bavarian 
division  at  Zella  (about  3  miles  south  of  Dermbach),  and  an 
indecisive  action  followed.  With  his  other  brigade,  Goeben 
attacked  another  Bavarian  division  at  Wiesenthal.  Encoun- 
tering considerable  resistance,  and  having  no  immediate  sup- 
ports at  hand,  Goeben  gave  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  his 
troops,  after  an  action  of  some  hours'  duration.  At  the  same 
time  the  Bavarians  retreated,  and  the  field  was  abandoned  by 
both  armies. 

During  this  time  the  other  Prussian  divisions  continued 
their  march  on  Fulda,  Beyer  reaching  Hiinfeld,  near  which 
place  his  advance  guard  had  a  remarkable  combat  with  the 
Bavarian  reserve  cavalry,  which  had  been  sent  from  Schwein- 
furt  towards  Vacha,  to  open  communications  with  the  Vlllth 
Corps.  The  Bavarian  advance  guard  consisted  of  two  regi- 
ments of  cuirassiers  and  a  detachment  of  horse  artillery.  On 
meeting  the  Prussians,  the  Bavarians  opened  on  them  with 
grape.  The  artillery  with  Beyer's  advance  guard  quickly 
came  into  action,  and  opened  fire  with  astonishing  results  • 
for  the  first  shot  from  the  Prussian  guns  sent  the  Bavarians. 


134  The  Campaign  of  Ki'migtiriUz. 

back  in  a  wild  panic,  the  confusion  being  rapidly  conveyed 
from  the  advance  guard  to  the  main  body,-  until  the  entire 
force  (consisting  of  three  brigades),  broke  into  a  headlong 
stampede.  Several  regiments  retreated  as  far  as  Briickenau 
and  Hammelburg,  and  many  troopers  did  not  draw  rein  until 
they  arrived  at  the  Main,  many  miles  from  the  scene  of  action. 
Several  days  elapsed  before  the  cavalry  could  be  rallied  at 
Briickenau.  In  this  case  the  Bavarians  could  neither  plead 
surprise  nor  heavy  loss.  They  saw  their  enemy  in  time  to 
open  fire  on  him  first;  and  their  total  loss  was  only  28  men. 
Only  a  few  shots,  from  two  guns,  were  fired  by  the  Prussians 
before  the  Bavarian  cavalry  had  scampered  beyond  reach  of 
harm. 

The  simultaneous  retreat  of  both  armies  from  Wiesenthal 
reminds  one  of  the  fiasco  at  Big  Bethel  in  1861 ;  and  had  the 
Bavarians  remained  on  the  field  at  Hiinfeld  long  enough  to 
dot  the  ground  thickly  with  dead  and  wounded,  their  action 
there  might  be  worthy  of  comparison  with  that  of  our  undis- 
ciplined levies  at  Bull  Run. 

After  the  combat  at  Wiesenthal,  Falckenstein  seems  to 
have  felt  considerable  anxiety;  for  the  next  day  he  withdrew 
Goeben  through  Dermbach,  recalled  Beyer  to  Geisa,  and 
brought  up  ManteuflFel  in  close  support.  This  concentration 
was  evidently  made  with  a  view  to  fighting  a  defensive  battle, 
but,  on  the  6th  of  July,  the  Prussians  discovered  that  they  had 
won  a  victory  on  the  4th,  the  Bavarians  being  in  retreat. 
Falckenstein  at  once  pushed  forward  towards  Fulda. 

After  the  actions  of  Zella  and  Wiesenthal,  Prince  Charles 
saw  that  the  intended  junction  of  the  separated  corps  at  Fulda 
could  not  be  made,  unless  he  could  open  the  road  by  defeating 
the  Prussians.     This  now  seemed  out  of  the  question;  and  he 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  135 

consequently  fell  back  on  Neustadt,  and  requested  Prince 
Alexander  to  open  communications  with  him  via  Briickenau 
and  Kissingen.  Prince  Alexander,  however,  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  over-anxious  either  to  comply  with  requests  or  to. 
obey  orders.  On  July  5th  he  had  advanced  to  within  seven 
miles  of  Fulda.  Hearing  of  the  Bavarian  reverses,  he  fell 
back  to  Schliichtern,  where  he  occupied  an  exceptionally  favor- 
able position  at  the  entrance  of  the  Kinzig  valley.  The  ground 
offered  every  facility  for  defense;  he  could  offer  a  stubborn 
resistance  to  the  advance  of  Falckenstein ;  his  line  of  retreat 
to  Frankfort  was  secure,  and  he  might  either  wait  for  the  Ba- 
varians to  join  him,  or  effect  a  junction  with  them  on  the  line 
Hammelburg-Gemiinden. 

While  at  Schliichtern,  Prince  Alexander  learned  of  the 
Austrian  defeat  at  Koniggratz;  and,  without  considering  his 
allies,  his  only  thought  seems  to  have  been  to  gain  the  line  of 
the  Main,  between  Hanau  and  Mayence,  where  he  might  pro- 
tect the  territories  of  Southwest  Germany.  How  far  he  was 
influenced  by  his  own  judgment,  and  how  far  by  the  Diet  at 
Frankfort,  is  not  known ;  but  he  abandoned  his  strong  position 
at  Schliichtern,  and  fell  back  to  Frankfort,  where  he  was  joined 
by  the  detachments  which  had  been  lefton  the  L,ahn.  Instead 
of  concentrating  to  oppose  the  Prussians,  the  Allies  thus  vol- 
untarily widened  the  gap  between  their  forces,  and  willfully 
invited  destruction. 

The  Prussians  entered  Fulda  on  the  7th  of  July,  and  rested 
there  one  day.  From  Fulda,  Falckenstein  directed  Goeben 
on  Briickenau,  and  sent  Beyer  out  on  the  Frankfort  road 
to  Schliichtern,  Manteuffel  occupying  Fulda.  The  movement 
to  Schliichtern  was  for  the  double  purpose  of  making  a  feint 
towards  Frankfort  and  gaining  a  separate  road  for  the  advance 


136  The  CanipdUjii  of  I\(>ni(/(initz. 

of  the  division.  From  Schliichtern,  Beyer  marched  direct  to 
the  suburbs  of  Briickenau.  Goeben  marched  through  and 
beyond  Briickenau,  and  Manteuffel,  following,  occupied  the 
town.  The  Army  of  the  Main  was  now  clo.sely  concentrated 
within  nine  miles  of  the  Bavarians,  who  were  extended  along 
the  Saale,  from  Neustadt  to  Hammelburg,  occupying  a  line 
22^  miles  long. 

On  July  lOth,  Falckenstein  directed  Beyer  on  Hammel- 
burg and  Goeben  on  Kissingen.  Manteufifel  was  ordered  to 
move  on  Waldaschach,  and  then  to  follow  Goeben.  The 
Bavarians  were  encountered  at  Hammelburg  and  Kissingen 
and  defeated  with  some  loss.  Minor  actions,  with  similar 
results,  were  fought  on  the  same  day  at  Friedrichshall,  Hausen, 
and  Waldaschach,  up  the  river  from  Kissingen.  The  Bavari- 
ans retreated  to  Schweinfurt  and  Wiirzburg,  and  the  passes  of 
the  Saale  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Prussians. 

All  military  principles  now  dictated  an  advance  against 
Schweinfurt,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  Bavarians  a  crushing 
defeat  and  disposing  of  them  altogether.  Such  a  move  would, 
doubtless,  have  been  made  by  Falckenstein,  had  not  political 
considerations  been  at  this  time  paramount.  The  Prussian 
victories  in  Austria  rendered  it  probable  that  peace  confer- 
ences would  soon  be  held;  and,  at  the  request  of  Bismarck, 
Falckenstein  was  notified  that  it  was  of  political  importance 
to  be  in  actual  possession  of  the  country  north  of  the  Main, 
as  negotiations  would  probably  soon  take  place  on  the  s^aiu 
quo  basis.  Falckenstein,  therefore,  decided  to  move  against 
the  Vlllth  Corps,  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  right  bank 
of  the  Main  entirely  of  the  hostile  forces. 

Prince  Alexander,  thoroughly  alarmed  at  the  condition  of 
affairs,  now  sought  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Bavarians  at 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  J  37 

Wiirzburg,  via  Aschaffenburg  and  Gemiindeu.  As  a  prelim- 
inary to  this  movement,  a  Hessian  brigade  was  sent  to  Aschaf- 
fenburg, to  secure  the  passage  of  the  Main  at  that  point  and 
to  reconnoiter  the  Prussians.  The  contemplated  movement 
was  hopeless  from  the  start,  unless  the  Bavarians  could  render 
assistance  by  advancing  to  Gemiinden;  and,  after  the  actions 
on  the  Saale,  they  were  not  in  a  condition  to  do  so.  As  it  was, 
Prince  Alexander  was  endeavoring  to  cross  the  difficult  moun- 
tain region  between  Aschaffenburg  and  Gemiinden,  in  the  face 
of  a  victorious  army,  superior  to  his  own  in  numbers  and 
morale,  to  effect  a  junction  with  an  ally  who  was  unable  to 
lend  him  a  helping  hand.  It  was  the  height  of  folly;  for  the 
junction  could  have  been  easily  and  safely  made  south  of  the 
Main.  True,  this  would  have  necessitated  the  sacrifice  of 
Frankfort;  but  defeat  north  of  the  Main  would  compel  the 
evacuation  of  the  city,  and  defeat  was  now  practically  invited. 
Turning  away  from  the  Bavarians,  Falckenstein  moved 
down  the  Main;  Goeben  in  advance,  followed  by  Manttuflfel, 
while  Beyer  moved,  by  way  of  the  Kinzig  valley,  on  Hanau. 
On  July  13th,  the  Hessian  brigade  was  defeated  by  Goeben  at 
Laufach,  and  fell  back  on  Aschaffenburg,  to  which  place  rein- 
forcements were  hurried  by  Prince  Alexander.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  the  Vlllth  Corps  was  defeated  by  Goeben  at  Aschaf- 
fenburg. The  brunt  of  the  battle  was  borne  by  an  Austrian 
brigade  attached  to  the  Federal  Corps,  but  few  troops  of  the 
Hessian  contingents  being  engaged,  and  the  Wiirtemberg  and 
Baden  troops  arriving  too  late.  Had  Prince  Alexander  con- 
centrated his  entire  force  at  Aschaffenburg,  the  result  might 
have  been  bad  for  the  Prussians,  for  their  march  was  so  unskill- 
fully  conducted  that  Goeben  was  without  support;  the  other 
detachments  of  Falckenstein's  army  being  more  than  thirty 


138  77/0  Cainpaif/ii  of  Kliniggrdtz. 

miles  in  rear.  The  Prussians  did  not  pursue  the  enemy,  l)ut 
contented  themselves  with  remaining  in  possession  of  the 
field. 

Prince  Alexander  was  now  convinced  of  the  impossibility 
of  effecting  a  junction  at  Wiirzburg  via  Aschaffenburg.  He 
accordingly  abandoned  the  line  ot  the  I^ower  Main  and  con- 
centrated his  force  at  Dieburg.  Frankfort  was  thus  left 
defenseless,  and  the  remnants  of  the  German  Diet  fled  to 
Augsburg.  Prince  Charles  now  proposed  a  junction  of  the 
Allies  in  the  vicinity  of  Wiirzburg,  the  Vlllth  Corps  to  move 
via  Miltenberg  and  Tauberbischofsheim,  and  the  concentra- 
tion to  be  effected  on  the  20th  of  July.  This  movement  neces- 
sitated a  march  of  some  ninety  miles  for  the  Vlllth  Corps, 
and  the  uncovering  of  Southwest  Germany,  while  the  Bavari- 
ans had  to  march  only  a  few  miles,  and  continued  to  cover 
their  own  territories;  but  the  imminent  danger  which  now 
threatened  the  Vlllth  Corps  caused  Prince  Alexander  to  for- 
get local  and  personal  jealousies,  and  strive  to  effect  the  junc- 
tion which  the  military  situation  imperatively  demanded. 

On  the  16th  of  July  the  Prussians  entered  Frankfort, 
where  they  remained  until  the  21st;  Goeben's  division  occu- 
pying the  city,  Beyer's  division  being  stationed  at  Hanau,  and 
Manteuffel's  division  holding  Aschaffenburg.  The  entire  re- 
gion north  of  the  Main  was  in  the  possession  of  the  Prussians, 
Frankfort  had  been  especially  antagonistic  to  Prussia,  and  it 
now  felt  the  full  force  of  the  severity  of  the  conquerors. 
Falckenstein  levied  a  contribution  of  $3,000,000  on  the  city, 
and  soon  followed  this  heavy  exaction  by  a  demand  for  a  sec- 
ond enormous  contribution  of  $10,000,000.  The  King  of 
Prussia,  however,  remitted  the  second  contribution  after  hear- 
ing the  appeal  and  protest  of  the  citizens. 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  139 

On  the  16th  of  July,  Falckeiistein  was  relieved  from  the 
•command  of  the  Army  of  the  Main,  and  appointed  military 
governor  of  Bohemia.  He  was  succeded  by  Manteuffel,  whose 
division  was  placed  under  command  of  Flies.  Reinforcements 
now  raised  the  Army  of  the  Main  to  a  strength  of  50,000  men 
and  121  guns. 

The  capture  of  Frankfort  and  the  possession  of  the  coun- 
try north  of  the  Main  had  been  obtained  at  the  sacrifice  of 
the  great  strategic  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  Prussians.  It 
was  no  longer  possible  to  prevent  the  concentration  of  the 
Vlllth  Corps  and  the  Bavarians,  and  on  the  22d  of  July  this 
junction  was  completed;  the  former  corps  holding  the  line  of 
the  Tauber,  and  the  latter  occupying  a  position  between  that 
river  and  Wiirzburg. 

Although  the  allied  forces  now  numbered  80,000  men  and 
286  guns,  Manteuffel  decided  to  move  against  them  from 
Frankfort.  The  advantage  of  the  Allies  was  in  numbers  alone; 
in  morale,  and  in  the  strategic  situation,  the  advantage  was 
with  the  Prussians.  Manteuffel  now  had  a  line  of  communi- 
cation through  Frankfort  and  Cassel.  Though  he  could  no 
longer  keep  the  Allies  asunder,  he  could,  by  marching  to  the 
Tauber,  compel  them  to  "form  front  to  a  flank,"  while  his  own 
front  securely  covered  his  communications.  His  communica- 
tions could  be  intercepted  only  by  a  movement  of  the  Allies 
north  of  the  Main,  which  would  reciprocally  expose  their 
own. 

The  Allies  had  hardly  effected  their  junction  when  a  want 
of  harmony  in  the  views  of  their  commanders  again  became 
evident.  An  offensive  movement  against  the  Prussians  was 
agreed  upon ;  but  Prince  Charles  wished  to  move  by  the  left 
bank  of  the  Main  on  Frankfort,  while  Prince  Alexander  pre- 


140  The  Campaign  of  h'dnii/i/nil-:. 

ferred  a  movemeiil  by  the  right  bank  on  Aschaffenburg.  The 
former  was,  doubtless,  the  better  move — at  all  events  it  was 
the  safer ;  for  the  Allies  would  have  covered  their  communica- 
tions better,  and  a  junction  might,  perhaps,  have  been  effected 
with  the  large  garrison  at  Mayence — but,  after  two  days  of 
discussion  and  deliberation,  the  latter  movement  was  agreed 
upon.  In  the  meantime,  while  the  Allies  were  deliberating,. 
Manteuffel  was  acting;  and  he  was  now  moving  rapidly 
towards  the  Tauber. 

On  July  23d  the  Prussians  touched  the  enemy.  A  slight 
and  indecisive  action  was  fought  by  a  Prussian  advance  guard 
with  the  Baden  division  at  Hundheim,  and  the  advanced  troops 
of  the  Vlllth  Corps  were  pressed  back  along  their  whole  line. 
While  the  Prussians  were  thus  closing  upon  the  Federal  Corps, 
the  Bavarians  began  the  contemplated  movement  by  the  right 
bank  of  the  Main ;  one  division  being  sent  by  rail  to  Gemiin- 
den,  another  to  lyohr  (on  the  right  bank,  farther  down),  and 
part  of  a  third  to  Wertheim.  Thus  the  junction  of  the  Allies, 
which  had  been  effected  with  such  difficulty,  was  voluntarily 
broken  at  the  very  moment  of  contact  with  the  enemy.  The 
line  of  the  allied  forces,  on  the  evening  of  July  28d,  was  thirty- 
six  miles  in  extent;  while  Manteuffel's  army  was  closely  con- 
centrated in  their  immediate  front.  Prince  Alexander,  finding 
himself  beyond  the  immediate  assistance  of  the  Bavarians, 
withdrew  all  his  detachments  behind  the  Tauber,  where  his 
corps  was  spread  over  a  space  seven  miles  in  breadth  and  nine 
in  depth,  in  a  country  full  of  deep  ravines,  which  rendered 
prompt  movements,  especially  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  quite 
out  of  the  question. 

On  the  24th,  Goeben  defeated  the  Wiirtembergers  at 
Tauberbischofsheim,    and    the    Baden    division    at    Werbach. 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  141 

The  retreat  of  the  Baden  troops  uncovered  Prince  Alexander's 
right  flank,  and  there  was  now  imminent  danger  of  the  Prus- 
sians again  pushing  in  and  separating  the  Vlllth  Corps  from 
the  Bavarians.  Prince  Alexander,  therefore,  fell  back  to  Gerchs- 
heim,  and  the  Bavarians  withdrew  to  Helmstadt.  Prince 
Charles  ordered  the  Vlllth  Corps  back  to  the  line  of  the 
Tauber,  though  the  Bavarians  could  render  no  immediate 
assistance.  Prince  Alexander,  doubtless  appreciating  the  folly 
■of  attempting,  without  reinforcements,  to  dislodge  the  victori- 
ous Prussians  from  a  position  which  he  had  been  unable  to 
hold  against  them,  seems  to  have  paid  no  attention  to  the  order, 
for  he  proceeded  at  once  to  concentrate  his  scattered  divisions 
at  Gerchsheim. 

On  July  25th  Goeben  formed  the  right  of  the  Prussian 
line,  Beyer  the  center,  and  Flies  the  left  Goeben  was  to 
attack  the  Vlllth  Corps  in  front,  while  Beyer  turned  its  right 
and  cut  it  off  from  Wiirzburg.  Flies  was  to  keep  his  division 
concentrated  on  the  left;  for  nothing  was  known  of  the  where- 
abouts of  the  Bavarians,  and  it  was  surmised  that  they  might 
"be  somewhere  in  that  direction. 

Beyer,  moving  against  the  Vlllth  Corps,  unexpectedly 
encountered  a  Bavarian  division  at  Helmstadt,  and  defeated  it, 
after  an  engagement  which  lasted  some  hours.  While  the 
Prussians  were  resting  on  the  field,  after  the  action,  a  second 
Bavarian  division  suddenly  appeared  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  in 
the  rear  of  Beyer's  left  wing.  So  completely  was  Beyer  without 
information  as  to  the  position  of  the  Bavarians,  that  he  was  in 
doubt  whether  these  troops  were  friend  or  foe.  The  Bavari- 
ans were  in  a  similar  quandary.  In  fact,  they  had  accidentally 
stumbled  upon  the  Prussians,  and  the  surprise  was  mutual. 
As  soon  as  he  discovered  that  he  was  in  the  presence  of  a 


142  The  Ciunpaign-  of  KlJniggrdlz. 

hostile  force,  Beyer  executed  a  change  of  front  to  the  left  and 
succeeded  in  gaining  another  victory. 

While  Beyer  was  engaged  with  the  Bavarians,  Goeben 
was  batting  with  the  Vlllth  Corps  at  Gerchsheini.  Prince 
Alexander  was  again  defeated,  and  driven  in  rout  on 
Wiirzburg. 

The  night  after  these  actions  Prince  Charles  held  a  coun- 
cil of  war,  and  finally  decided  to  attack  Flies,  who,  having  ad- 
vanced, was  now  on  the  Prussian  left.  Ivcarning,  however,  that 
his  own  left  had  been  uncovered  by  the  defeat  of  the  Vlllth 
Corps,  the  Bavarian  commander  resolved  to  stand  on  the 
defensive  on  the  plateau  of  Waldbiittelbrlinn  (in  rear  of  Ross- 
briinn*),  and  ordered  Prince  Alexander  to  take  up  a  position 
immediately  in  front  of  Wiirzburg,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 
army  across  the  Main,  should  such  a  movement  be  necessary. 

About  3  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  July  26th,  a  simulta- 
neous attempt  of  the  Bavarians  and  Flies  to  occupy  some  com- 
manding ground  which  lay  between  the  outposts  brought  on 
an  action  at  Rossbriinn.  While  Flies  was  engaged  with  the 
Bavarians,  Beyer  struck  them  heavily  on  the  flank,  and  by  10 
o'clock  they  were  in  full  retreat.  The  Prussians  did  not  at- 
tempt a  pursuit,  and  by  1  o'clock  p.  m.  Prince  Charles  had 
rallied  and  concentrated  his  corps  on  the  plateau  of  Waldbiit- 
telbriinn.  In  the  meantime  the  Vlllth  Corps  had  crossed 
the  Main. 

The  position  of  the  Bavarians  was  now  full  of  peril.  Their 
allies  had  been  defeated,  and  were  glad  to  place  a  river  between 
themselves  and  the  Prussians.  The  Bavarians  were,  conse- 
quently, alone  on  the  left  bank   of  the  Main ;  their  losses  had 


•Rossbriinn  is  not  marked  on  the  map.    It  is  about    7  miles   due  west  of 
Wiirzburg. 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  148 

been  considerable;  their  morale  was  shattered;  their  retreat 
across  the  defiles  of  the  Main  was  insecure;  and  a  defeat  in 
their  present  position  meant  absolute  ruin.  The  Prussian 
Official  History  says:  "A  renewed  attack  on  the  part  of  the 
Prussian  main  forces  would  necessarily  have  forced  it  (the 
Bavarian  Corps)  to  a  struggle  for  life  or  death.  The  political 
situation  of  affairs  showed  no  reason  for  bringing  on  so  des- 
perate a  combat.  The  only  object  henceforth  was  to  occupy 
as  much  territory  of  the  Allies  as  possible,  in  order  to  facilitate 
peace  negotiations  with  them,  and  maneuvering  against  the 
enemy's  left  flank  would  oblige  him  to  retreat  without  any 
hard  struggle."  This  apology  for  a  failure  to  complete  the 
defeat  of  a  shattered  and  unsupported  hostile  force  seems  some- 
what disingenuous.  A  complete  defeat  and  surrender  of  the 
Bavarians  would  have  been  quickly  followed  by  the  capture  or 
dispersion  of  the  Vlllth  Corps,  and  the  entire  South-German 
territory  would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  Prussians. 
Certainly  such  a  condition  of  affairs  would  have  "facilitated 
peace  negotiations"  by  rendering  further  resistance  hopeless. 
Moreover,  the  same  history  states  that  the  retreat  of  the  Vllltli 
Corps  behind  the  Main  was  not  known  at  the  Prussian  head- 
quarters; and  it  seems  probable  that  inefficient  performance  of 
outpost  and  reconnaissance  duties  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians, 
rather  than  any  considerations  of  politics  or  magnanimity, 
saved  the  Bavarians  from  destruction.  Late  in  the  day,  Prince 
Charles  withdrew  across  the  Main. 

On  July  27th  the  Prussians  moved  on  Wtirzburg.  Their 
artillery  exchanged  shots  with  the  citadel  of  Marienberg  (on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Main,  opposite  Wiirzburg),  and  succeeded 
in  setting  fire  to  the  arsenal,  but  withdrew  without  effecting 
anything  of  moment. 


144  The  Campaign  of  Koninqrlilz. 

The  contending  armies  now  faced  each  other;  each  in  an 
almost  impregnable  position.  The  situation  was,  however, 
altogether  in  favor  of  the  Prussians.  Their  communications 
were  secure,  while  the  communications  of  the  Allies  with 
Hesse,  Baden,  and  Wiirtemberg  were  intercepted,  and  those 
with  Bavaria  were  endangered,  by  the  position  of  the  Army  of 
the  Main.  Moreover,  the  Prussian  lid  Reserve  Corps  had 
moved  from  Saxony  via  Leipsic,  Plauen,  and  Hof,  and  was  now 
approaching  Baireuth.  In  the  language  of  thePrussianOfficial 
History:  "The  position  of  the  Bavarian  army  at  Wiirzburg  had 
now  become  untenable.  It  could  only  extricate  itself  from  its 
present  position  either  by  assuming  the  offensive  against  the 
Prussian  army — which  was  scarcely  possible  at  this  point — or 
by  a  retrograde  movement  up  the  Main,  so  as  to  face  the 
army  to  the  north  and  re  establish  its  base  on  the  Bavarian 
territory  in  its  rear." 

But  the  bitterness  of  extreme  defeat  was  not  pushed  home 
to  the  Allies;  for  on  July  28th  news  of  the  peace  preliminaries 
between  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  of  an  armistice  with  Bava- 
ria, was  received.  Though  the  truce  with  Bavaria  was  not  to 
go  into  effect  until  August  2d,  hostilities  were  suspended,  the 
only  movement  of  importance  being  the  occupation  of  Nurem- 
berg by  the  Prussian  lid  Reserve  Corps. 

Peace  was  concluded  on  August  13ih  with  Wiirtemberg, 
on  the  1 7th  with  Baden,  and  on  the  22d  with  Bavaria. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  contemplate  the  operations  of  the 
armies  in  Western  Germany,  in  1866,  with  au}^  feeling  of  ad- 
miration. In  the  strategical  operations  of  Falckenstein  and 
Manteuffel  are  found  the  only  redeeming  features  of  the  cam- 
paign. Falckenstein  especially,  in  pushing  in  between  the 
two  armies  of  the  Allies,  and  defeating  them  in  succession, 


Western  Germany  and  Italy.  145 

displayed   generalship    of  no  mean    order;    but  the  want  of 
harmony  between  the  allied  leaders  removed  every  obstacle 
from  the  path  of  Prussian  success.     The  Prussians  seem  to 
have  been  often  completely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  designs,  and 
even   in  regard   to  the  positions,  of  the  Allies.     We  find  the 
Army  of  the   Main  waiting,  in  a  defensive   position,  nearly 
two  days,  in  ignorance  of  its  own  victor}'  at  Wiesenthal.     We 
find  the  Prussians  winning  a  victory  at  Aschafienburg,  when 
their  own  unskillful  march  invited  a  defeat,  and  their  success 
was    due  solely  to  the  greater  blunders  of  their  opponents. 
Before,  and  even  during,  the  battle  of  Helmstadt,  the  Prussians 
seem  to  have  been  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  position  and 
movements  of  Prince  Charles,  and  Beyer's  escape  from  disas- 
ter when  surprised  by  the  Bavarians   was  due  solely  to  the 
fact  that  the  surprise  was  accidental  and  mutual      Advance 
guard,  outpost,  and  reconnaissance  duties  seem  to  have  been 
performed  with  the  grossest   ineflSciency.     In   almost    every 
action  the  Prussians  seem  to  have  been  unaware  of  the  extent 
of  their  victory,  or  to  have  shown  an  incapacity  to  organize  a 
pursuit.     Gneisenau  and  his  famous  order  to  "pursue  to  the 
last  breath  of  horse  and  man"  seem  to  have  been  forgotten  in 
the  Army  of  the  Main;  and  we  find  Prince  Charles,  after  the 
battle  of  Rossbriinn,  quietly  slipping  back,  without  molesta- 
tion, to  an  almost  impregnable  position,  when  a  simple  frontal 
attack  by  the  Prussians  would  have  completed  the  discomfit- 
ure and  insured  the  destruction  of  the  Bavarian  army. 

As  to  the  Allies,  every  adverse  criticism  that  can  be  made 
on  their  opponents  applies  to  them  in  a  still  higher  degree. 
Their  leaders  rarely  rose  to  the  level  of  respectable  medioc- 
rity. The  junction  of  the  allied  corps,  which  was  imperative 
from    the  first,  was   made  only   when  they  were  practically 


146  The  Cnmpairjn  nf  Kmiiqqrdtz. 

herded  together  by  the  movements  of  the  Prussians-  As  soon 
as  they  had  been  forced  into  the  long  desired  junction,  they 
voluntarily  undertook  an  ill-advised  movement  which  sepa- 
rated them  again,  at  the  very  moment  of  their  contact  with  the 
enemy.  Incapacity  and  jealousy  were  characteristics  of  both 
the  allied  commanders;  and  to  these  defects  Prince  Alexander 
added  the  greater  fault  of  insubordination.  It  would  be  hard 
to  find  among  the  improvised  "political  generals"  who  ap- 
peared on  the  stage  of  war  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  American 
conflict  a  single  one  who  possessed  in  a  greater  degree  than 
Prince  Charles  or  Prince  Alexander  a  genius  for  blundering — 
an  eminent  capacity  for  invariably  doing  the  wrong  thing.  It 
may  be  said  of  the  two  generals  of  the  allied  armies,  that  their 
operations  afford  a  fine  demonstration  of  the  principles  of  war 
by  the  method  of  rediicHo  ad  absurdmn. 

THE  OPERATIONS  IN  ITALY. 

Only  a  brief  mention  of  the  operations  in  Italy  is  here 
necessary.  On  the  night  of  the  23d  of  June,  1866,  the  Ital- 
ian army  crossed  the  Mincio,  and  encountered  the  Austrians 
at  Custozza  on  the  next  day.  The  Italian  army,  numbering 
about  120,000  men,  was  under  the  nominal  command  of  King 
Victor  Emmanuel,  the  real  commander  being  General  La 
Marmora.  The  Austrians,  numbering  about  72,000,  were 
commanded  by  Archduke  Albrecht.  The  battle  resulted  in 
the  defeat  of  the  Italians,  who  withdrew  across  the  Mincio. 
The  Austrian  commander  remained  on  the  defensive. 

Garibaldi,  with  about  6,000  volunteers,  invaded  the  Tyrol, 
but  was  defeated  in  two  small  actions.  Though  he  finally 
succeeded  in  gaining  a  foothold  on  Austrian  soil,  his  opera- 
tions were  of  no  importance. 


Western  (Icrnunuj  and   fhtlij.  147 

On  the  20th  of  July,  the  Austrian  fleet,  under  Tegethoff, 
defeated  the  Italian  fleet  in  the  great  naval  battle  of  Lissa, 
in  which  the  Italians  lost  three  iron-clads. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  Venetia  was 
offered  by  Austria  to  the  French  Emperor,  and  the  Vth  and 
IXth  Corps  were  recalled  to  the  Danube.  The  Italians,  under 
the  command  of  Cialdiiii,  again  advanced,  and  the  Austrians 
(now  numbering  scarcely  HO, 000)  fell  back  to  the  neighborhood 
of  Venice.  On  the  25th  of  July  all  military  operations  were 
stopped  by  the  conclusion  of  an  armistice. 

The  Italians  had  everywhere  suffered  defeat.  Yet  their 
alliance  was  of  the  utmost  advantage  to  Prussia;  for  they  neu- 
tralized three  army  cops,  which  would  have  been  of  priceless 
value  to  the  Austrians  in  Bohemia. 


148  The  Campaign  of  Knnu/griitz. 


APPENDIX. 


Note  A. 


The  Prussian  Staff  History  seems  .reluctant  to  give  full 
meed  of  praise  to  the  Austrian  cavalry  for  its  gallantry  in 
covering  the  retreat  of  the  defeated  army.  Yet  it  is  evident, 
even  from  the  Prussian  narrative,  that  the  Austrian  cavalry 
was  not  driven  back  in  a  single  instance,  until  after  it  had 
encountered  infantry  or  artillery,  or  both.  The  Staff  History 
acknowledges  that  in  one  of  the  cavalry  attacks  60  or  100  horse- 
men of  the  "Emperor  Alexander  Lancers"  in  the  course  of  the 
charge  dashed  past  Stresetitz  and  pushed  straight  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  King,  who  had  now  reached  a  position  about  400 
paces  to  the  northwest  of  that  village.  The  King's  personal 
escort  were  compelled  to  draw  .saber  in  defense  of  their  sover- 
eign, and  were  on  fhe  point  of  charging  the  hostile  horsemen, 
when  the  latter  came  under  the  fire  of  the  Both  Infantry,  which 
practically  annihilated  them,  but  few  of  the  troopers  escaping. 
The  rest  of  the  regiment  met  a  similar  fate,  and  w'as  so  badly 
mauled  by  the  infantry  and  artillery  fire  as  to  be  compelled  to 
retire  in  great  disorder.  The  history  of  the  charges  by  the 
other  bodies  of  Austrian  «avalry  in  covering  the  retreat  is 
essentially  the  same  as  that  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  Lan- 
cers— a  gallant  charge,  annihilating  losses  from  infantry  and 
artillery  fire,  and  a  retreat  in  confusion  and  disorder.  It  is 
evident,  however,  that  the  Prussian  cavalry  must,  in  every 
instance,  have  been   driven  back,  before  its  adversary  could 


Appendix.  14*.* 

encounter  the  infantry  fire;  and  it  is  equally  plain  that  the 
artillery  could  not  have  pounded  the  retreating  Austrian 
horsemen  with  its  fire  if  the  Prussian  cavalry  had  been  mingled 
with  them  in  vigorous  pursuit.  It  can  not  admit  of  doubt  that 
in  the  purely  cavalry  contests  the  honors  of  the  day  were  with 
the  horsemen  of  the  defeated  army;  and  the  Austrian  writers, 
in  fact,  claim  greater  achievements  for  their  cavalry  than  the 
Prussian  Stafi"  History  seems  willing  to  grant. 

Perhaps  the  best  authority  among  those  who  praise  the 
Imperial  cavalry  for  its  conduct  in  this  battle  is  Hoenig,  him- 
self a  Prussian  officer,  who  writes  with  a  rare  freedom  from 
national  prejudice.  In  his  work  entitled  "The  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion as  a  Body  in  the  Fight"  he  says:  "It  is  beyond  a  doubt 
that  this  cavalry  knew  the  fate  which  awaited  it,  .surrounded 
as  it  was  on  three  sides  by  the  fire  zone  of  breech-loaders.  It 
was  sure  to  be  defeated  at  last,  but  the  well-delivered  stroke 
had  a  tremendous  tactical  eflFect.  It  relieved  the  pressure  on 
the  retreating  army  and  saved  it  from  the  utter  rout  which 
would  undoubtedly  have  followed  if  the  Prussian  cavalry  had 
remained  master  of  the  field,  or  had  not  been  attacked  as  it 
was.  This  is  not  a  ca.se  for  flattering  national  sentiment,  but 
for  reviewing  the  events  calmly,  truthfully,  and  justly,  and 
anyone  who  considers  the  attacks  of  the  Austrian  cavalry  in 
this  way  will  unhesitatingly  conclude  that  it  carried  out  most 
successfully  one  of  the  most  difficult  tactical  duties  which  has 
ever  fallen  to  the  lot  of  cavalry.  Cramped  and  shut  in,  it 
attacked  the  Prussian  cavalry,  in  spite  of  a  ceaseless  flank  fire 
of  breech-loaders,  forced  its  way  right  up  to  the  infantry  line 
of  an  army  already  intoxicated  with  the  assurance  of  its  great 
victory,  and  brought  the  whole  Prussian  line  to  a  .standstill." 


150  The  Crnnptiif/ii  of  K'nniggrdtz. 

Note  B. 

The  following  remarks  of  Captain  F.  N.  Maude,  R.K.,  on 
"The  Tactics  of  the  American  War,"  are  interesting  as  show- 
ing an  able  English  military  critic's  appreciation  of  the  ad- 
vanced tactical  development  of  the  American  armies: 

"It  is  curious  to  note  how  little  attention  has  been  devoted 
to  the  study  of  the  fighting  of  this  most  bloody  of  modern 
wars;  and  yet  it  would  seem  that  the  records  of  these  cam- 
paigns fought  out  to  the  bitter  end  by  men  of  our  own  Anglo- 
Saxon  races,  would  be  a  far  more  likely  source  of  information, 
from  which  to  deduce  the  theory  of  an  attack  formation 
specially  designed  to  meet  our  needs,  than  the  histories  of 
struggles  between  French  and  Germans,  or  Russians  and 
Turks.  Von  Moltke  is  reported  to  have  said  that  'nothing  was 
to  be  learned  from  the  struggle  of  two  armed  mobs.'  If  that 
is  really  the  case,  which  we  venture  to  doubt  exceedingly,  the 
great  strategist  must  ere  this  have  been  sorry  he  ever  spoke, 
for,  armed  mobs  or  not,  both  Southern  and  Northern  troops 
bore,  and  bore  victoriously,  a  percentage  of  loss  before  which 
even  the  best  disciplined  troops  in  Germany,  the  Prussian 
Guard  Corps,  failed  to  make  headway.  It  is  of  no  relevance 
to  the  argument  to  say  that  the  breech-loader  was  not  then 
in  use.  When  a  man  is  hard  hit  himself,  or  sees  his  comrade 
rolled  over,  it  never  enters  his  head  to  consider  whether  the 
hit  was  scored  by  muzzle-loader  or  breech-loader;  the  fact 
itself,  that  he  or  the  other  man  is  down,  is  the  only  one  he 
concerns  himself  with,  and  when  the  percentage  of  hits  in  a 
given  time  rises  high  enough,  the  attack  collapses  equally,  no 
matter  against  what  weapon  it  may  be  delivered. 

"Actually,  though  the  armament  was  inferior,  the   per- 
centage of  hits  was  frequently  far  higher  than  in  breech-load- 


Appendix.  '  151 

ing  campaigns.  There  is  no  action  on  record  in  recent  years 
in  which  the  losses  rose  so  high,  and  in  so  short  a  time,  as  in 
the  American  fights." 

After  a  brief  description  of  Meagher's  attack  at  Freder- 
icksburg, and  Pickett's  charge  at  Gettysburg,  Captain  Maude 
continues: 

"  Surel3',  Moltke  never  spoke  of  such  gallant  soldiers  as 
an  armed  mob,  seeing  that  they  succeded  in  driving  an  attack 
home  against  four  times  the  percentage  of  loss  that  stopped 
the  Prussian  guard  at  St.  Privat.  And,  assuming  for  the  mo- 
ment that  the  saying  attributed  to  him  is  really  true,  we  can- 
not help  fancying  that  he  must  have  often  bitterly  regretted 
it  when  watching  his  own  men  in  the  maneuvers  of  late  years, 
attacking  in  what  is  really,  practically  the  sajne  formation 
which  the  armed  mobs  worked  out  for  themselves. 

"The  points  of  contrast  between  ourselves  and  the  Ameri- 
cans are  far  too  numerous  to  be  dismissed  without  comment. 
They  began  the  war  with  a  drill-book  and  system  modeled  on 
our  own,  and  they  carried  it  out  to  its  conclusion,  with  only  a 
few  modifications  of  detail,  but  none  of  principle.  The  nor- 
mal prescribed  idea  of  an  attack  appears  to  have  been  as  fol- 
lows: A  line  of  scouts,  thickened  to  skirmishers  according  to 
the  requirements  of  the  ground  ;  from  200  to  300  paces  in  rear, 
the  first  line  two  deep,  precisely  like  our  own,  then  in  rear  a 
second  line  and  reserve.  Of  course  their  lines  did  not  advance 
with  the  steady  precision  of  our  old  peninsular  battalions. 
Their  level  of  instruction  was  altogether  too  low,  and  besides, 
the  extent  of  fire-swept  ground  had  greatly  increased.  Eye- 
witnesses say  that  after  the  first  few  yards,  the  line  practically 
dissolved  itself  into  a  dense  line  of  skirmishers,  who  threw 
themselves  forward,  generally  at  a  run,  as  far  as  their  momen- 


152  The,  Campai(]7i,  of  Kiiniggrdtz. 

tuin  would  carry  them  ;  sometimes,  if  the  distance  was  short, 
carrying  the  position  at  the  first  rush,  but  more  generally  the 
heavy  losses  brought  them  to  a  halt  and  a  standing  fire  fight 
ensued.  They  knew  nothing  of  Scherff's  great  principle,  on 
which  the  Treffen  Abstdnde  or  distances  between  the  lines 
are  based,  but  they  generally  worked  it  out  in  practice  pretty 
successfully.  The  second  line  came  up  in  the  best  order  they 
could  and  carried  the  wreck  of  the  first  on  with  them  ;  if  they 
were  stopped,  the  reserve  did  the  same  for  them,  and  either 
broke  too,  or  succeeded. 

"  It  will  be  seen  that,  except  in  its  being  more  scientifically 
put  together,  this  German  attack  is,  practically,  precisely  sim- 
ilar to  that  employed  by  the  Americans,  with  the  sole  differ- 
ence that  the  breech-loader  has  conferred  on  the  assailants  the 
advantage  of  being  able  to  make  a  more  extended  use  of  their 
weapons,  and  has  reduced  to  a  certain  extent  the  disadvantage 
of  having  to  halt. 

"Had  we,  in  1871,  been  thoroughly  well  informed  as  to 
the  methods  employed  across  the  Atlantic,  we  should  have 
seen  at  once  that  the  new  weapons  did  not  necessarily  entail 
any  alteration  in  principle  in  our  drill  book,  and,  with  a  little 
alteration  in  detail,  have  attained  at  one  bound  to  a  point  of 
efficiency  not  reached  even  in  Germany  till  several  years  after 
the  war." 


DC  SOUTHI  m  HI  (.lONAl  I  H'^'^'^^  '  f '']' '.'L 


AA    000  908  540    8 


